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IN RE: CRAIG LESSER AND MARILYN LESSER

Summary: <p> Respondents, Craig and Marilyn Lesser, were respectively, president and vice-president of LSR Industries, a Wisconsin corporation that was in the business of breeding and selling rabbits to research institutions, and licensed dealers under the&nbsp;Animal Welfare Act. The ALJ&nbsp;issued an Initial Decision and Order assessing civil penalties of $9,250, and suspending Respondents' license for 30 days,&nbsp;after respondents&nbsp;interfered with APHIS inspections of their facilities and failed to maintain their facilities in accordance with the standards involving housing, sanitation, cleaning, ventilation, storage of food and bedding, and lighting. However, the Judicial Officer increased the civil penalties of $9,250 assessed by the ALJ by $500, because of sanitation and waste violations, for which the ALJ assessed no civil penalties.&nbsp;Since Respondents did not raise any issue before the ALJ as to whether warrantless inspections are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, they cannot raise the issue on appeal. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by warrantless inspections under this regulatory statute. </p>

Respondents, Craig and Marilyn Lesser, were respectively, president and vice-president of LSR Industries, a Wisconsin corporation that was in the business of breeding and selling rabbits to research institutions, and licensed dealers under the Animal Welfare Act. The ALJ issued an Initial Decision and Order assessing civil penalties of $9,250, and suspending Respondents' license for 30 days, after respondents interfered with APHIS inspections of their facilities and failed to maintain their facilities in accordance with the standards involving housing, sanitation, cleaning, ventilation, storage of food and bedding, and lighting. However, the Judicial Officer increased the civil penalties of $9,250 assessed by the ALJ by $500, because of sanitation and waste violations, for which the ALJ assessed no civil penalties. Since Respondents did not raise any issue before the ALJ as to whether warrantless inspections are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, they cannot raise the issue on appeal. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by warrantless inspections under this regulatory statute.

IN RE: CECIL BROWNING, DELORES BROWNING AND DARREN BROWNING, d/b/a ALLIGATORLAND SAFARI ZOO, INC.

Summary: <p> This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. s 2131 et seq.), and the regulations and standards issued thereunder (9 C.F.R. s 1.1 et seq.). On November 20, 1992, Administrative Law Judge Edwin S. Bernstein (ALJ) issued an Initial Decision and Order assessing a civil penalty of $2,000, and suspending Respondents' license for 30 days, and thereafter until they are in full compliance with the Act, regulations and standards, because Respondents failed to keep their primary enclosures sanitary and in suitable condition, failed to maintain complete records, failed to keep food and watering receptacles clean, failed to handle wastes properly, failed to provide adequate veterinarian care, and failed to utilize sufficient personnel to maintain proper husbandry practices.&nbsp;(Respondents were licensed exhibitors of captive wildlife, including deer, non-human primates, and bears, among other animals.) The court also found the sanctions were not too severe, considering the willfullness of the violations. </p>

This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. s 2131 et seq.), and the regulations and standards issued thereunder (9 C.F.R. s 1.1 et seq.). On November 20, 1992, Administrative Law Judge Edwin S. Bernstein (ALJ) issued an Initial Decision and Order assessing a civil penalty of $2,000, and suspending Respondents' license for 30 days, and thereafter until they are in full compliance with the Act, regulations and standards, because Respondents failed to keep their primary enclosures sanitary and in suitable condition, failed to maintain complete records, failed to keep food and watering receptacles clean, failed to handle wastes properly, failed to provide adequate veterinarian care, and failed to utilize sufficient personnel to maintain proper husbandry practices. (Respondents were licensed exhibitors of captive wildlife, including deer, non-human primates, and bears, among other animals.) The court also found the sanctions were not too severe, considering the willfullness of the violations.

LEE ROACH AND ROACH LABORATORIES, INC.

Summary: <span> Company which produces antiserum for medical diagnostic tests by injecting rabbits and other live animals with antigens and then extracting their blood is research facility within meaning of Act. </span>

Company which produces antiserum for medical diagnostic tests by injecting rabbits and other live animals with antigens and then extracting their blood is research facility within meaning of Act.

IN RE: TERRY LEE HARRISON AND PAMELA SUE HARRISON, RESPONDENTS

Summary: <span> Willful violation is defined as one where violator either intentionally does act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive or reliance on erroneous advice, or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements. </span>

Willful violation is defined as one where violator either intentionally does act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive or reliance on erroneous advice, or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements.

IN RE: PET PARADISE, INC.

Summary: <span> Where complaint advised respondent of exact matters at issue, there is no basis for dismissing any allegations of complaint merely because they failed to specify subsections of regulations or standards involved in some of alleged violations. Formalities of court pleading are not applicable in administrative proceedings. Findings of fact need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. A violation is willful if the person intentionally does an act which is prohibited or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements. </span>

Where complaint advised respondent of exact matters at issue, there is no basis for dismissing any allegations of complaint merely because they failed to specify subsections of regulations or standards involved in some of alleged violations. Formalities of court pleading are not applicable in administrative proceedings. Findings of fact need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. A violation is willful if the person intentionally does an act which is prohibited or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements.

