Federal

Summary: This paper first examines the historical listing of Great Apes under the Endangered Species Act, including the “split listing” of chimpanzees. It then analyzes how the listing status of Great Apes limits their use in various situations such as private possession, scientific research, and entertainment. Finally, the paper discusses the applicable provisions of CITES that restrict the international trade in Great Apes.

Summary: The following discussion outlines key events from the recent past that led to the surplus of chimpanzees in U.S. research facilities and the actions that the government has taken to reduce the number of chimpanzees that are maintained in those facilities. The remainder of the discussion provides a detailed analysis of the Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act and an overview of the current status of the national chimpanzee sanctuary system.

Summary: This paper first addresses the need for protection of Great Apes by the Animal Welfare Aact (AWA), and the method by which they are afforded that protection. It then identifies and analyzes the types of activities that are regulated under the AWA, including commercial trade, exhibition, scientific research, and transportation. The Act requires that apes possessed for any of those purposes are maintained pursuant to certain minimum standards of care. Those standards are outlined and explained in Section IV. While APHIS is ultimately responsible for enforcing the AWA and USDA regulations, the agency does not have exclusive regulatory authority over apes used for those purposes. In addition to a variety of other federal laws, all regulated facilities must comply with all state and local laws governing the import, possession, use, and treatment of apes. The final portion of this paper analyzes the effect that the AWA has on those state and local laws.

Summary: The Humane Society of the United States sued to overturn the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's 2012 Final Rule to delist the Great Lakes gray wolves from the endangered species list. The US District Court called the 2012 Final Rule "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act and in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The District Court thus relisted the wolves and placed them back under the control of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.

Summary: Although he has never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the District of Columbia's Animal Control Act, plaintiff, an animal rights activist, challenges a provision that reads: “No person shall knowingly and falsely deny ownership of any animal.” D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff asserts that he desires to give speeches in the District of Columbia about why he opposes treating animals as property, and in such speeches he would like to deny ownership of his dog. However, he alleges that he does not do so because he is deterred by D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff therefore sued the District of Columbia to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the statute violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The District Court, however, found that plaintiff lacked standing because he presented no concrete evidence to substantiate his fears of prosecution, but rather rests his claims on mere conjecture about possible governmental actions. Such hypothetical fears cannot form the basis for standing under Article III of the US Constitution. The defendant's motion to dismiss was therefore granted and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed.

Summary: Plaintiffs operated a derelict-animal “sanctuary” on their ten-acre property in Marion County, Texas, where they held over one hundred exotic animals, including six tigers, several leopards, and a puma. Plaintiffs were arrested and charged with animal cruelty and forfeited the animals. Afterward, plaintiffs sued many of those involved in the events under a cornucopia of legal theories, all of which the district court eventually rejected. On appeal, plaintiffs argued Marion County and the individual defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by illegally searching their property and seizing the animals. The court held, however, that government officials may enter the open fields without a warrant, as the defendants did here, because “an open field is neither a house nor an effect, and, therefore, the government's intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those unreasonable searches proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment.” One plaintiff further alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; however, the court dismissed this claim because the plaintiff failed to allege how he was excluded from a government benefit or effective service as a result of not having an interpreter during the investigation or arrest. The other claims were either dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, not being properly appealed, or not stating a proper cause of action. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was therefore affirmed.

Summary: Utilizing a research exception granted under the international moratorium on commercial whaling imposed by the International Whaling Commission, Japanese whalers have been harvesting endangered whales in the Southern Ocean. The anti-whaling activist group, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, also operates in the Southern Ocean by locating Japanese whaling vessels in order to bring an immediate halt to all whaling activities, often employing violent tactics designed to injure whaling vessels and property. Sea Shepherd operates under an apparent mandate of the United Nations World Charter for Nature allowing individuals to “[i]mplement the applicable international legal provisions for the conservation of nature and the protection of the environment.” The multitude of vague international conventions and treaties governing the Southern Ocean have therefore created a tangled and confusing web of authority where both Japanese whalers and Sea Shepherd have arguable claims of operating under legitimate legal mandates. In this note, Alana Preston argues that individual countries should enforce their domestic laws to prevent the Japanese from whaling, so private entities, like Sea Shepherd, will not.

Summary: In United States v. University of Nebraska at Kearney, a federal district court was asked to determine whether a university, as a provider of housing for its students, must comply with the standards set out in the Fair Housing Act? Typically, the Fair Housing Act requires that housing providers make reasonable accommodations to no-pets policies for people with disabilities to live with emotional support animals, regardless of the animal's training as a service animal. The federal court, however, held that the Fair Housing Act also requires universities to waive no-pets policies for students with emotional support animals. This article examines the test used to determine the applicability of the Fair Housing Act to dwellings—arguing for a new factor test—and also discusses the current test’s effect on the legal coverage for emotional support animals.

Summary: This case considers whether student housing at the University of Nebraska–Kearney (UNK) is a “dwelling” within the meaning of the FHA. The plaintiff had a service dog (or therapy dog as the court describes it) trained to respond to her anxiety attacks. When she enrolled and signed a lease for student housing (an apartment-style residence about a mile off-campus), her requests to have her service dog were denied, citing UNK's "no pets" policy for student housing. The United States, on behalf of plaintiff, filed this suit alleging that UNK's actions violated the FHA. UNK brought a motion for summary judgment alleging that UNK's student housing is not a "dwelling" covered by the FHA. Specifically, UNK argues that students are "transient visitors" and the student housing is not residential like other temporary housing (migrant housing, halfway houses, etc.) and more akin to jail. However, this court was not convinced, finding that "UNK's student housing facilities are clearly 'dwellings' within the meaning of the FHA."

Summary: Plaintiff challenged the defendants' approval of the Rennic Stark Project in the Ninemile Ranger District of the Lolo National Forest under the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Project proposed a host of forest management measures. Under the National Environmental Protection Act, the defendant published an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the project in November 2012. The EA discussed the likely effects of the project on a number of wildlife species, including the ESA-listed threatened Canada lynx, the Forest Service-sensitive fisher, the Forest Service-sensitive North American wolverine, goshawk, and westslope cutthroat trout. The defendant signed and issued a Decision Notice adopting Alternative 2 from the EA, as well as a Finding of No Significant Impact. Plaintiff timely appealed the defendant's decision, but the defendant denied the appeal. Plaintiff then filed its complaint in this court and moved for summary judgment. Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied on all claims and defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on all claims.