Animal Rights

Summary: This case from Brazil concerns the elephant named "Ramba." Ramba is a former circus elephant who spent more than 30 years at circuses in Chile and Argentina. On October 18, 2019, she arrived at Santuário de Elefantes do Brasil (Brazil Elephants Sanctuary) after a 73 hour trip all the way from Chile. Before Ramba was transferred, Judge Leonísio Salles de Abreu Junior, from the 1st Civil Court at Chapada dos Guimarães, the region where the sanctuary is located in Mato Grosso , Brazil, made a ruling changing her status from a mere "good." The judge prohibited the local Government from charging the sanctuary R$ 50.000 (approximately US $ 13.00) in a tax on movement of goods finding that Ramba is not a thing, and is not a subject to importation good tax. According to an article at https://www.ambientesecom.net/2019/10/24/groundbreaking-decision-of-brazilian-judge-for-captive-elephant/?fbclid=IwAR3mccgbTaDJ7ZuqRLMYjbXx9SO_z-rw3MNzxKRFEFI31SN2_SToOaPrzrs, the judge said further, "Her position, far from being a commodity (as she was in the life of exploitation to what she was submitted to by her former owners), is now that of a guest, who seeks for a new destination on the margins of what human evil has already caused her."

Summary: This paper discusses the potential of a human rights framework to contribute to the growth and development of global animal law. Parts one and two of the essay take as their example the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and examine the major trends in the Court’s judgments and admissibility decisions that directly or indirectly concern the rights or welfare of animals. It is concluded that the Court is not indifferent to the welfare of animals, but that animal welfare is instrumentalised: it is understood not as a good in itself, but is instead valued for its implications for human welfare and rights. Part three of the essay then considers the obstacles that the anthropocentrism of the human rights idea and the instrumentalisation of animal concerns present to the use of human rights frameworks to further the development of global animal law, as well as the opportunities that exist in the meeting of these paradigms. It concludes that although the telos of human rights law is different from that of animal law, nevertheless there exist many overlapping concerns within which mutually beneficial interactions are possible.

Summary: The purpose of this analysis is to explore the influence of the concept of animal welfare on international biodiversity law. A close examination of the recent evolution of this branch of international law shows that animal welfare has an ambivalent place in biodiversity-related agreements. Indeed, while welfare is only a faint consideration in the development of international regimes dealing with biodiversity as a whole, the concept has become an essential element for agreements dealing with the conservation of specific endangered species. Despite its role in these agreements, the place of animal welfare in international biodiversity law highlights that this corpus of rules is currently insufficient to be an effective tool for the protection of wildlife welfare. The last section of this study suggests that the adoption of international rules aiming at ensuring the protection of wild animals’ welfare could serve the double purpose of strengthening the conservation purpose of biodiversity regimes while also filling the welfare gap of international biodiversity law.

Summary: This is a book review of the casebook "Animal Law."

Summary: New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act has been touted as a world first in great ape protection, and that may be true. However, it has also been depicted as an act conferring basic legal rights on great apes, and that is an exaggeration. Challenging the legal status of great apes in any jurisdiction requires sound, factual propositions. Therefore, the background and breadth of New Zealand's protections must be understood before proponents of change employ them as precedent. This essay offers a brief history of the non-human hominid provisions of New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act.

Summary: Despite the traditional view of animals as mere chattels, courts are increasingly viewing animals as more than "things," recognizing the intrinsic value of animal companions. With the help of organizations such as the Animal Legal Defense Fund, case law, local ordinances, and popular attitudes are changing, reflecting the understanding that animals have the capacity to live full mental and emotional lives. This essay tracks these changes, arguing that the time has come to recognize a different legal status for companion animals.

Summary: The concept of sustainability has evolved through a wide variety of definitions. Traditionally, sustainability was seen as a system of management which would allow humans to perpetually exploit the world's natural resources; that is, to manage resources so they would never be depleted. More recently, however, writers have argued the traditional concept of sustainability has failed because a truly sustainable system recognizes all resources and stakeholders for their inherent value. Equity is thus the essential ethic of a sustainable system. This article adopts this modern view of sustainability and identifies interspecies equity-the consideration of nonhuman animals based upon their inherent self-interests-as the embodiment and ultimate test of a truly sustainable system. By identifying the negative impacts of suppressing interspecies equity and citing examples of how to incorporate the sustainable ideal of interspecies equity, this article points the way toward a truly equity-based ethic of sustainability.

Summary: The rule that "animals are property," and do not merit legal rights, is ingrained in the law of English-speaking countries. Challenges to this rule must be brought in strategic, thoughtful, sensitive, sophisticated, and coordinated ways. This essay offers seven related strategic considerations for anyone who wishes to battle the "animals as property" rule.

Summary: Howard Lyman discusses a case that provides an example of using the law to force activists to use their scarce resources in court to defend the right of free speech.