Georgia

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GA - Rabies - 40-13-2-.19. Pets.

Summary:

This Georgia regulation states that all dogs and cats twelve (12) weeks of age or older entering Georgia must have proof of a current and approved rabies vaccination in accordance with the most recent Compendium of Animal Rabies Control published by the National Association of State Public Health Veterinarians, Inc. It also provides other requirements for importation of pets.

Gomez v. Innocent

Summary:

Josh Gomez took his dog, Pilot, to Pet First Animal Hospital because Pilot was lethargic and throwing up. Gary Innocent, the veterinarian, diagnosed Pilot with parvo virus that could have killed him if left untreated. Innocent gave Gomez an estimate of $1,453.25 for the dog’s care. The animal hospital required full payment up front, but Gomez could not afford to pay so Innocent accepted $400 for one night’s care. Gomez left the dog for the night and called the following day. He was informed that he owed an additional $751.25. Gomez paid the $751.25 on the following day. Upon picking up Pilot from the animal hospital he was informed that he owed an additional $484.80. Gomez could not pay the $484.80 so Innocent asked Gomez to leave Pilot at the animal hospital until the bill was paid. Gomez obliged and left Pilot there. After Pilot was at the animal hospital for 20 days, a good Samaritan paid the dog’s accrued bill of $972. Gomez sued, alleging that Innocent and PetFirst breached their contract by refusing to return the dog after he paid the amounts agreed to, but before he paid “additional sums not agreed to by the parties in their initial contract.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Innocent and PetFirst. This appeal followed. Gomez claimed that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the validity of the veterinary lien statute. The Court stated that Innocent was a licensed veterinarian who, at Gomez’s request, treated Gomez’s dog. Gomez signed a treatment authorization form and was informed that all professional fees were due at the time services were rendered. A detailed written estimate of the expected treatments and costs was given to Gomez which stated that the total final bill could vary from the estimate. Gomez did not present any evidence creating an issue of material fact as to the accuracy or validity of any of the charges on the itemized bill that Innocent produced. Innocent met his burden by showing that he acted properly in relying on the veterinary lien statute to retain the dog when Gomez failed to pay. The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

GA - Restaurant, animals - 511-6-1-.07. Physical Facilities.

Summary:

This Georgia regulation has an exception for dogs in outdoor dining areas in the subsection of the regulation that prohibits animals in food service establishments. Subsection (5)(o)(vi) states that pet dogs may be allowed in outside dining areas of a food establishment provided patrons access the area from the outdoors and several other conditions are met. Pet dogs must not come into contact with any serving dishes, utensils, or tableware nor are they allowed on chairs, tables, or other furnishings. Employees and consumers must not provide food to pet dogs. The pet dogs must be kept on a leash and under control of the consumer at all times. At no time is the pet dog allowed to travel through the interior portion of the food service establishment. The establishment must also establish processes for training employees not to handle or pet the dogs and a procedure and equipment for the clean up of pet waste.

Saulsbury v. Wilson

Summary:

This Georgia involves an interlocutory appeal arising from a dog bite lawsuit. In 2016, Plaintiff Saulsbury was walking her English Bulldog past Defendant Wilson's house when Wilson's pitbull dog escaped its crate in the open garage. A fight ensued between the dogs. Wilson then attempted to break up the fight and was allegedly bitten by Saulsbury's dog, suffering a broken arm in the process and necessitating a course of rabies shots. The Saulsburys then sued the Wilsons in magistrate court to recover hospital and veterinary expenses. Wilson counterclaimed for her injuries in excess $15,000, thus transferring the case to superior court. At this time, the Saulsburys moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals here reverses that denial. The court found that Wilson assumed the risk when she intervened in a dog fight with her bare hands. In particular, the court observed that assumption of risk serves as a complete defense to negligence. That finding was bolstered by the fact that Wilson had knowledge that her dog had previously bitten other persons and had admitted to breaking up previous dog fights with a stick. The court relied on previous case law showing that all animals, even domesticated animals, pose a risk as does the act of breaking up even human fights. The court was not persuaded by the fact that Saulsbury may have been in violation of various DeKalb County ordinances related to an owner's responsibility to control his or her animal. A plain reading of those ordinances does not impose a duty on the part of an owner to "dangerously insert herself into a dog fight." The court found the lower court erred in denying the Saulsbury's motion for summary judgment and reversed and remanded the case.

Wyno v. Lowndes County

Summary:

Misty Wyno was attacked and killed by a neighbor’s dog. Her husband, Jason Wyno brought a wrongful death action against the dog’s owners, Lowndes County, and four individual Lowndes County Animal Control employees. Jason alleged that Lowndes County and the County Employees negligently failed to perform ministerial duties, negligently failed to provide police protection, negligently created and failed to abate a nuisance, were negligent in their control of allegedly dangerous dogs, and were negligent per se by violating several provisions of the Lowndes County Animal Control Ordinance. Jason also alleged that the County Employees acted with actual malice and/or an intent to injure by repeatedly refusing to investigate or take any action with regards to the dangerous dogs. Lowndes County asserted sovereign immunity as a defense for both itself and its employees. In addition, Lowndes County and the County Employees asserted that they were immune from liability due to the provisions of the Dangerous Dog Control Law in effect at the time. The trial court dismissed the suit against the employees in their individual capacities finding that the Dangerous Dog Control Law barred an action against any party except the dog’s owners. The Supreme Court of Georgia ultimately held that the record was devoid of any evidence that any of the County Employees acted with malice or the intent to harm Jason or Misty Wyno to defeat official immunity. Jason, therefore, did not satisfy his burden and the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Bramblett v. Habersham Cty.

