Animal Fighting

Summary: In this case, defendants were convicted of felony dog fighting and felony animal cruelty. On appeal, defendants sought to suppress evidence and to quash and traverse the search warrant that led to their convictions. Police officers responding to a report of a thin, loose, horse near the defendants' home entered the property in order to make reasonable attempts to secure the loose horse and determine if there was a suitable corral on the property. The officers knew there had been prior calls to the property in response to reported concerns about the conditions of horses and pit bulls on the property. Further, one officer heard puppies barking inside the home when she knocked on the door trying to contact defendants, and another officer heard a dog whining from inside the garage. There were strong odors of excessive fecal matter reasonably associated with unhealthful housing conditions. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to be concerned there was a dog in distress inside the garage and possibly in need of immediate aid, and the court found there was nothing unreasonable about one officer standing on the front driveway and simply looking through the broken window in the garage door to determine whether the dog he heard making a whining bark was in genuine distress. Nor was it unreasonable for the officers to then proceed to the back yard after having looked in the garage. As a result, the court ruled that the information the officers had justified the issuance of the search warrant, and thus the order denying the motion to suppress evidence and to quash and traverse the warrant was affirmed. The defendants' judgments of conviction were also affirmed.

Summary: Abstract: The constitutionality of restrictions on speech depicting actual cruelty to animals is a question that continues to divide courts and commentators. In U.S. v. Stevens, the Supreme Court struck down a 1999 ban on depictions of animal cruelty. The Court invalidated the ban on its face because, as written, the statute extended beyond acts of actual animal cruelty to other forms of unlawful animal harm, such as hunting out of season. Thus, the Court did not resolve the core question presented.

Congress responded by drafting a new statute, one narrowed to “crush” videos--obscene depictions of animal cruelty--in an effort to avoid constitutional problems. This new statute, however, continues to raise constitutional and public policy concerns--despite its recent upholding in the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Richards.

This article is the first to analyze the constitutional and public policy issues presented by Congress's new animal cruelty speech regulation. This article contends that the modified statute is poor public policy and remains constitutionally problematic. First, as a policy matter, the statute is ineffective because it fails to criminalize the most widespread and troubling form of animal cruelty speech: animal fighting videos. Second, the statute's overly narrow reach--limited to obscene depictions of animal cruelty--in fact increases its constitutional problems by triggering the “virulence” doctrine first articulated in R.A.V. Since courts are unlikely to view obscene depictions of animal cruelty as virulently “prurient” obscenity, as opposed to the kind of “morbidly” violent speech entitled to the protections of strict scrutiny as established in Brown, the statute will likely be invalidated.

The article concludes with an exploration of possible new legislation, which could effectively prevent animal cruelty, while also preserving free speech rights.

Summary: Defendants appealed sentences arising out of a Missouri-based dog-fighting conspiracy. Each man pleaded guilty to conspiring to engage in animal fighting ventures in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one Defendant additionally pleaded guilty to engaging in animal fighting ventures in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156. When sentencing each defendant, the district court applied an upward departure provision found in the application notes to United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG or Guidelines). Each appellant argued that his relevant conduct was not sufficiently cruel to warrant the upward departure. The 8th Circuit found, however, that the district court had properly considered conduct that was legally relevant to Defendants' sentencing under the Guidelines. The court also found that Defendants' conduct amounted to more than just possessing fighting pit bulls. Defendants bred, raised, trained, sold, and fought them knowing that the dogs would be allowed, if not required, to fight until severely injured or dead. Thus, the ordinary cruelty inherent in dog fighting justifies base offense level, while the extraordinary cruelty of Defendants' crimes separately justified the upward departure. The district court's judgment was affirmed.

Summary: The primary question in this appeal was whether Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting a criminal prohibition against animal fighting. Defendants were indicted, in violation of the Animal Welfare Act, for their roles in organizing, operating, and participating in “gamefowl derbies,” otherwise known as “cockfighting.” Upon the 4th Circuit’s review of the parties' arguments, it held that the animal fighting statute was a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. It also held that the statute did not require the government to prove the defendants' knowledge regarding the particular venture's nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, the district court’s decision was affirmed.

Summary: After being tipped off about a dog fight, authorities seized several dogs from a home. Defendant was charged with one count of second-degree animal abuse and four counts of second-degree animal neglect. After the presentation of the state's evidence in circuit court, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, arguing, as to second-degree animal neglect, that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant had custody or control over the dogs. Circuit court denied the motion and defendant was convicted on all counts. Defendant appealed the denial of the motion, again arguing that the state failed to prove that he had “custody or control” over the dogs. The appeals court concluded that the plain text and context of ORS 167.325(1), together with the legislature's use of the same term in a similar statute, demonstrated that the legislature intended the term “control” to include someone who had the authority to guide or manage an animal or who directed or restrained the animal, regardless if the person owned the animal. Given the facts of the case, the court concluded that based on that evidence, a reasonable juror could find that defendant had control over the dogs, and the trial court had not erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

Summary: After being convicted by a Superior Court bench trial and having the Superior Court’s judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeals, defendant appealed the admission of evidence recovered from his home after officers entered it without a warrant in pursuit of an aggressive and bloody dog. The Supreme Court of Indiana found that the entry was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution and that the evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequent search warrant was inadmissible. The Superior Court's judgment was therefore reversed.

Summary: This 1922 law, in Spanish, outlaws cock fighting in Costa Rica.

Summary: This petition makes it a felony to instigate or encourage cockfighting, possess or train birds for cockfighting, or maintain a facility for cockfighting in the state of Oklahoma. The ballot proposal also makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly be a spectator at a cockfight. It passed in 2002 with 56% of the vote.

Summary:

This 1998 ballot proposal asked, "[s]hall a statute be enacted making it a class D felony to bait or fight animals; permit such activities on premises you control; or promote, conduct, stage, advertise or collect fees for such activities; and making it a class A misdemeanor to knowingly attend baiting or fighting of animals; knowingly sell, offer for sale, or transport animals for such purposes; own, possess, manufacture or deal in cockfighting implements; bear wrestle; permit bear wrestling on premises you control; promote, conduct, stage, advertise, or collect fees for bear wrestling; or market, possess, train, or surgically alter a bear for bear wrestling?" It was passed in 1998 by 62.6% of voters.

Summary: Proposition 201 would amend state law to create the crime of cockfighting. Cockfighting would be classified as a class 5 felony, generally punishable by a possible fine of up to $150,000 and a possible prison term ranging from nine months to two years. Presence at a cockfight would be classified as a class 1 misdemeanor, generally punishable by a possible fine of up to $2,500 and a possible jail term of up to six months. This proposition would extend existing state law animal cruelty exemptions and defenses that apply to lawful hunting, ranching, farming, rodeos and related activities to also apply to cockfighting. The measure passed in 1998 with 68.1% of the vote.