Ag-gag, Ecoterrorism, Agroterrorism

Summary: This Arkansas subchapter concerns illegal acts committed against agricultural production and animal research facilities. Under the act, a person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person acquires or otherwise exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility, with the intent to deprive the owner of the animal facility, animal, or property and disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Any person who violates any provision of this subchapter is deemed guilty of a Class D felony and will be ordered to pay replacement costs/restitution.

Summary: This article is known as the Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act. Under the Act, it is unlawful for any person to intentionally release, steal, destroy, or otherwise cause loss of any animal or crop from an animal or crop facility without the consent of the owner. Other illegal actions include vandalizing obtaining access by false pretenses for the purpose of performing acts not authorized by the facility, and possession of records obtained by theft or deception without authorization of the facility. Violation results in a Class C felony if the loss $250 or more or a Class A misdemeanor if the loss is less $250.

Summary: The group of statutes provides that the commissioner shall require laboratories and research facilities to treat all animals used in testing humanely, provide food and suitable housing, and that any experiments that inflict or involve pain shall be performed with anesthesia. Each research facility shall be inspected by the commissioner in order to ensure compliance with said rules. In addition, the statutes provide that alternative animal testing methods be utilized when the alternative has been scientifically validated and recommended by the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee for the Validation of Alternative Methods (ICCVAM) and adopted by the appropriate federal agency.

Summary: In this Opinion, the judge granted the defendants a total of $96,870.85 in attorneys fees. The action stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the Schumachers for $ 6.6 million dollars against the City of Portland and the named defendants seeking damages for alleged illegal protest activities in front of their fur store. The defendants all prevailed on their Motion to Strike. The court observed that awarding of attorney fees is mandatory under Oregon law when a party prevails in an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit. Thus, the issue at hand was the amount of the attorney fees. The court went through the factors under Oregon law in analyzing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. When examining each factor, the court determined that the evidence either was in favor of defendants or was neutral. Notably, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants were not objectively reasonable because the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that the prevailing defendants did anything illegal.

Summary:

Defendants were convicted of interfering with agricultural operations under the anti-picketing provision of a criminal statute. The Court of Appeals held that the anti-picketing provision was not facially over-broad under the free speech or free assembly provision of State Constitution. The provision, which imposed criminal penalties on people engaged in picketing but created an exception for those involved in a labor protest, did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the State Constitution, but it did violate equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. The statutory presumption of severability did not apply in this case.

Summary:

Animal rights protestors appealed the decision of the Supreme Court, Westchester County that permanently enjoined the protestors from engaging in protest activity that constituted a private nuisance (to wit, participating in targeted protest at the home of the plaintiff Mark L. Bibi). This court found that the protestors failed to refute the evidence from the lower court that showed the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law (including evidence of the appellant's federal conviction conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992). While the court did find that the appellant-protestor's incarceration did not render the appeal academic, imposition of the injunction was a reasonable and constitutional restriction on protest activity.

Summary:

In an issue of first impression, this Court considered whether the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) was unconstitutional either on its face or as-applied to defendants. The defendants in this case were an animal rights organization ("SHAC") and six associated individuals. The defendants engaged in direct action ranging from electronic civil disobedience to destroying property at the homes of individuals associated with Huntingdon Life Sciences (a research corporation that performs animal testing for other companies). Defendants argued that the statute has a chilling effect on speech because protestors will refrain from all speech, even protected speech, due to the ambiguity of what the statute proscribes. Thus the Court found that the government provided sufficient evidence to prove that the defendants conspired to violate the AEPA.

Summary:

The plaintiffs in this case own a chinchilla ranch in mid-Michigan. They filed a complaint alleging that PETA lied to them to gain access to their farm, took video footage of their farm operation, and then published an exposé on PETA's website that put the plaintiffs in an unfavorable false light. The court ultimately granted defendant-PETA's motion for summary judgment on all the issues. The court observed that the Ouderkirks gave permission for the taping in an email that makes no reference to any restriction on that consent. Further, the primary use made of the plaintiffs' likenesses by the defendant was to advocate against the chinchilla trade; thus, PETA had a right under the First Amendment to disseminate the information containing the plaintiffs' likenesses.

Summary:

State animal terrorism laws have been enacted to protect agricultural research and production using animals. The laws prohibit acts that obstruct, impede, or disrupt agricultural operations, research, or experimentation conducted at an animal facility. A person who violates a state animal terrorism law may be charged with a misdemeanor or a felony, face a stiff fine and prison term, and may be required to pay restitution. Opponents of such laws argue that they may violate state and federal constitutional rights.

Summary:

This summary examines the legal issues that arise when animal activist take extreme measures to document animal cruelty. Their actions, ofter termed "ecoterrorism," often involve taking photographs of alleged animal cruelty that can often be admitted at trial. However, many states have begun to enact laws targeting the actions of animal activists.