Animal Rights

Summary: This is the unprecedented case of Estrellita, a woolly monkey, and the first animal with the status of subject of rights in Ecuador. Estrellita was illegally taken from her habitat as a baby and sold to a family that kept her as a pet for 18 years. The authorities became aware of Estrellita after an anonymous report stating that the Plaintiff was keeping a wild animal in their home. Estrellita was seized and relocated to a nearby zoo. The owner of Estrellita filed a habeas corpus requesting that Estrellita be returned to her, as she was a family member. Sadly, Estrellita died while under the care of the authorities. Despite the family's heartfelt plea, the court denied the habeas corpus, deciding that the best course of action was to keep Estrellita in the zoo - a decision that ultimately cost her life. The Constitutional Court decided to hear the case because it considered it had questions that needed to be answered. In a 7-2 court ruling, Ecuador's Constitutional Court held that animals are subjects of rights protected by the rights of nature. (In Ecuador, nature has been granted rights under the 2008 Constitution). The court found that both the Plaintiff and the authorities had violated Estrellita's rights to life and integrity by taking her from the wild and, in the government's case, by ignoring her needs when relocating her to the zoo. The court further held that the writ of habeas corpus could be appropriate in animal cases, depending on the circumstances. Another significant outcome of this decision is that the court instructed the Ministry of Environment and the Ombudsman to draft new legislation that materializes the parameters and criteria outlined in its decision. This legislation is essential in creating a legal framework to protect animals and ensure their rights are respected.

Summary: This is the case of Cuqui Brown, a sloth kept as a pet by a family in Ecuador. Cuqui Brown was seized by the authorities and transferred to a zoo. Plaintiff filed a Habeas Corpus against the Ministry of the Environment, alleging that Cuqui Brown was a family member, and requested that the court order the authorities to return Cuqui Brown to the plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff alleged that her rights and the rights of Cuqui were violated based on Estrellita's case that granted animals the status of subjects of rights. The court denied the Habeas Corpus, stating that the decision in Estrellita's case does not enable individuals to keep a wild animal or to request that a wild animal be returned to their possession. Instead, the Estrellita case recognizes the rights of wild animals based on aspects like their life, integrity, and their relationship with nature, not on the well-being or attachment of the person who removes them from their habitat to keep them as pets.

Summary: This excerpt is from Ecuador's General Procedural. It contains provisions concerning the representation of nature. These provisions state that any person may file a lawsuit claiming damages on behalf of nature. More specifically, under the articles in Chapter II, nature can be legally represented by any person, entity, collectivity, or by the ombudsperson, who may also act on their initiative. Article 30 establishes who can be a plaintiff and a defendant. Nature is within the definition of these parties.

Summary: Animal rights are commonly understood as an expression of the rights of nature. However, both are in open contradiction, due to the complex interactions of ecosystems and the place of fauna in them, poorly understood by the generators of animal law rules, because in those animal suffering is inherent. The rights of animals in Colombia are not an expression of the rights of nature, on the contrary, they undermine them, and hinder the consolidation of an environmental right aligned with social justice and that puts the survival of ecosystems at the center. The above, because animal law outlaws critical ecological processes, gentrifies environmental law, promotes an artificial binary between fauna and flora, contradicts certain forms of climate action, hinders conservation, stigmatizes cultural diversity, agency class discrimination, prevents the control of invasive species, generates a protection deficit for other kingdoms of life, like the vegetable and the fungi, and promotes a transition from anthropocentrism to a kind of zoocentrism (article in Spanish).

Summary: In decision SU016 of 2020, the court confirmed its decision to revoke the habeas corpus granted to Chucho, the Andean bear. After holding a public audience where many experts spoke as to the possibility of granting wild animals the status of legal persons and the right to freedom, the Constitutional Court held that the judge that have granted habeas corpus had incurred in a legal error as animals have not a right to freedom, and the habeas corpus is a legal mechanism available for humans that are illegally and unjustly detained. It is no available to animals. Moreover, the court stated that there were other more adequate mechanism to guarantee the well-being of animals, such as an inquiry for intervention of the environmental authorities, or a popular action. With this decision, the status of animals remains the same. Animals are legally recognized as sentient beings, subject to special legal protection, and humans have the duty to take care of them.

Summary: Ley 1801 of 2016, or “National Code of Safety and Citizen Coexistence.” Title XIII is titled “of the relationship with animals.” chapter one talks about the respect and care owed to animals, prohibiting behaviors that negatively affect animals, such as the promotion, participation, or sponsorship of betting activities involving animals; the sale of domestic animals on public roads; the wandering of animals on the streets; and the use of captive animals as shooting targets. Chapter II “Domestic animals or pets,” establishes that only species authorized by the law can be kept as pets. The ownership of wild animals as pets is prohibited. Services animals accompanying their owners are always allowed in public spaces. Dog fighting is prohibited in the entire territory. Chapter IV regulates the management and ownership of potentially dangerous dogs, tort liability, the registry of potentially dangerous dogs.

