Georgia

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GA - Avondale Estates - Chapter 1: General Provisions & Chapter 4: Animals and Fowl

Summary: <p> In Avondale Estates, Georgia, animal fighting is not only prohibited by ordinance, but an animal trained for fighting is also considered a public nuisance, and an abused and dangerous animal. This ordinance provides provisions for each of the respective categories, as well as penalties for the violations. Notably, the city will not respond to a citizen's compliant about a violation of this chapter if the citizen chooses to remain anonymous. </p>

In Avondale Estates, Georgia, animal fighting is not only prohibited by ordinance, but an animal trained for fighting is also considered a public nuisance, and an abused and dangerous animal. This ordinance provides provisions for each of the respective categories, as well as penalties for the violations. Notably, the city will not respond to a citizen's compliant about a violation of this chapter if the citizen chooses to remain anonymous.

GA - Alto - Hoarding - Article 1: Animal Control ( §§ 6-2, 6-16, 6-40, 6-41)

Summary: <p> This Alto, Georgia hoarding ordinance makes it a crime to collect animals while failing to provide them with humane/adequate care; to collect dead animals that are not properly disposed of; and to collect, house, or harbor animals in filthy, unsanitary conditions that constitute a health hazard to the animals being kept, and/or to the animals or residents of adjacent property. A person found guilty of hoarding animals may not own, possess, or have on his or her premises in Alto any animal for one year from the date of conviction. Additionally, a person may also face fines not to exceed $1,000 or may also face imprisonment not to exceed 6 months or both. <br/> </p>

This Alto, Georgia hoarding ordinance makes it a crime to collect animals while failing to provide them with humane/adequate care; to collect dead animals that are not properly disposed of; and to collect, house, or harbor animals in filthy, unsanitary conditions that constitute a health hazard to the animals being kept, and/or to the animals or residents of adjacent property. A person found guilty of hoarding animals may not own, possess, or have on his or her premises in Alto any animal for one year from the date of conviction. Additionally, a person may also face fines not to exceed $1,000 or may also face imprisonment not to exceed 6 months or both.

I.B. Sirmans v. State

Summary: <p> Defendant was convicted of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. The portion of the sentence depriving defendant of animals which the State failed to demonstrate were abused vacated and case remanded; judgment affirmed in all other respects because the motion to suppress was properly denied, and defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to sever the trial. </p>

Defendant was convicted of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. The portion of the sentence depriving defendant of animals which the State failed to demonstrate were abused vacated and case remanded; judgment affirmed in all other respects because the motion to suppress was properly denied, and defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to sever the trial.

Griffith v. State

Summary: <p> Defendant was indicted under Ga. Penal Code &sect; 703, which prohibited one from instigating, engaging in, or doing anything furtherance of the an act or cruelty to a domestic animal. Ga. Penal Code &sect; 705 defined cruelty as every willful act, omission or neglect, whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the law provided that a domestic animal, such as a horse, should be sheltered and cared for by his owner. The jury was authorized to find that the defendant willfully abandoned the horse by turning the horse out to the elements, and failing to feed, shelter, or care for the animal. Such conduct was "willful." The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court on the jury's conviction of defendant for cruelty to animals. </p>

Defendant was indicted under Ga. Penal Code § 703, which prohibited one from instigating, engaging in, or doing anything furtherance of the an act or cruelty to a domestic animal. Ga. Penal Code § 705 defined cruelty as every willful act, omission or neglect, whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the law provided that a domestic animal, such as a horse, should be sheltered and cared for by his owner. The jury was authorized to find that the defendant willfully abandoned the horse by turning the horse out to the elements, and failing to feed, shelter, or care for the animal. Such conduct was "willful." The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court on the jury's conviction of defendant for cruelty to animals.

Greenway v. Northside Hosp., Inc.

