Missouri

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State v. McIntosh

Summary: This case is an appeal following the defendant's conviction of animal abuse and assault in the fourth degree. Defendant claimed that the trial court erred in convicting him of animal abuse due to insufficient evidence showing that he purposely caused suffering to the dog he allegedly abused. The event that led to defendant's conviction was witnessed by a neighbor, who saw the defendant in his backyard swinging a small dog through the air by its leash and collar. The neighbor also saw defendant climb on top of the dog to choke it and slam its head into the ground. The neighbor testified at trial about these events, and the trial court found defendant guilty of animal abuse and assault in the fourth degree. The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence, consisting of the neighbor's testimony, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

This case is an appeal following the defendant's conviction of animal abuse and assault in the fourth degree. Defendant claimed that the trial court erred in convicting him of animal abuse due to insufficient evidence showing that he purposely caused suffering to the dog he allegedly abused. The event that led to defendant's conviction was witnessed by a neighbor, who saw the defendant in his backyard swinging a small dog through the air by its leash and collar. The neighbor also saw defendant climb on top of the dog to choke it and slam its head into the ground. The neighbor testified at trial about these events, and the trial court found defendant guilty of animal abuse and assault in the fourth degree. The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence, consisting of the neighbor's testimony, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

MO - Domestic violence - 455.045. Temporary relief available--ex parte orders

Summary: Missouri amended its laws on domestic violence protection orders in 2021 to include the protection of pets. Any ex parte order of protection shall be to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault and may include "[a] temporary order of possession of pets where appropriate." “Pet” is defined as a living creature maintained by a household member for companionship and not for commercial purposes.

Missouri amended its laws on domestic violence protection orders in 2021 to include the protection of pets. Any ex parte order of protection shall be to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault and may include "[a] temporary order of possession of pets where appropriate." “Pet” is defined as a living creature maintained by a household member for companionship and not for commercial purposes.

MO - Hunting, Internet - 3 CSR 10-7.410. Hunting Methods

Summary: In paragraph (R) of this Missouri regulation, the state prohibits computer-assisted, remote hunting. "Except as otherwise permitted in this Code, wildlife may be taken only in the immediate physical presence of the taker and may not be taken by use of computer-assisted remote hunting devices. . ."

In paragraph (R) of this Missouri regulation, the state prohibits computer-assisted, remote hunting. "Except as otherwise permitted in this Code, wildlife may be taken only in the immediate physical presence of the taker and may not be taken by use of computer-assisted remote hunting devices. . ."

State v. Hammond

Summary: Defendant Hammond appeals his conviction for misdemeanor animal abuse in violation of § 578.012. The facts underlying the conviction stem from defendant’s conduct with a horse. In 2016, police were dispatched to a horse that was "down" on a road. The officer observed multiple injuries on the horse's hooves, fetlocks, and lower legs. Its hooves were severely abraded, which was confirmed by subsequent veterinary examination. Another officer observed markings on the road indicative of a "blood trail" from defendant's residence to the location of the horse. According to this officer, defendant told him that he had been "doing farrier stuff to his horses and this particular horse had broke away from them five times and broke a couple of lead lines, burned some people’s hands, and that he was going to teach the horse a lesson." Ultimately, the officers were able to get the horse to stand and loaded into a trailer. It later died at the animal clinic to where it was taken. Defendant was charged with felony animal abuse and a jury trial was held. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included misdemeanor animal abuse. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to read Missouri's right-to-farm amendment when it instructed the jury on the amendment. The court noted that, similar to a prior case evoking the right-to-farm amendment, the amendment itself was not intended to nullify or curtail longstanding laws. The prohibition against animal cruelty existed in some form in the Missouri code for 145 years. Further, the court disagreed with defendant's contention that his prosecution criminalized a legitimate farming practice. The jury convicted defendant based on a finding that, when he pulled the horse behind his truck, his conscious object was to cause injury or suffering to the horse. While defendant contends that his was employing a legitimate, established farming technique to "train" the horse, the jury rejected his claim. Defendant's claim on appeal that the animal abuse law could then be used to prosecute farmers for other legitimate farming activities (i.e., branding, castration, use of whips, etc.) was also rejected. The court found that the conscious object of such activities is not to inflect pain or suffering, but to achieve another goal. The pain is "incidental to the farmer's legitimate objectives." The jury found this not to be the case with defendant. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Hammond to read the right-to-farm amendment to the jury, and when it refused to instruct the jury on the amendment’s terms. Affirmed.

