Utah

Summary: <p> The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence in the diagnosis and the treatment of plaintiff's brood mare, which resulted in the mare's infertility. Plaintiff was required to show that Dr. Rogers did not exercise the care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled veterinarians doing the same type of work in the community, and that the failure to exercise the required skill and care was the cause of the injury. Experts testified at trial that the care exercised by Dr. Rogers met the standard of care of veterinarians practicing in the area, and had they been treating the mare, the treatment would not have differed substantially from that of Dr. Rogers.&nbsp; The Supreme Court held that the record is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that the care of Dr. Rogers did not meet the standard of care of other practitioners practicing in the community. </p>

Summary: <p> Plaintiff dog owners appeal the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Ted Hallows. Hallows. a Division of Wildlife Resources employee, shot the dogs after they got loose from plaintiffs' backyard. While the factual accounts of the shooting differed, Hallows asserted that he shot the dogs within the scope of his employment and was therefore protected under the Governmental Immunity Act. On appeal, the court first found that plaintiffs may maintain an action against Hallows for conduct outside the scope of his employment and this claim was not barred by their admitted failure to comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim and statute of limitations requirements. Further, as to plaintiffs' claims that Hallows was not acting within his scope of employment when the shooting occurred, there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. </p>

Summary: <p> In this Utah case, plaintiff&nbsp;sued the defendants for personal injuries he sustained in attempting to untangle the defendants' horse from a chain&nbsp;that he alleges the defendants negligently tied it to a post in their yard.&nbsp; The Supreme Court held that plaintiff who, at defendant's request, entered upon defendants' land to help free horse which had become entangled in chain because of defendant's alleged negligence in tying the horse to the post, could not recover for his injuries since it was his knowing and voluntary conduct in going into a "plain-to-be-seen" danger.&nbsp; The dissent found that&nbsp;defendants did owe a duty to plaintiff to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in the manner in which they tied the horse.&nbsp; The dissent found this case more analogous to those under a "rescue doctrine," where recovery is not barred based on the doctrine of assumption of risk or intervening cause.&nbsp; </p>

Summary: <p> Subsequent to the game cockfighter's conviction for cruelty to animals, she sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional on the grounds: (1) that it was vague and uncertain in that innocent conduct of merely being a spectator could be included within its language; and (2) that presence at such a cockfight was proscribed, without requiring a culpable mental state.&nbsp;On review the court held that the board, in the exercise of its police power, had both the prerogative and the responsibility of enacting laws which would promote and conserve the good order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society. The courts should defer to the legislative prerogative and should presume such enactments were valid and should not strike down legislation unless it clearly and persuasively appeared that the act was in conflict with a constitutional provision. </p>

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs sued defendant corporation for breach of warranty as to fitness of purpose of poultry feed concentrate after egg production dropped, hens became malnourished, and an unusual amount of picking and cannibalism developed. As to the issue of damages, the Supreme Court held instruction that plaintiff was entitled to damages in amount of market value of chickens destroyed and that provided formula by which market value of suitable replacements could be determined was correct. </p>

Summary: <p> In this Utah case, defendant Powell took his dog to a kennel managed by plaintiff Waters to be boarded for a few days. Waters took the dog to a play area to be introduced to the other dogs&nbsp;where&nbsp;the dog bit Waters. Waters filed a complaint against Powell alleging that he was strictly liable for the injury the dog inflicted. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Waters was a "keeper" of the dog for purposes of the state's dog bite statute (sec. 18-1-1). Waters essentially conceded on appeal that if she is a keeper then she is precluded from asserting a strict liability claim against Powell. Thus, the district court's denial of summary judgment was reversed and the case&nbsp;remanded with instructions that Powell's summary judgment motion be granted. </p>

Summary: <p> In this Utah case, the defendant appeals the decision of the district court finding him guilty on four counts of failing to maintain a city dog license and one count of running an illegal kennel. In December 2005, a Kanab City animal control officer responded to numerous complaints of barking dogs at Defendant's residence. This officer observed four dogs over the age of three months on the premises during two separate visits to Defendant's home that month and on subsequent random visits in the following months. On appeal, defendant argued that the city ordinance on which his conviction for operating an illegal kennel is based is unconstitutionally vague. This court disagreed, finding that an ordinary person reading the ordinance would understand that, in order to keep more than two dogs over the age of three months in the same residence, a citizen must register for a kennel permit. </p>

Summary: <p> In this Utah case, the State sought&nbsp;review of the court of appeals' decision vacating the convictions of defendants. Reber was convicted of aiding or assisting in the wanton destruction of protected wildlife in violation of state law for killing a mule deer without a license or permit.&nbsp;On appeal, defendant contended that the state had no jurisdiction because he was an Indian hunting in Indian country. However, the court held that the State has jurisdiction over these defendants because the State has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country when a non-Indian commits a victimless crime. Defendants are not Indians, as that term has been defined by federal law, and the crimes in these cases were victimless. </p>

Summary: <p> A woman was convicted of fifty-eight counts of animal cruelty after animal control officers found fifty-eight diseased cats in her trailer.&nbsp; The trial court sentenced the woman to&nbsp;ninety days of jail time for each count, but revised the sentence to include two days of jail time, &nbsp;two years of formal probation, and twelve and a half years of informal probation.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but found that fourteen and&nbsp;a half years probation exceeded the&nbsp;court's statutory authority.&nbsp; </p>

Summary: This set of Utah rules concerns the collection, importation, and possession of zoological animals under circumstances described in the rules. Commonly kept domestic animals such as alpacas, donkeys, cats, dogs and hybrid dogs, gerbils, goats, hamsters, and many others are not governed by these rules. A person shall obtain a certificate of registration before collecting, importing, transporting, or possessing any species of animal or its parts classified as prohibited or controlled. A person may not release to the wild or release into any public or private waters any zoological animal, including fish, without first obtaining authorization from the division. Certain species are prohibited for collection, importation, and possession. These species include bighorn sheep, bears, coyotes, gray wolves, wild cats, skunks, lemurs, great apes, and those species listed in Appendix I or II of CITES, among others listed in R657-3-24.