Summary: <p> While completely disoriented at a hospital, the plaintiff was asked by deputies to sign a form releasing his two yellow labs to animal control in the event of the plaintiff's demise. The plaintiff was allegedly informed that if he did not die, he could retrieve his dogs in 7 to 10 days; he therefore signed the form without reading the terms. Later, the nurse informed him that his dogs had been euthanized and plaintiff filed suit. The trial court granted all of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, so the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court found an issue of material fact existed towards all defendants and therefore concluded that the trial court erred in granting all motions for summary judgment. </p>

While completely disoriented at a hospital, the plaintiff was asked by deputies to sign a form releasing his two yellow labs to animal control in the event of the plaintiff's demise. The plaintiff was allegedly informed that if he did not die, he could retrieve his dogs in 7 to 10 days; he therefore signed the form without reading the terms. Later, the nurse informed him that his dogs had been euthanized and plaintiff filed suit. The trial court granted all of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, so the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court found an issue of material fact existed towards all defendants and therefore concluded that the trial court erred in granting all motions for summary judgment.

Pless v. State

Summary: <p> In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, reversed the appellate court's holding and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. On remand, the appellate court vacated that portion of&nbsp;its opinion that reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own;&nbsp; all other respects of the appellate decision, Pless v. State, <a href="/cases/causga2006wl1237027.htm"> 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006), </a> remain undisturbed. </p>

In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, reversed the appellate court's holding and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. On remand, the appellate court vacated that portion of its opinion that reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own;  all other respects of the appellate decision, Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006), remain undisturbed.

State v. Pless

Summary: <p> In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court found that the evidence showed that in the months prior to the July 14 and August 1 incidents, Pless's dogs were repeatedly found loose in neighbors' yards and garages. Accordingly, evidence supported the conviction on the charge of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance under &sect; 3-4-7(5). ("Public nuisance" is defined, among other things, as any animal which "[i]s found repeatedly at large."). On certiorari review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the issue was not properly before the Court of Appeals and there was no authority for the court to address it sua sponte. </p>

In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court found that the evidence showed that in the months prior to the July 14 and August 1 incidents, Pless's dogs were repeatedly found loose in neighbors' yards and garages. Accordingly, evidence supported the conviction on the charge of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance under § 3-4-7(5). ("Public nuisance" is defined, among other things, as any animal which "[i]s found repeatedly at large."). On certiorari review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the issue was not properly before the Court of Appeals and there was no authority for the court to address it sua sponte.

Gibson v. Rezvanpour

Summary: <p> The prospective buyer of a home was bitten by the homeowner's dog.&nbsp; The prospective buyer filed a claim against the homeowners, real estate agents, real estate brokers and the real estate agency.&nbsp; The State Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. </p>

The prospective buyer of a home was bitten by the homeowner's dog.  The prospective buyer filed a claim against the homeowners, real estate agents, real estate brokers and the real estate agency.  The State Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Ranwez v. Roberts

Summary: <p> Plaintiff brought claims against her tenant neighbor and the property owner after she was viciously attacked by her tenant neighbor's four pit bulls.&nbsp; The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding the property owner was an out-of -possession landlord. </p>

Plaintiff brought claims against her tenant neighbor and the property owner after she was viciously attacked by her tenant neighbor's four pit bulls.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding the property owner was an out-of -possession landlord.

COLUMBUS R. CO. v. WOOLFOLK

Summary: <div> <div> In this Georgia case, Woolfolk brought a suit to recover the value of a dog that he alleged was willfully and wantonly killed by the running of a street car on defendant's line of road. The defendant demurred specially to the paragraph&nbsp;that alleged the value of the dog to be $200.&nbsp;Defendant&nbsp;argued that the measure of damages could not be based on the value of the dog because&nbsp;dogs have no market value. The court&nbsp;disagreed, first noting that, by the common law a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie and the modern trend is to value dogs in the same way other domestic animals are valued. Further, the court found&nbsp;a&nbsp;"better rule" for ascertaining the measure of damages: &ldquo;The value of a dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown. Judgment affirmed. </div> </div>

In this Georgia case, Woolfolk brought a suit to recover the value of a dog that he alleged was willfully and wantonly killed by the running of a street car on defendant's line of road. The defendant demurred specially to the paragraph that alleged the value of the dog to be $200. Defendant argued that the measure of damages could not be based on the value of the dog because dogs have no market value. The court disagreed, first noting that, by the common law a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie and the modern trend is to value dogs in the same way other domestic animals are valued. Further, the court found a "better rule" for ascertaining the measure of damages: “The value of a dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown. Judgment affirmed.
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