Summary: In July 2022, the Interspecies Justice Foundation filed the first writ of habeas corpus for a non-human animal in Chile. The petition urged the court to recognize Sandai, a 28-year-old orangutan to be recognized as a non-human person and subject of rights, and therefore, to end his captivity in Buin Zoo in Chile. The plaintiff argued that Sandai lived in conditions unfit for his species. One of the expert testimonies submitted to the court stated that “Sandai’s body language reflects a depressed, defeated, and vulnerable emotional and psychological state, which is normal if we consider the conditions in which Sandai is being kept.” The Chilean Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court denying the admissibility of the habeas corpus filed on behalf of Sandai. In dismissing the appeal, the court stated that the constitution in its article 19 refers to persons and that in accordance with the Royal Spanish Academy, persons are individuals of the human species. Therefore, Sandai does not meet the legal requirements to be protected under this legal mechanism. Thus, upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals of San Miguel on July 27. Furthermore, with the purpose of protecting the well-being of Sandai, the Supreme Court ordered the Livestock Service (SAG) to adopt all appropriate measures to guarantee that the Buin Zoo complies with the law, specifically attending to Sandai’s case, stating: “that the deprivation of his liberty does not cause him suffering and any other alteration of its normal development, verifying that they have the appropriate facilities for his species, avoiding all mistreatment and deterioration of his health”.

Summary: Protecting and liberating animals is surely part of social justice’s core of freeing the vulnerable from the powerful, but in many ways the animal movement exists outside of that tide. Arguably that is because of its historic focus on the animals themselves, rather than upon the antecedent, anthropocentric, and outcome-determining nature of human power systems, the ones through which humans oppress one another, and the systems many animal advocates unwittingly accept even as those systems undo any progress—though things like population growth—the advocates claim to be making. This myopia makes claims regarding animal law and liberation a misnomer. Recent attacks on women’s bodily autonomy in terminating pregnancies which will also have a devastating impact on nonhumans, and the animal rights movement’s relative silence in the face of these attacks while continuing largely performative campaigns, is exemplary. This article offers recognition of these power systems through an animal rights perspective, systems which threaten humans and nonhumans from a common source, and a framework for threading animal rights into social justice more generally to overcome those specific actors—many of whom masquerade as animal activists—behind the power imbalance. It also offers a test for the success of the transition, whereby normative systems come to rely on true consent more than coercion or incentives, as a sign that power is being redistributed from the powerful to the vulnerable.

Summary: The Oregon Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in an Oregon court. The Executive Director of Sound Equine Options (SEO), Kim Mosiman, filed a complaint naming a horse (“Justice”)as plaintiff with the Mosiman acting as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his former owner. In the instant appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. In 2017, defendant's neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her horse. The veterinarian found the horse to be about 300 pounds underweight with significant walking difficulties and other maladies. The horse was voluntarily surrendered to Mosiman who eventually nursed the animal back to good health. In 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint on Justice's behalf for a single claim of negligence per se, alleging that defendant violated the Oregon anti-cruelty statute ORS 167.330(1) by failing to provide minimum care. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a horse lacks the legal capacity to sue and the court granted dismissal. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern over the "profound implications" of allowing a non-human animal to sue and stated that an appellate court could come to a different conclusion by "wad[ing] into the public policy debate involving the evolution of animal rights." Here, the appellate court first found no statutory authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal because "a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner the legal system would recognize." The animal has a "distinctive incapacity" that sets it apart from humans with legal disabilities that require appointment of a legal guardian. The court reaffirmed the law's treatment of animals as personal property and found no support in the precedent for permitting an animal to vindicate its own legal rights. While Oregon's animal welfare laws recognize animals as beings capable of feeling pain, this makes them a special type of property and imposes duties on the human owners rather than rights to the animal victims. The court held that only human beings and legislatively-created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law. The court emphasized that this holding does not prevent Oregon laws from ever recognizing an animal as a legal person, but the courts are not the appropriate vehicle to do that. Accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

Summary: The present article analyses the protection of animals in times of armed conflict. The primary objective of this article is to explore the relationship between animal law and international humanitarian law and to find out to what extent rules of animal welfare law can be applied during armed conflict and how international humanitarian law can protect animals. For this purpose, the article firstly provides an overview of legal scholarship, as well as a summary of existing international humanitarian law norms protecting animals. The article also discusses if existing models of protection of non-human victims of war, such as natural environment and cultural heritage, analogously, can be applied to include animals under the protection of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, possible scenarios of animal victimhood during wars are outlined and finally, the article offers several practical suggestions on how animal welfare law can become part of the international law of armed conflict.