Summary: This Oklahoma statute provides that the municipal governing body may regulate or prohibit animals from running at large. The governing body may also regulate and provide for taxing the owners and harborers of dogs, and authorize the killing of dogs which are found at large in violation of any ordinance regulating the same.
Summary: These statutes comprise Oklahoma's lost property provisions.
Summary: The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws.
Summary: Under Oklahoma law, no person may possess, hunt, chase, harass, capture, shoot at, wound or kill, take or attempt to take, trap or attempt to trap any endangered or threatened species or subspecies without specific written permission of the Director. Violation incurs a $100 - 1,000 penalty with up to 30 days in jail.
Summary: Oklahoma law prohibits the knowing and willful killing or molestation of hawks, falcons, owls, or eagles, or their nests, eggs, or young. The only exceptions to this prohibition are the taking of a hawk or owl in the act of destroying domestic birds or fowl, or the use of hawks, owls, falcons, or eagles by licensed falconers.
Summary: Dogs are considered personal property in Oklahoma.
Summary: This Newcastle, Oklahoma ordinance declares it to be unlawful and an offense for any person to keep any animal within the corporate limits of the city except as provided by these provisions. A violation of this ordinance will result in a fine not to exceed $200.
This Newcastle, Oklahoma ordinance declares it to be unlawful and an offense for any person to keep any animal within the corporate limits of the city except as provided by these provisions. A violation of this ordinance will result in a fine not to exceed $200.
Summary: Petitioners sought relief from a temporary injunction for the Respondents, which prevented petitioners from enforcing the statute banning cockfighting. The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the statute did not violate the Oklahoma State Constitution, and was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Relief granted for petitioners.
Petitioners sought relief from a temporary injunction for the Respondents, which prevented petitioners from enforcing the statute banning cockfighting. The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the statute did not violate the Oklahoma State Constitution, and was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Relief granted for petitioners.
Summary: While the Moneys (Defendants) were on vacation, they boarded their dog at Peppertree Animal Clinic (Peppertree). On June 16, 1990, Julie Hass (Plaintiff), an employee of Peppertree, was bitten by the dog while walking him. The Court reverses the Defendants' summary judgment and remands to the trial court because the dog bite statute applies a strict liability standard and that the owner of a dog is only the person who has legal right to the dog.
While the Moneys (Defendants) were on vacation, they boarded their dog at Peppertree Animal Clinic (Peppertree). On June 16, 1990, Julie Hass (Plaintiff), an employee of Peppertree, was bitten by the dog while walking him. The Court reverses the Defendants' summary judgment and remands to the trial court because the dog bite statute applies a strict liability standard and that the owner of a dog is only the person who has legal right to the dog.
Summary: The five-year-old child hopped a fence, which was in disrepair, into his neighbor's yard to retrieve a ball. As he was trying to leave, he was severely bitten by a pit bull that the neighbor was keeping for his son. In reversing the judgment in part, the court held that the keeping of a pit bull might be a violation of Tulsa, Okla., Rev. Ordinances tit. 2, ch. 1, § (2)(d) (1973), so the child's negligence per se theory was actionable. The court held that the neighbor was the dog's owner as a matter of law under the dog-bite statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 4. sec. 42.1 (1981).
The five-year-old child hopped a fence, which was in disrepair, into his neighbor's yard to retrieve a ball. As he was trying to leave, he was severely bitten by a pit bull that the neighbor was keeping for his son. In reversing the judgment in part, the court held that the keeping of a pit bull might be a violation of Tulsa, Okla., Rev. Ordinances tit. 2, ch. 1, § (2)(d) (1973), so the child's negligence per se theory was actionable. The court held that the neighbor was the dog's owner as a matter of law under the dog-bite statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 4. sec. 42.1 (1981).
