Animal Rights

Summary:

Mr. Bartlett discusses the psychological and conceptual impediments to human acceptance of the notion of animal rights. He posits that human characteristics such as homocentrism, human narcissism, and species-selfishness all function to keep animals from securing their rightful place in the existing social and legal framework. Mr. Bartlett also argues that human attitudes, policies, and behavior affecting animals are influenced by underlying conceptual pathologies, and that animal advocates would be well served by taking into account such human pathologies in their quest for greater animal protection.

Summary:

Mr. Stevenson analyzes the free trade rules of the World Trade Organisation and discusses their detrimental impact on certain measures designed to protect animals. Specifically, he discusses U.S. laws to safeguard dolphins and sea turtles, as well as proposed EU laws regarding leghold traps and cosmetic testing on animals. Mr. Stevenson provides an analysis of current WTO rule interpretation, identifies ways in which the rules should be reformed, and provides a less restrictive interpretation that would permit the existence of measures designed to improve animal welfare.

Summary:

On September 25, 1999, a distinguished group of legal scholars met in New York City at the 5th Annual Conference on Animals and the Law, hosted by the Committee on Legal Issues Pertaining to Animals of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, to discuss how the law classifies nonhuman animals and whether the current legal framework is in accord with scientific understanding, public attitudes, and fundamental principles of justice. This conference took a monumental step in facilitating discussion about, and furthering the cause of, the legal protection and welfare of nonhuman animals.

Summary:

This Article first provides an overview of the philosophical basis of the allocation (or non-allocation) of moral status to nonhuman animals considering historical and modern views of animals. Second, it analyzes the legal status of animals under the current system and discusses the idea of extending legal 'personhood' to such animals. Next, it considers the common law and statutory basis for the current valuation of companion animals. Finally, this Article supports and promotes the idea that there is a rational basis for changing the way that companion animals should be valued by the legal system and recommends the adoption of statutory provisions to promote consistency and certainty in these cases.

Summary:

It is widely accepted that animals are viewed as property under the law. It is equally apparent, however, that animals are much more than the average inanimate piece of personal property. The law of standing should reflect that animals are creatures with interests worthy of legal protection in their own right. Thus, while the courts may inevitably continue to recognize animals as property, animals are qualitatively different and the courts can and must take this into consideration when deciding the issue of standing.

Summary:

This article presents the remarks of Steven M. Wise on the status of animals in the legal system.

Summary:

This article offers an extended analogy for the purpose of posing basic questions about proposals for granting legal rights to some nonhuman animals. The analogy is drawn from the precedent-breaking eighteenth century English case Somerset v. Stewart, which liberated an African slave. The article highlights the complex cultural backdrop in each situation, and suggests that the comparison helps one see the nature and possibilities of precedent-breaking decisions that rely on various non-legal resources available to judges who, because of conscience, principle, or policy considerations, choose not to follow established precedent.

Summary:

Mr. Taylor writes about the Great Ape Project's campaign to win fundamental rights for all hominids with New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act. While the Act was a significant step in the struggle for hominids' rights, larger steps, including a Nonhuman Hominid Protection Bill, will soon follow.

Summary: The debate about whether nonhuman animals deserve legal rights encompasses an ever broadening range of theories and strategies. Most thinkers pushing for nonhuman animal rights reject speciesism, which they view as an often tacit foundation for their adversaries’ arguments. Yet almost every current contributor to the debate—whether they favor or disfavor the extension of rights beyond the human sphere—engages in some form of intelligenceism by focusing disproportionate attention on humanlike animals. This essay submits that nonhuman animal advocates must recognize this pervasive intelligenceist bias and be wary of the detrimental effects its substitution for speciesism could have on their long-term objectives. There is a suspicion that some crucial perspective has been omitted from consideration, that the conclusion is as much a product of myopia as of logic.

Summary:

This essay is written by a legal advocate in a socio-legal movement, the crime victims' rights movement, to legal advocates in the animal rights movement. It addresses three issues from the perspective of an outsider to the animal rights movement. First, the essay addresses the problems in the relationship between rights philosophy and successful legal rights advocacy; second, the essay reviews two animal rights legal advocate strategies of incrementalism and the common law coup; finally, the essay concludes with three practical suggestions for the animal rights movement about joining a part of the victims' rights movement to reach mutually identified goals.