Federal

Summary: <p> Defendant shipped caviar made from the roe of Columbia River sturgeon, which he paid&nbsp;for in cash and fictitiously recorded the caviar as imported.&nbsp; The Company and Hansen-Sturm were indicted for the violations of the Lacey Act and for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act.&nbsp; The court held that defendants could be convicted for the lesser included offense of&nbsp;conspiracy to perform a negligent act, even though it was based on a standard of negligence versus intentional conduct.&nbsp; The conspirators in the exercise of due care should have known that the protected prey was taken and possessed in violation of state law.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </p>

Summary: <span> Dog broker shipping dogs under 8 weeks old was assessed civil penalty of $7,000 and license as dealer under Animal Welfare Act was suspended for 35 days, since broker was one of largest dog brokers in state, 8-week minimum age requirement was based on finding that ability of dogs to function in adult environment was adversely affected if shipped under that age, violations were serious and flagrant in view of large number of puppies shipped on 10 different occasions during 2-month period, and broker had violated Act and standards on prior occasion resulting in 12 day license suspension. </span>

Summary: <span> Secretary is authorized to promulgate standards applicable to operator of auction sale as to care, treatment, housing, feeding, watering, and sanitation of animals, since literal language of 7 USCS &sect; 2142 and its legislative history gives Secretary broad authority to impose on auction operator standards of humane handling of all animals subject to Animal Welfare Act, and although construing word "handling" in &sect; 2143 broad enough to include those areas would nullify significance and effect of additional terms, contemporaneous construction of Act by administrative officials charged with responsibility for achieving congressional purpose of ensuring humane care and treatment of animals indicates Secretary has authority to impose such standards on auction operators. </span>

Summary: <p> The United States initiated an action seeking an interpretation of Indian fishing rights under treaties with Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest.&nbsp; The Court held that the language of the treaties securing a "right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory" was not intended merely to guarantee the Indians access to usual and accustomed fishing sites and an "equal opportunity" for individual Indians, along with non-Indians, to try to catch fish, but instead secures to the Indian tribes a right to harvest a share of each run of anadromous fish that passes through tribal fishing areas.&nbsp; Thus, an equitable measure of the common right to take fish should initially divide the harvestable portion of each run that passes through a "usual and accustomed" place into approximately equal treaty and nontreaty shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser amount.&nbsp; The Court also held that any state-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause, and the State Game and Fisheries Departments, as parties to this litigation, may be ordered to prepare a set of rules that will implement the court's interpretation of the parties' rights even if state law withholds from them the power to do so. </p>

Summary: <p> The&nbsp;Oklahoma statute at issue prohibited transporting or shipping outside the State for sale natural minnows seined or procured from waters within the State. Appellant, who held a Texas license to operate a commercial minnow business in Texas, was charged with violating the Oklahoma statute by transporting from Oklahoma to Texas a load of natural minnows purchased from a minnow dealer licensed to do business in Oklahoma.&nbsp; In overruling Geer v. Connecticut, the Court held that the Oklahoma statute on its face discriminated against interstate commerce by forbidding the transportation of natural minnows out of the State for purposes of sale, and thus overtly blocking the flow of interstate commerce at the State's border. </p>

Summary: <p> <span> Imposition of $4,000 civil penalty was appropriate under 7 USCS &sect; 2149(b) where respondent committed numerous, serious violations of Animal Welfare Act, respondent handled large number of animals, and violations continued after respondent was advised in writing of violations and given opportunity to correct them. </span> </p>

Summary: <p> Environmental Groups sued the National Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Department of Commerce for making regulations which allowed swordfish longline fishing along the Hawaii coast, alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Court found that because the regulations were made under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (Magnuson Act), and because that Act had a 30-day time limit for when challenges to regulations could be made, the environmental groups has not brought their challenge to the regulations in time. </p>

Summary: <p> After an 8th Circuit decision to affirm the district court's summary judgment against Szabla and to reverse the district court&rsquo;s grant of summary judgment for the City of Brooklyn Park, the City of Brooklyn Park filed a petition requesting a hearing en blanc. The 8th Circuit granted the petition, but&nbsp;limited the en blanc hearing to the issues raised in the city&rsquo;s petition.&nbsp; In all other respects, however, the Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Mn., 429 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 2005) panel opinion and judgment were reinstated.&nbsp;Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, 486 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007). </p>

Summary: <p> Appellants brought this action for declaratory and other relief claiming that the Montana statutory elk-hunting license scheme, which imposes substantially higher (at least 7 1/2 times) license fees on nonresidents of the State than on residents, and which requires nonresidents (but not residents) to purchase a "combination" license in order to be able to obtain a single elk, denies nonresidents their constitutional rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, &sect; 2, and by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.&nbsp; The court held that the Privileges and Immunity Clause is not implicated, as access to recreational hunting is not fundamental and Montana has provided equal access for both residents and non-residents.&nbsp; Further, the statutory scheme does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the state has demonstrated a rational relationship between the increased fee to non-residents (i.e., protection of a finite resource (elk) where there has been a substantial increase in non-resident hunters). </p>

Summary: <p> The Fund for Animals petitioned the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to list as endangered the trumpeter swans living in Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho.&nbsp; The Fish and Wildlife Service denied the petition without giving a good explanation why, so the Fund for Animals sued.&nbsp; The court found that because the Fish and Wildlife Service had subsequently provided a letter finding that the swans were not "markedly separated from other populations"&nbsp;and were&nbsp;part of the Rocky Mountain population, which was growing in numbers, the FWS had provided a sufficient explanation and the case&nbsp;against it was therefore&nbsp;moot.&nbsp; </p>