Defendant Hammond appeals his conviction for misdemeanor animal abuse in violation of § 578.012. The facts underlying the conviction stem from defendant’s conduct with a horse. In 2016, police were dispatched to a horse that was "down" on a road. The officer observed multiple injuries on the horse's hooves, fetlocks, and lower legs. Its hooves were severely abraded, which was confirmed by subsequent veterinary examination. Another officer observed markings on the road indicative of a "blood trail" from defendant's residence to the location of the horse. According to this officer, defendant told him that he had been "doing farrier stuff to his horses and this particular horse had broke away from them five times and broke a couple of lead lines, burned some people’s hands, and that he was going to teach the horse a lesson." Ultimately, the officers were able to get the horse to stand and loaded into a trailer. It later died at the animal clinic to where it was taken. Defendant was charged with felony animal abuse and a jury trial was held. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included misdemeanor animal abuse. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to read Missouri's right-to-farm amendment when it instructed the jury on the amendment. The court noted that, similar to a prior case evoking the right-to-farm amendment, the amendment itself was not intended to nullify or curtail longstanding laws. The prohibition against animal cruelty existed in some form in the Missouri code for 145 years. Further, the court disagreed with defendant's contention that his prosecution criminalized a legitimate farming practice. The jury convicted defendant based on a finding that, when he pulled the horse behind his truck, his conscious object was to cause injury or suffering to the horse. While defendant contends that his was employing a legitimate, established farming technique to "train" the horse, the jury rejected his claim. Defendant's claim on appeal that the animal abuse law could then be used to prosecute farmers for other legitimate farming activities (i.e., branding, castration, use of whips, etc.) was also rejected. The court found that the conscious object of such activities is not to inflect pain or suffering, but to achieve another goal. The pain is "incidental to the farmer's legitimate objectives." The jury found this not to be the case with defendant. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Hammond to read the right-to-farm amendment to the jury, and when it refused to instruct the jury on the amendment’s terms. Affirmed.

Hill v. Missouri Department of Conservation

Summary: This case concerns the regulatory authority of the Missouri Conservation Commission ("Commission"), which has authority over the control, management, restoration, conservation, and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the state. The respondents in this case operate different selective breeding and private hunting facilities that rely on captive bred deer and elk (“cervids”). Respondent Hill co-owns the Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch which is a large hunting preserve and white-tailed deer breeding operation. Respondent Broadway owns a hunting preserve which offers three-day guided hunts of a variety of animals, including elk. Broadway also has a deer breeding operation. Respondent Grace owns a breeding facility for white-tailed deer, sika, and red deer. The respondents cannot operate their hunting preserves and captive breeding facilities without permits from the Missouri Department of Conservation, which all respondents have. Cervids can be infected with a fatal neurodegenerative disease known as chronic wasting disease (CWD). The first detection of the disease in Missouri was at Heartland Wildlife Ranches, which was eventually purchased by Respondent Broadway and renamed Winter Quarters Wildlife Ranch. Due to this, the Missouri Conservation Commission set up surveillance within 25 miles of the facility. From 2010 to 2013 the Commission found 10 free-ranging deer infected with CWD out of the 14,000 tested in the surveillance zone. Over the next three years the Commission detected CWD in 14 free-ranging deer, several of which were found near closed or currently operating captive cervid facilities. Attempting to eradicate CWD, the Commission proposed a series of regulatory amendments that were to take effect in January of 2015. The amendments were aimed at the captive cervid industry. The regulations relevant to this case banned the importation of cervids, imposed more rigorous fencing requirements, and imposed more rigorous recordkeeping and veterinary inspection requirements. Respondents brought an action suing the Appellants (the Missouri Conservation Commission) to prevent these regulations from going into effect. At trial, the circuit court declared that the regulations were invalid and enjoined the Commission from enforcing them. On appeal, the Commission raised three arguments. First, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because Respondents’ cervids are “game” and “wildlife resources of the state” and, therefore, can be regulated by the Commission under the Missouri Constitution. Second, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because the Commission’s authority to promulgate the regulations does not implicate or infringe on the Respondents’ rights to farm. Third, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred by enjoining the Commission’s enforcement of the new regulations against all people in Missouri, rather than only against the Respondents. The Respondents contend that captive cervids are not wildlife or game even though they are wild by nature because they are too domesticated and, therefore, akin to livestock. The Court rejects this contention and looks at the plain meaning of the terms “game” and “wildlife” and concludes that both terms plainly include all species that are wild by nature. The terms are not ambiguous. The Court points out that it would be unreasonable to hold that the Commission has constitutional authority to regulate individual cervids that are born free and still free-roaming but take away that authority when an individual cervid is considered domesticated. “The Court will not give a law a construction which would render it unreasonable when it is susceptible to a reasonable one.” Furthermore, historically, the term “game” was broad enough to embrace all kinds of deer whether tame or wild. Captive cervids are therefore considered “game” and “wildlife” and the Commission has authority under the Missouri Constitution to regulate Respondents’ captive cervids. Respondent’ second contention is that they own the captive cervids and, therefore, the cervids are not resources of the state. The Court rejects this contention. The Commission has always regulated deer and elk owned by private parties. The Court holds that the phrase “resources of the state” unambiguously refers to resources within the entire geographical boundaries of the state. Therefore, Respondents’ cervids are considered resources of the state. The Court agrees with the Commission’s second contention that the regulations did not infringe on Respondents’ right to farm. Respondents failed to show that they are engaged in farming and ranching practices and, therefore, cannot invoke the guarantee of the Missouri Constitution. The Court did not reach the Commission’s third contention. Ultimately the Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Respondents and entered judgment in favor of Appellants on both counts.

