Georgia

Summary: <p> The plaintiff,&nbsp;on behalf of her then seven-year-old son, brought an action against the defendant Elliot for injuries the child sustained resulting from a bite by defendant's&nbsp;golden retriever. The trial court granted the defendant's&nbsp;motion for a directed verdict reasoning that because this was the dog's first bite of a human, there was there was no cause of action under Georgia's &ldquo;first bite&rdquo; rule. The appellate court found that the excluded evidence did not indicate the owner had any reason to suspect that the dog had a propensity to bite and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion&nbsp;in granting&nbsp;defendant's motion or directing a verdict.&nbsp; </p>

Summary: <p> In this Georgia case, the plaintiff was injured from being bitten by defendants' dog who was chained to the bed of their pickup truck while the defendants were inside an adjacent restaurant. The plaintiff sued defendants,&nbsp;claiming that they failed to warn her of their dog's dangerous propensities and that they committed negligence per se by violating the state's strict liability statute (OCGA &sect; 51-2-7) and the Hall County Animal Control Ordinance. A jury found in favor of the defendants. The court found that the evidence was therefore more than sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that defendants' dog was &ldquo;under restraint&rdquo; for purposes of the ordinance. Further, there was no evidence that the owners had knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity. Affirmed. </p>

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The plaintiffs' 5-year-old child was bitten by the defendants' dog while the plaintiffs were visiting the defendants, who were also their neighbors. While jumping on the defendants' trampoline, the plaintiffs' child fell onto the defendants' dog who bit the child on the leg and would not let go for a few minutes.&nbsp; The plaintiffs contended at trial that the defendants' knowledge that the dog had "Wobbler's Syndrome," a cranial neck instability that causes leg problems, somehow put the defendants on notice of the dog's vicious propensity. However, the court discarded plaintiffs' argument, finding that is no evidence that Butkus had bitten or attempted to bite anyone before the incident. Further, there was no reason for the defendants to believe that the dog's leg condition would make it more apt to attack humans. </p>

Summary: <p> Deputy removed sick and malnourished animals from Defendant's property, initiated by a neighbor's call to the Sheriff.&nbsp; Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of cruelty to animals.&nbsp; He appealed, alleging illegal search and seizure based on lack of exigent circumstances to enter his property.&nbsp;&nbsp;The court found that deputy's entry into the home was done with Morgan's lawful consent, and, as such, the subsequent seizure of the dogs in the home was based on the deputy's plain view observations in a location where he was authorized to be. </p>

Summary: <p> In this Georgia case, the plaintiff-invitee&nbsp;was knocked into a barbed wire fence by horse that was being boarded by the property owner, suffering injuries as a result.&nbsp;The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's order of summary judgment, finding that, under dangerous-animal statute, the property owner did not know of any vicious propensity on part of horse.&nbsp;Further, the invitee failed to show that horse had a vicious propensity and therefore could not prevail on premises-liability claim. </p>

Summary: <p> In this Georgia case, the Court of Appeals held that, on issue of first impression, an alligator farm was not a "farm" within meaning of the state statute that exempted&nbsp;"farm laborers" or their employers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act (Gill was bitten while cleaning out a pen and subsequently developed both a bone infection and salmonella). In construing the relevant statutes, the court found that in the chapter on Employment Security Law (ESL), the legislature meant that individuals who raise or tend wildlife perform "agricultural labor," but only when they do so on a "farm," which is "used for production of stock, dairy products, poultry, fruit, and fur-bearing animals." Accordingly, the court concluded that when Gill cleaned out the alligator pens, he was caring for wildlife and thus performing "agricultural labor."&nbsp;However, his employer, an alligator farm, was not a "farm" because alligators are "wildlife," not "[live]stock ... [or] fur-bearing animals."&nbsp; </p>

Summary: <span> In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court found that the&nbsp;evidence showed that in the months prior to the July 14 and August 1 incidents, Pless's dogs were repeatedly found loose in neighbors' yards and garages. Accordingly, evidence supported the conviction on the charge of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance under &sect; 3-4-7(5). ("Public nuisance" is defined, among other things, as any animal which "[i]s found repeatedly at large."). On certiorari review, the Georgia Supreme Court in <a href="/cases/causga646se2d202.htm%20"> State v. Pless, 646 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 2007) </a> reversed judgment of Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App. 2006), and the case was then&nbsp;sent to <a href="/cases/causga648se2d752.htm"> Pless v. State, 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) </a> on remand. </span>

Summary: <p> A family friend wanted to ride&nbsp;a horse and&nbsp;the horse owner told him it&nbsp;was rideable, despite knowing the horse was not fully trained yet.&nbsp; The family friend sued after being kicked in the eye, knocked unconscious and paralyzed by the horse.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the horse owner on the basis that there was still a genuine issue of material fact as&nbsp;to the horse owner's immunity under the Equine Activities Act.&nbsp; </p>

Summary: <p> In this Georgia case, after sustaining severe injuries inflicted during a vicious attack by four pit bulls, Helene Ranwez sued her tenant neighbor and the owner of the rental property, Scott Roberts.&nbsp; The crucial question in this case was whether an out-of-possession landlord&nbsp;has liability for a tenant's dog bite.&nbsp; Roberts contended that because he had relinquished possession and control of the premises to his tenant, Glenn Forrest, he could not be held liable for Ranwez's injuries as a matter of law.&nbsp; In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court held that an out-of-possession landlord's tort liability to third persons is subject only to the statutory provisions of OCGA &sect; 44-7-14, which makes it clear that a landlord who relinquishes possession of the premises cannot be liable to third parties for damages arising from the negligence of the tenant. </p>

Summary: <div> <div> This Georgia case&nbsp;involves&nbsp;an action for injuries&nbsp;received by a boy after he was attacked by the defendant's dog.&nbsp;The lower court granted summary judgment to the defendant and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held that where there was no&nbsp;showing that the dog ever&nbsp;so much as growled at a human being before the attack, the owner of dog was not liable for injuries. Evidence that the dog previously&nbsp;chased a cat and had engaged in a fight with another dog was insufficient to show the owner's knowledge of the dog's vicious tendencies toward humans to create liability for the owner. </div> </div>