Arizona

Summary: This 2022 Arizona law states that the breed of a dog may not be the sole factor considered or used for any of the following purposes: (1) underwriting or actuarial processes for determining risk, liability or actual or potential losses related to claims involving dogs under a policy of insurance; or (2) questionnaires, surveys or other means of gathering information regarding ownership or possession of a dog or the presence of a dog on premises insured or to be insured under a policy of insurance.

Summary: This Arizona law from 2022 requires an animal shelter to thoroughly scan for the presence of a microchip in the dog or cat and make a reasonable effort to contact the owner after taking possession of a dog or cat.

Summary: Joel and Kim Goldberger owned residential rental property in Flagstaff that was insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company under a rental dwelling policy. The Goldbergers filed a claim asserting that their tenant allowed feral cats to access the property and cause approximately $75,000 in “accidental damage.” State farm subsequently denied the claim asserting that feral cats are domestic animals and therefore the damage was not covered under the policy. The Goldbergers filed suit alleging breach of contract and insurance bad faith. State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. State Farm claimed that the policy stated that accidental losses caused by “birds, vermin, rodents, insects, or domestic animals” were not covered by the policy. The superior court granted State Farm’s motion and this appeal followed. The Goldbergers argued that the superior court erred in dismissing their complaint due to the fact that the term “domestic animals” is reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations and must be construed against State Farm. State Farm argued that the exclusion in the policy was only susceptible to one reasonable interpretation. The Court stated that there were two interpretations to the term “domestic animal.” The first definition is a species-based definition that says that domestic animals are animals belonging to a broader class of animals that have been domesticated at some point in history. The second definition is an individualized definition that says that domestic animals are animals that are kept by a person for any of various purposes, including as pets. The Court ultimately decided that the individualized definition makes more sense in terms of the insurance policy itself as well as case law. In making this determination, the court noted the "nonsensical" outcome that would arise for exotic or nontraditional pets were a species-based definition adopted. Domestic animals encompass animals that are subject to the care, custody, and control of a person. On the facts alleged in the complaint alone, the Court could not say that the tenant was keeping the feral cats in such a manner that the exclusion would preclude coverage. The court therefore resolved all reasonable inferences in the Goldberger’s favor and presumed that the cats were feral. Because the feral cats that caused the damage are not domestic animals under all reasonable interpretations of the facts alleged in the complaint, the court erred in granting the insurer's motion to dismiss. The Court reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the Goldberger’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Summary: This Arizona law insulates a person from liability for civil damages when he or she uses reasonable force to enter a locked and unattended motor vehicle to remove a minor or confined domestic animal if certain factors apply. The person first must determine that the motor vehicle is locked or there is no reasonable manner in which the person can remove the minor or domestic animal from the vehicle. Before entering the vehicle, the person must notify law enforcement or first responders. No more force than is necessary to remove the animal or minor may be used and the person must remain with the minor or domestic animal until first responders arrive. For the purposes of this section, “domestic animal” means a dog, a cat or another animal that is domesticated and kept as a household pet.

Summary: The special action considers whether a person who uses a dangerous instrument in committing an animal cruelty offense may be sentenced as a dangerous offender. The facts in the underlying case are as follows. A witness in an apartment complex heard a dog crying and observed Shundog Hu using a rod to hit a dog that was inside a pet enclosure. Hu was charged with both intentionally or knowingly subjecting an animal to cruel mistreatment, a felony, and under the "dangerous offense" laws because the animal cruelty "involved the discharge, use, or threatening exhibition of a pole and/or rod, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-105 and 13-704." Hu moved to dismiss the dangerous offense allegation stating that, as a matter of law, "a dangerous offense cannot be committed against an animal." Hu contended that the legislature's inclusion of the phrase "on another person" in the statutory definition for "dangerous offense" evinces this intent. The State, on the other hand, argued that sentencing enhancement is based on the use of the dangerous instrument rather than the target of the instrument. The superior court granted Hu's motion and the State petitioned for this special action. This court accepted jurisdiction because " the State has no adequate remedy on appeal and the petition presents a legal issue of statewide importance." This court first examined the statutory definition for a "dangerous" felony offense: "an offense involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury on another person.” The State's contention is that the "or" in the definition is disjunctive and, thus, the phrase "on another person" only applies to the second independent clause. Hu counters that such an interpretation would cover harm to anything and lead to absurd results. This court first noted that the statutory definitions are silent as to whether they only apply to humans. Applying principles of secondary interpretation and sensible construction, the court held that legislature's purpose in drafting the dangerous offense definition and the related statutes was to enhance crimes to “dangerous offenses” to protect human life. The State cannot charge a crime as a dangerous offense unless the target is against another person. In reaching this conclusion, the court contemplated extreme examples involving felony damage to vegetation as well as comparison to a recent decision in Texas where a deadly weapon finding was limited to human victims only.

Summary: This Arizona law states that a court shall allow a facility dog to accompany a victim who is under 18 while he or she is testifying in court. A party seeking the use of a facility dog must file a notice with the court that includes the certification of the facility dog, the name of the person or entity who certified the dog and evidence that the facility dog is insured. It is discretionary for the court to allow a facility dog for a victim over the age of 18.

Summary: This part of Arizona's emergency response plan describes the state's responsibility toward pets and service animals.

Summary: This Arizona statute allows common councils to regulate dogs running at large.

Summary: This is a short overview of Arizona Great Ape law.

Summary: In Arizona, most species of apes including chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos are classified as “restricted live wildlife” because they are “inherently dangerous animals capable of transmitting disease and causing serious injury or death to human beings.”[1] It is illegal to keep “restricted” apes for use as pets and assistance animals.The following discussion begins with a general overview of the various state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries. The discussion concludes with a compilation of local ordinances which govern the possession and use of apes within geographic subdivisions of the state.