This case concerns the regulatory authority of the Missouri Conservation Commission ("Commission"), which has authority over the control, management, restoration, conservation, and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the state. The respondents in this case operate different selective breeding and private hunting facilities that rely on captive bred deer and elk (“cervids”). Respondent Hill co-owns the Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch which is a large hunting preserve and white-tailed deer breeding operation. Respondent Broadway owns a hunting preserve which offers three-day guided hunts of a variety of animals, including elk. Broadway also has a deer breeding operation. Respondent Grace owns a breeding facility for white-tailed deer, sika, and red deer. The respondents cannot operate their hunting preserves and captive breeding facilities without permits from the Missouri Department of Conservation, which all respondents have. Cervids can be infected with a fatal neurodegenerative disease known as chronic wasting disease (CWD). The first detection of the disease in Missouri was at Heartland Wildlife Ranches, which was eventually purchased by Respondent Broadway and renamed Winter Quarters Wildlife Ranch. Due to this, the Missouri Conservation Commission set up surveillance within 25 miles of the facility. From 2010 to 2013 the Commission found 10 free-ranging deer infected with CWD out of the 14,000 tested in the surveillance zone. Over the next three years the Commission detected CWD in 14 free-ranging deer, several of which were found near closed or currently operating captive cervid facilities. Attempting to eradicate CWD, the Commission proposed a series of regulatory amendments that were to take effect in January of 2015. The amendments were aimed at the captive cervid industry. The regulations relevant to this case banned the importation of cervids, imposed more rigorous fencing requirements, and imposed more rigorous recordkeeping and veterinary inspection requirements. Respondents brought an action suing the Appellants (the Missouri Conservation Commission) to prevent these regulations from going into effect. At trial, the circuit court declared that the regulations were invalid and enjoined the Commission from enforcing them. On appeal, the Commission raised three arguments. First, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because Respondents’ cervids are “game” and “wildlife resources of the state” and, therefore, can be regulated by the Commission under the Missouri Constitution. Second, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because the Commission’s authority to promulgate the regulations does not implicate or infringe on the Respondents’ rights to farm. Third, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred by enjoining the Commission’s enforcement of the new regulations against all people in Missouri, rather than only against the Respondents. The Respondents contend that captive cervids are not wildlife or game even though they are wild by nature because they are too domesticated and, therefore, akin to livestock. The Court rejects this contention and looks at the plain meaning of the terms “game” and “wildlife” and concludes that both terms plainly include all species that are wild by nature. The terms are not ambiguous. The Court points out that it would be unreasonable to hold that the Commission has constitutional authority to regulate individual cervids that are born free and still free-roaming but take away that authority when an individual cervid is considered domesticated. “The Court will not give a law a construction which would render it unreasonable when it is susceptible to a reasonable one.” Furthermore, historically, the term “game” was broad enough to embrace all kinds of deer whether tame or wild. Captive cervids are therefore considered “game” and “wildlife” and the Commission has authority under the Missouri Constitution to regulate Respondents’ captive cervids. Respondent’ second contention is that they own the captive cervids and, therefore, the cervids are not resources of the state. The Court rejects this contention. The Commission has always regulated deer and elk owned by private parties. The Court holds that the phrase “resources of the state” unambiguously refers to resources within the entire geographical boundaries of the state. Therefore, Respondents’ cervids are considered resources of the state. The Court agrees with the Commission’s second contention that the regulations did not infringe on Respondents’ right to farm. Respondents failed to show that they are engaged in farming and ranching practices and, therefore, cannot invoke the guarantee of the Missouri Constitution. The Court did not reach the Commission’s third contention. Ultimately the Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Respondents and entered judgment in favor of Appellants on both counts.

