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Brower v. Evans

Summary: <p> The district court held that the Secretary's Initial Finding, triggering a change in the dolphin-safe label standard, was not in accordance with the law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the Secretary failed to (1) obtain and consider preliminary data from the congressionally mandated stress studies and (2) apply the proper legal standard to the available scientific information. We affirm. </p>

The district court held that the Secretary's Initial Finding, triggering a change in the dolphin-safe label standard, was not in accordance with the law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the Secretary failed to (1) obtain and consider preliminary data from the congressionally mandated stress studies and (2) apply the proper legal standard to the available scientific information. We affirm.

U.S. v. Oliver

Summary: <p> Despite delays in receiving eagle parts through the federal permit process, the court rules the BGEPA does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.&nbsp; There is nothing so peculiar about defendant's situation to allow a one-man exception.&nbsp; For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by Native Americans, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#religious"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act </a> . </p>

Despite delays in receiving eagle parts through the federal permit process, the court rules the BGEPA does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  There is nothing so peculiar about defendant's situation to allow a one-man exception.  For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

U.S. v. Martinelli

Summary: <p> Court held the 1962 version of the BGEPA mandates a jury trial where defendant requests one, despite the fact it constitutes a "petty offense."&nbsp; For further discussion&nbsp;of criminal prosecutions under the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#criminal"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. </a> </p>

Court held the 1962 version of the BGEPA mandates a jury trial where defendant requests one, despite the fact it constitutes a "petty offense."  For further discussion of criminal prosecutions under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

U.S. v. Hayashi

Summary: <p> Appellant challenged the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, which convicted him of taking a marine mammal in violation of the MMPA.&nbsp; The court reversed appellant's conviction for taking a marine mammal under the MMPA.&nbsp; It held that the MMPA and the regulations implementing the act did not make it a crime to take reasonable steps to deter porpoises from eating fish or bait off a fisherman's line.&nbsp; </p>

Appellant challenged the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, which convicted him of taking a marine mammal in violation of the MMPA.  The court reversed appellant's conviction for taking a marine mammal under the MMPA.  It held that the MMPA and the regulations implementing the act did not make it a crime to take reasonable steps to deter porpoises from eating fish or bait off a fisherman's line. 

Gibson v. Babbitt

Summary: <p> Defendant, a Native American, challenged the constitutionality of the limitation of eagle parts through the permit system to members of federally recognized tribes.&nbsp; The limitation under the federal eagle permit system to federally recognized Indian tribes does not violate RFRA because the government has a compelling interest in protecting a species in demise and fulfilling pre-existing trust obligations to federally-recognized tribes in light of the limited supply of eagle parts.&nbsp; For further discussion on free exercise challenges under the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#free"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. </a> </p>

Defendant, a Native American, challenged the constitutionality of the limitation of eagle parts through the permit system to members of federally recognized tribes.  The limitation under the federal eagle permit system to federally recognized Indian tribes does not violate RFRA because the government has a compelling interest in protecting a species in demise and fulfilling pre-existing trust obligations to federally-recognized tribes in light of the limited supply of eagle parts.  For further discussion on free exercise challenges under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

ALDF v. Glickman

Summary: <p> Animal welfare organization and individual plaintiffs brought action against United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), challenging regulations promulgated under Animal Welfare Act (AWA) to promote psychological well-being of nonhuman primates kept by exhibitors and researchers.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals held that: (1) regulations were valid, and (2) animal welfare organization did not have standing to raise procedural injury. Case discussed in topic: <a href="/articles/ovusawa.htm#BM6_Regulatory_Process"> US Animal Welfare Act </a> </p>

Animal welfare organization and individual plaintiffs brought action against United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), challenging regulations promulgated under Animal Welfare Act (AWA) to promote psychological well-being of nonhuman primates kept by exhibitors and researchers.  The Court of Appeals held that: (1) regulations were valid, and (2) animal welfare organization did not have standing to raise procedural injury. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act

U.S. v. Hardman (On Rehearing En Banc)

Summary: <p> The Hardman and Wilgus cases are remanded for factfinding where the record was limited as to whether the government employed the least restrictive means&nbsp;to support its compelling interests of protecting eagles and Native American culture.&nbsp; On the Saenz motion for return of eagle feathers to a non-federally recognized Indian religious practitioner, the court holds that the government failed to support its assertions that opening the permit system to all adherents of Indian religions would compromise the eagle population or destroy federal trust obligations to Native American tribes/culture.&nbsp; For discussion of the BGEPA and religious challenges, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#religious"> Detailed Discussion </a> . </p>

The Hardman and Wilgus cases are remanded for factfinding where the record was limited as to whether the government employed the least restrictive means to support its compelling interests of protecting eagles and Native American culture.  On the Saenz motion for return of eagle feathers to a non-federally recognized Indian religious practitioner, the court holds that the government failed to support its assertions that opening the permit system to all adherents of Indian religions would compromise the eagle population or destroy federal trust obligations to Native American tribes/culture.  For discussion of the BGEPA and religious challenges, see Detailed Discussion .

City of Sausalito v. Brian O'Neill

Summary: <p> In considering standing under the MMPA, the court found that the plaintiff city had only pure economic injury and had not shown that any harm would result to marine mammals protected under the MMPA.&nbsp; </p>

In considering standing under the MMPA, the court found that the plaintiff city had only pure economic injury and had not shown that any harm would result to marine mammals protected under the MMPA. 

Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001))

Summary: <p> (This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized.&nbsp; The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that&nbsp;the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts.&nbsp; For discussion of&nbsp;Eagle Act, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#formerly"> Detailed Discussion </a> . </p>

(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized.  The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts.  For discussion of Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion .

U.S. v. Wilgus

Summary: <p> This opinion was vacated by the <u> Hardman </u> order.&nbsp; Defendant&nbsp;was not a member of a federally-recognized tribe nor a person of Native American ancestry,&nbsp;but sincerely practiced Native American religions.&nbsp; In response to Wilgus's free exercise challenge,&nbsp;the court held that the Act is a neutral, generally applicable law, falling within the safe-harbor created by <u> Employment Division v. Smith </u> .&nbsp; For further discussion on the status of formerly recognized tribes under the BGEPA, please see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#formerly"> Detailed Discussion. </a> </p>

This opinion was vacated by the Hardman order.  Defendant was not a member of a federally-recognized tribe nor a person of Native American ancestry, but sincerely practiced Native American religions.  In response to Wilgus's free exercise challenge, the court held that the Act is a neutral, generally applicable law, falling within the safe-harbor created by Employment Division v. Smith .  For further discussion on the status of formerly recognized tribes under the BGEPA, please see Detailed Discussion.

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