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AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, et al., Plaintiffs v. RINGLING BROTHERS AND BARNUM & BAILEY CIRCUS, e

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs-ASPCA filed suit against Ringling Brothers and Barnum &amp; Bailey Circus and Feld Entertainment, Inc, under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that FEI routinely beats elephants, chains them for long periods of time, hits them with sharp bull hooks, breaks baby elephants with force to make them submissive, and forcibly removes baby elephants from their mothers before they are weaned. This conduct, plaintiffs contend, violates the "take" provision of the ESA. </p>

Plaintiffs-ASPCA filed suit against Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus and Feld Entertainment, Inc, under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that FEI routinely beats elephants, chains them for long periods of time, hits them with sharp bull hooks, breaks baby elephants with force to make them submissive, and forcibly removes baby elephants from their mothers before they are weaned. This conduct, plaintiffs contend, violates the "take" provision of the ESA.

American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals et al v. Ringling Brothers, et al,

Summary: <p> This case involves the Ringling Brothers circus company&rsquo;s mistreatment of elephants brought by the ASPCA. Plaintiffs alleged that the alleged routine beating, chaining, and other mistreatment amounted to an unlawful taking of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Judge rejects defendants&rsquo; motion to dismiss and order the case to proceed. </p>

This case involves the Ringling Brothers circus company’s mistreatment of elephants brought by the ASPCA. Plaintiffs alleged that the alleged routine beating, chaining, and other mistreatment amounted to an unlawful taking of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Judge rejects defendants’ motion to dismiss and order the case to proceed.

Animal Legal Defense Fund; Animal Welfare Institute; Valerie Buchanan; Jane Garrison; Nancy Megna, plaintiffs-appellants v. Ann

Summary: In this federal action, plaintiffs (ALDF, the AWI, and three individuals) challenged the USDA's decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of on-human primates in order to comply with the Animal Welfare Act. While the district court found that the USDA's decision did not constitute a reviewable final agency decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the lower court did indeed have authority under the Administrative Procedures Act to review the agency's decision not to create a policy. On June 4, 2007, the Court vacated the previous opinion and dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Two judges wrote separate opinions, concurring and dissenting in part.

In this federal action, plaintiffs (ALDF, the AWI, and three individuals) challenged the USDA's decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of on-human primates in order to comply with the Animal Welfare Act. While the district court found that the USDA's decision did not constitute a reviewable final agency decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the lower court did indeed have authority under the Administrative Procedures Act to review the agency's decision not to create a policy. On June 4, 2007, the Court vacated the previous opinion and dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Two judges wrote separate opinions, concurring and dissenting in part.

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, COMPLAINT FOR VALERIE BUCHANAN, JANE GARRISON, AND NANCY MEGNA DECLARATORY

Summary: This action concerns a lawsuit filed by the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), et al, over the lack of action by the federal agency, the Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to adopt a policy on what constitutes appropriate conditions for primates in federally licensed or registered facilities. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the failure of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United State Department of Agriculture to make a final decision concerning the defendants' proposed “Policy On Environment Enhancement For Nonhuman Primates.” See 64 Fed. Reg. 38,145 (July 15, 1999) (Policy). APHIS determined at least seven years ago that APHIS enforcement officials and the regulated community urgently need such a policy to insure that primates are housed in “physical environments adequate to promote the[ir] psychological well-being,” as required by the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). 7 U.S.C. § 2143. By failing to make a final decision on the proposed Policy, defendants are violating the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143, and are unreasonably delaying and/or unlawfully withholding agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

This action concerns a lawsuit filed by the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), et al, over the lack of action by the federal agency, the Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to adopt a policy on what constitutes appropriate conditions for primates in federally licensed or registered facilities. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the failure of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United State Department of Agriculture to make a final decision concerning the defendants' proposed “Policy On Environment Enhancement For Nonhuman Primates.” See 64 Fed. Reg. 38,145 (July 15, 1999) (Policy). APHIS determined at least seven years ago that APHIS enforcement officials and the regulated community urgently need such a policy to insure that primates are housed in “physical environments adequate to promote the[ir] psychological well-being,” as required by the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). 7 U.S.C. § 2143. By failing to make a final decision on the proposed Policy, defendants are violating the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143, and are unreasonably delaying and/or unlawfully withholding agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, a California corporation, CHIMPANZEE COLLABORATORY, SARAH BAECKLER, AMAZING ANIMAL ACTORS, INC., a Ca

Summary: Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that defendants, individuals and companies who use non-human primates in television and movie productions, engage in physical and psychological abuse of chimpanzees. According to plaintiffs, the abuse has been going on for years and includes violent beatings with sticks and other implements. Plaintiffs raise their first cause of action under the federal Endangered Species Act, contending that defendant's harassment, beating, and brutalization of the chimpanzees constitutes a "taking" under the ESA. Plaintiffs also raise causes of action under California law for specific recovery of property (e.g., the primates), conversion, violations under the California Business Code, and violations under the cruelty provisions of the California Penal Code.

Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that defendants, individuals and companies who use non-human primates in television and movie productions, engage in physical and psychological abuse of chimpanzees. According to plaintiffs, the abuse has been going on for years and includes violent beatings with sticks and other implements. Plaintiffs raise their first cause of action under the federal Endangered Species Act, contending that defendant's harassment, beating, and brutalization of the chimpanzees constitutes a "taking" under the ESA. Plaintiffs also raise causes of action under California law for specific recovery of property (e.g., the primates), conversion, violations under the California Business Code, and violations under the cruelty provisions of the California Penal Code.

Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises, Plaintiffs, by their Next Friends, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc

Summary: In this case of first impression, five wild-captured orcas named Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), seek a declaration that they are held by the Defendants in violation of Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs were forcibly taken from their families and natural habitats, are held captive at SeaWorld San Diego and SeaWorld Orlando, denied everything that is natural to them, subjected to artificial insemination or sperm collection to breed performers for Defendants’ shows, and forced to perform, all for Defendants’ profit. As such, Plaintiffs are held in slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction freeing them from Defendants’ bondage and placing them in a habitat suited to their individual needs and best interests.

In this case of first impression, five wild-captured orcas named Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), seek a declaration that they are held by the Defendants in violation of Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs were forcibly taken from their families and natural habitats, are held captive at SeaWorld San Diego and SeaWorld Orlando, denied everything that is natural to them, subjected to artificial insemination or sperm collection to breed performers for Defendants’ shows, and forced to perform, all for Defendants’ profit. As such, Plaintiffs are held in slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction freeing them from Defendants’ bondage and placing them in a habitat suited to their individual needs and best interests.

U.S. v. Top Sky

Summary: <p> Defendant alleged that his treaty-based hunting rights incorporate a right to sell eagles.&nbsp; The court disagreed, finding such an interpretation of those treaty rights contrary to Indian custom and religion.&nbsp;&nbsp;Court also&nbsp;holds that defendant lacks standing to raise a religious challenge to the BGEPA based on the religious rights of&nbsp;others.&nbsp; Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendant's overbreadth claim.&nbsp; For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#abrogation"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act </a> . </p>

Defendant alleged that his treaty-based hunting rights incorporate a right to sell eagles.  The court disagreed, finding such an interpretation of those treaty rights contrary to Indian custom and religion.  Court also holds that defendant lacks standing to raise a religious challenge to the BGEPA based on the religious rights of others.  Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendant's overbreadth claim.  For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

U.S. v. White

Summary: <p> Defendant was a member of a recognized Indian tribe who killed an eagle upon his reservation.&nbsp; The Court holds that it will not find an intent by Congress to abrogate Indian hunting rights under the BGEPA where the statute did not explicitly state that those rights were abrogated.&nbsp; For further discussion on abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#abrogation"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act </a> . </p>

Defendant was a member of a recognized Indian tribe who killed an eagle upon his reservation.  The Court holds that it will not find an intent by Congress to abrogate Indian hunting rights under the BGEPA where the statute did not explicitly state that those rights were abrogated.  For further discussion on abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

U.S. v. Street

Summary: <p> The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment.&nbsp; For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#enhanced"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. </a> </p>

The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment.  For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

Carl v. Resnick

Summary: <p> In this Illinois case, plaintiff Judy Carl was riding her horse on a trail in the Cook County Forest Preserve when the horse upon which defendant was riding pinned its ears back, turned its body toward plaintiff's horse, and kicked plaintiff and her horse. One hoof struck plaintiff's leg, causing her injury.&nbsp; In interpreting the state's Equine Act, the court observed that&nbsp;plaintiff's complaint against defendant was not barred by the Equine Act unless plaintiff's recreational riding of her own horse on a public trail was one of the limited activities sought to be encouraged by the Act.&nbsp; After determining that there was no conflict between the Illinois EALA and Animal Control Act,&nbsp;the court reversed the trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment for plaintiff on Count I as to liability under the Animal Control Act (510 ILCS 5/16 (West 1995)). <br/> </p>

In this Illinois case, plaintiff Judy Carl was riding her horse on a trail in the Cook County Forest Preserve when the horse upon which defendant was riding pinned its ears back, turned its body toward plaintiff's horse, and kicked plaintiff and her horse. One hoof struck plaintiff's leg, causing her injury.  In interpreting the state's Equine Act, the court observed that plaintiff's complaint against defendant was not barred by the Equine Act unless plaintiff's recreational riding of her own horse on a public trail was one of the limited activities sought to be encouraged by the Act.  After determining that there was no conflict between the Illinois EALA and Animal Control Act, the court reversed the trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment for plaintiff on Count I as to liability under the Animal Control Act (510 ILCS 5/16 (West 1995)).

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