Summary:

Defendants appeal from an order granting a petition for recoupment of costs filed by Habersham County pursuant to OCGA § 4-11-9.8, and a separate order directing the defendants to pay $69,282.85 into the court registry in connection with the boarding, treatment, and care of 29 dogs that the Brambletts refused to surrender after the County seized over 400 animals from their property. In April 2017, over 400 animals were removed from the Bramblett's property and they were charged with over 340 counts of cruelty to animals under Georgia law. There were 29 animals that were not surrendered and were running loose on the property. The current petition for recoupment of costs here refers to the care for those 29 animals, which were later impounded. The Brambletts appealed that order, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the County's petition without providing notice under OCGA § 4-11-9.4. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the procedure in OCGA § 4-11-9.8 applied because the notice provisions of OCGA §§ 4-11-9.4 and 4-11-9.5 only apply when the animal has been impounded “under” or “pursuant to this article” of the Georgia Animal Protection Act. Here, the animals were seized under as part of an investigation of violations of OCGA § 16-12-4 so the notice provisions did not apply. As to defendants contention that the court erred by not considering the "actual predicted costs" of caring for 29 dogs and instead relying on a "formulaic calculation," the court also found no error. The judgment was affirmed.

State v. Peabody

Summary:

This Georgia case involves a former police lieutenant who was indicted on two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals after he left his K-9 named Inka locked in his police vehicle while he attended to tasks inside his home. The dog died after being left inside the vehicle, which had all doors and windows closed with no A/C or ventilation running. The state appeals the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to quash the indictment. Specifically, the state argues that OCGA § 17-7-52 (a law that requires at least a 20-day notice prior to presentment of a proposed indictment to a grand jury when a peace officer is charged with a crime that occurred in the performance of his or her duties) is inapplicable. The state did not send defendant a copy of the proposed indictment before it presented the case to the grand jury. The state contends defendant "stepped aside" from his police-related duties and was therefore not afforded the protections of OCGA § 17-7-52. This court disagreed with that assessment. Since Peabody was responsible for the care and housing of Inka as her K-9 handler, leaving her unattended, albeit in an illegal manner, was still in performance of his police duties. As such, Peabody was entitled to the procedural protections of the statute according to the appellate court. The trial court's motion to quash his indictment was affirmed.

GA - Hunting - § 27-3-28. Possession of wildlife accidentally killed by motor vehicle

Summary:

This Georgia states that except as otherwise provided in this Code, any person may lawfully possess native wildlife which have been accidentally killed by a motor vehicle. However, the person taking possession of a bear accidentally killed by a motor vehicle shall notify a law enforcement officer within 48 hours after taking possession of the bear; and this Code section shall not authorize any person to take possession of any animal of a species designated as a protected species under Article 5 of this chapter or under federal law.

Steagald v. Eason

Summary:

In this case, Gary and Lori Steagald sued the Eason family, alleging that the Easons failed to keep their dog properly restrained and were therefore liable under OCGA § 51-2-7. Lori Steagald suffered injuries after the Easons dog attacked her while she was visiting the Easons home. The Easons filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that they had no reason to know that the dog was vicious or dangerous and therefore were not liable under the statute. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals affirmed the motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the lower court’s decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that the Eason family was liable under the statute because they did have reason to believe that the dog could potentially be vicious or dangerous. The Court focused on the fact that the dog had previously “growled and snapped” at the Easons while being fed. The Court held that although the dog had never bit anyone prior to Lori Steagald, it was reasonable to assume that the dog could potentially bite and injure someone given the fact that it had a history of snapping and growling. As a result, the Court reversed the Easons motion for summary judgment and determined that the question of whether or not the Easons are liable under the statute is a question for the jury. 

Gilreath v. Smith

Summary:

While pet sitting for Defendants Bruce and Jodi Smith, Plaintiff Josephine Gilreath was attacked and injured by the Smiths' rooster, which caused a serious infection with long-term consequences. Plaintiff Gilreath filed suit, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the ground that Gilreath assumed the risk. Gilreath appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and reasoned that Gilreath assumed the risk of injury based on the state statutes of owners of land under OCGA § 51-3-1, as keepers of a vicious or dangerous animal under OCGA § 51-2-7, and as required by a Roswell city ordinance. The Court reasoned that at prior pet-sittings at the Defendants home, Gilreath had been warned that the rooster would attack and that a garbage can lid was useful for controlling the rooster. Second, Gilreath has not raised an issue of fact regarding whether the Smiths had superior knowledge of the risks associated with the danger. Gilreath, a professional pet sitter with at least nine years of experience, admitted that she had a responsibility to educate herself about the animals she takes care of yet she failed to do so for roosters. Third, Gilreath admitted that she chose to take the job knowing that she had been told that the rooster would attack. Gilreath also contends that the Smiths violated a Roswell city ordinance, but she failed to introduce a certified copy of the ordinance and thus failed to prove this claim.
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