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon

Summary: <em> (edited from Syllabus of the Court) </em> As relevant here, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act) makes it unlawful for any person to &ldquo;take&rdquo; endangered or threatened species, &sect; 9(a)(1)(B), and defines &ldquo;take&rdquo; to mean to &ldquo;harass, harm, pursue,&rdquo; &ldquo; wound,&rdquo; or &ldquo;kill,&rdquo; &sect; 3(19). In 50 CFR &sect; 17.3, petitioner Secretary of the Interior further defines &ldquo;harm&rdquo; to include &ldquo;significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.&rdquo; Respondents, persons and entities dependent on the forest products industries and others, challenged this regulation on its face, claiming that Congress did not intend the word &ldquo;take&rdquo; to include habitat modification. <em> Held: </em> The Secretary reasonably construed Congress' intent when he defined &ldquo;harm&rdquo; to include habitat modification.

(edited from Syllabus of the Court) As relevant here, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act) makes it unlawful for any person to “take” endangered or threatened species, § 9(a)(1)(B), and defines “take” to mean to “harass, harm, pursue,” “ wound,” or “kill,” § 3(19). In 50 CFR § 17.3, petitioner Secretary of the Interior further defines “harm” to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.” Respondents, persons and entities dependent on the forest products industries and others, challenged this regulation on its face, claiming that Congress did not intend the word “take” to include habitat modification. Held: The Secretary reasonably construed Congress' intent when he defined “harm” to include habitat modification.

U.S. v. Clucas

Summary: <p> Defendant and&nbsp;several individuals went on a duck hunt in and were charged with exceeding the limit for migratory birds under Virginia law.&nbsp; The game wardens testified that the defendant, Clucas, admitted in the presence of the other parties that they had killed more than the 'bag', meaning thereby that they had killed more than ten ducks allowed for each person.&nbsp; The government held the position that the other individuals were hired&nbsp;for the reason of taking or killing the ducks.&nbsp; The court held that in view of the fact that January 6, 1943, was not the first day of the season the possession of twenty-six ducks by the two defendants did not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Virginia regulation. The possession being legal, the burden of proof did not shift to the defendants.&nbsp; </p>

Defendant and several individuals went on a duck hunt in and were charged with exceeding the limit for migratory birds under Virginia law.  The game wardens testified that the defendant, Clucas, admitted in the presence of the other parties that they had killed more than the 'bag', meaning thereby that they had killed more than ten ducks allowed for each person.  The government held the position that the other individuals were hired for the reason of taking or killing the ducks.  The court held that in view of the fact that January 6, 1943, was not the first day of the season the possession of twenty-six ducks by the two defendants did not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Virginia regulation. The possession being legal, the burden of proof did not shift to the defendants. 

U.S. v. Guthrie

Summary: <p> The court affirmed the decision of the district court which convicted defendant of violations of the Lacey Act (Act) and the Endangered Species Act. The court held that the Act was not unconstitutional, that defendant was not permitted to collaterally challenge an agency regulation on the grounds of new scientific evidence, and that the Secretary of the Interior's finding that the turtle was a valid species was not arbitrary. </p>

The court affirmed the decision of the district court which convicted defendant of violations of the Lacey Act (Act) and the Endangered Species Act. The court held that the Act was not unconstitutional, that defendant was not permitted to collaterally challenge an agency regulation on the grounds of new scientific evidence, and that the Secretary of the Interior's finding that the turtle was a valid species was not arbitrary.

Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co.

Summary: <div> In this case, an environmental group filed a citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) seeking an injunction to prevent modification of the habitat of a pair of spotted owls by defendant-logging company. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon entered summary judgment for the logging company. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court found the issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly interpreted the ESA to foreclose citizen suits that only allege a future injury to a protected species. The Court held that the ESA's language, purpose, and structure authorize citizens to seek an injunction against an imminent threat of harm to a protected species. The&nbsp;proposed clear-cutting logging activity&nbsp;was imminent and reasonably certain to injure the owl pair&nbsp;by significantly impairing their essential behavioral patterns. </div>

In this case, an environmental group filed a citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) seeking an injunction to prevent modification of the habitat of a pair of spotted owls by defendant-logging company. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon entered summary judgment for the logging company. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court found the issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly interpreted the ESA to foreclose citizen suits that only allege a future injury to a protected species. The Court held that the ESA's language, purpose, and structure authorize citizens to seek an injunction against an imminent threat of harm to a protected species. The proposed clear-cutting logging activity was imminent and reasonably certain to injure the owl pair by significantly impairing their essential behavioral patterns.
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