MO - Veterinary - 20 CSR 2270-6.011 Rules of Professional Conduct

Summary: Subsection 11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for veterinarians provides that a licensee shall not reveal confidential, proprietary or privileged facts or data or any other sensitive information contained in a patient's medical records without the prior consent of the client except as otherwise authorized or required by law, regulation, or other order. The subsection specifically states that "[w]hen these situations [of abuse and neglect] cannot be resolved through education, the board considers it the responsibility of the veterinarian to report such cases to the appropriate authorities." Thus, the rule seems to create an ethical responsibility that mandates the reporting of abuse or neglect by veterinarians.

Subsection 11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for veterinarians provides that a licensee shall not reveal confidential, proprietary or privileged facts or data or any other sensitive information contained in a patient's medical records without the prior consent of the client except as otherwise authorized or required by law, regulation, or other order. The subsection specifically states that "[w]hen these situations [of abuse and neglect] cannot be resolved through education, the board considers it the responsibility of the veterinarian to report such cases to the appropriate authorities." Thus, the rule seems to create an ethical responsibility that mandates the reporting of abuse or neglect by veterinarians.

MO - Lien, care and board - Chapter 430. Liens for Keeping, Training and Breeding Animals

Summary: This chapter of Missouri laws concerns liens for the keeping, training, and breeding of animals. Section 430.150 states that every person who keeps, boards or trains any horse, mule or other animal has a lien on such animal, and on any vehicle, harness or equipment that came with the animal, for the amount due. No owner or claimant has the right to take any such property out of the custody of the person having such lien, except with the lienholder's consent or on the payment of such debt. Section 430.160 outlines the procedure for enforcement of the lien, which includes where to file a claim and the notice requirements.

This chapter of Missouri laws concerns liens for the keeping, training, and breeding of animals. Section 430.150 states that every person who keeps, boards or trains any horse, mule or other animal has a lien on such animal, and on any vehicle, harness or equipment that came with the animal, for the amount due. No owner or claimant has the right to take any such property out of the custody of the person having such lien, except with the lienholder's consent or on the payment of such debt. Section 430.160 outlines the procedure for enforcement of the lien, which includes where to file a claim and the notice requirements.

Detailed Discussion of Missouri Great Ape Laws

Summary: The following discussion begins with a general overview of the various Missouri state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries. The discussion concludes with a compilation of local ordinances which govern the possession and use of apes within geographic subdivisions of the state.

The following discussion begins with a general overview of the various Missouri state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries. The discussion concludes with a compilation of local ordinances which govern the possession and use of apes within geographic subdivisions of the state.

MO - Initiatives - Proposition A (felony animal fighting)

Summary: <p>This 1998 ballot proposal asked, "[s]hall a statute be enacted making it a class D felony to bait or fight animals; permit such activities on premises you control; or promote, conduct, stage, advertise or collect fees for such activities; and making it a class A misdemeanor to knowingly attend baiting or fighting of animals; knowingly sell, offer for sale, or transport animals for such purposes; own, possess, manufacture or deal in cockfighting implements; bear wrestle; permit bear wrestling on premises you control; promote, conduct, stage, advertise, or collect fees for bear wrestling; or market, possess, train, or surgically alter a bear for bear wrestling?" It was passed in 1998 by 62.6% of voters.</p>

This 1998 ballot proposal asked, "[s]hall a statute be enacted making it a class D felony to bait or fight animals; permit such activities on premises you control; or promote, conduct, stage, advertise or collect fees for such activities; and making it a class A misdemeanor to knowingly attend baiting or fighting of animals; knowingly sell, offer for sale, or transport animals for such purposes; own, possess, manufacture or deal in cockfighting implements; bear wrestle; permit bear wrestling on premises you control; promote, conduct, stage, advertise, or collect fees for bear wrestling; or market, possess, train, or surgically alter a bear for bear wrestling?" It was passed in 1998 by 62.6% of voters.
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