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Georgia Aquarium v. Pritzker

Summary:

In this case, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the Georgia Aquarium’s application for a permit under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to import 18 beluga whales from Russia’s Sea of Okhotsk for public display. The Aquarium challenged the defendant National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) decision to deny a permit to import the beluga whales as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court found that defendant National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) was correct in following the statutory mandate of the MMPA after it found that the Sakhalin-Amur stock of the whales is likely declining and is experiencing adverse impacts in addition to Russian live-capture operations. Further, some of the beluga whales destined for the import were potentially young enough to still be nursing and dependent upon their mothers.

Colorado Wild Horse v. Jewell

Summary:

Finding the number of horses too high to maintain ecological balance and sustain multipurpose land use in Colorado's White River Resource Area, the US Bureau of Land Management (BLM) invoked its authority under the Wild Free–Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horses Act”), to declare those horses to be “excess animals” and scheduled to remove them from the land. Plaintiffs—organizations challenged BLM's “excess” determinations and its decision to remove these horses. They asked the district court to enjoin BLM's planned gather. Because the Wild Horses Act authorized BLM's excess determination and BLM appeared to have used reasonable methods to estimate the total wild-horse population, the Court found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their Wild Horses Act claims. And because the record reflected that BLM considered the cumulative effects of the proposed gather and permissibly relied on the Environmental Assessment written for a previous East Douglas HMA gather, the Court found that Plaintiffs were also unlikely to prevail on their National Environmental Policy Act claims. The Court further found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm as a result of the gather and that the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of BLM. Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

Lawson v. Pennsylvania SPCA

Summary:

Upon an investigation of numerous complaints, the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty obtained a warrant and searched plaintiffs’ house. As a result, plaintiffs were charged with over a hundred counts that were later withdrawn. Plaintiffs then filed the present case, asserting violations of their federal constitutional rights, as well as various state-law tort claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion in part as to: (1) false arrest/false imprisonment, malicious prosecution of one plaintiff and as to 134 of the charges against another plaintiff, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and invasion of privacy; and (2) to the following claims in Count One: verbal abuse, security of person and property, false arrest/false imprisonment, due process and equal protection, and failure to train or discipline as the result of a policy or custom. The District Court denied the motion with respect to (1) the following claim in Count One: unreasonable search and seizure and the individual defendants' request for qualified immunity in connection with that claim; and (2) with respect to one plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, but only to the charge relating to the puppy's facial injuries.

U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp.

Summary:

CITGO was convicted of multiple violations of the Clean Air Act and its regulations, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (“MBTA”). CITGO urged the 5th Circuit to reverse the Clean Air Act convictions because the district court erroneously instructed the jury about the scope of a regulation concerning “oil-water separators.” CITGO also contended that the MBTA convictions were infirm because the district court misinterpreted the statute as covering unintentional bird kills. The 5th Circuit agreed with both contentions, holding that CITGO's equalization tanks and air floatation device were not oil-water separators under the Clean Air Act's regulations and that “taking” migratory birds involved only “conduct intentionally directed at birds, such as hunting and trapping, not commercial activity that unintentionally and indirectly caused migratory bird deaths. The district court’s decision was reversed and remanded with instructions.

Naruto v. Slater (PETA)

Summary:

This complaint addresses what has come to be known as the "Monkey Selfie" case. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. (PETA) and Antje Engelhardt, Ph.D., as Plaintiff's next friends, filed this lawsuit on behalf of Plaintiff Naruto, a six-year-old male member of the Macaca nigra species (also known as a crested macaque) who lives in the Tangkoko Reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia. In 2011, Naruto took a number of photographs of himself, including one that became famous as the “Monkey Selfie.” In 2014, Defendant Slater and Defendant Blurb, Inc. published and sold a book in the United States that contained copies of the Monkey Selfies and stated in that book that Slater and Defendant Wildlife Personalities, Ltd. are the copyright owners of the Monkey Selfies. In this complaint, PETA contends that the Monkey Selfies "resulted from a series of purposeful and voluntary actions by Naruto, unaided by Slater, resulting in original works of authorship not by Slater, but by Naruto." Thus, according to PETA, Naruto has rights to the Monkey Selfies and owns that copyright. PETA observes that "while the claim of authorship by species other than homo sapiens may be novel, 'authorship' under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., is sufficiently broad so as to permit the protections of the law to extend to any original work, including those created by Naruto." As a result, PETA argues that Naruto should be afforded the protection of a claim of ownership, and the right to recover damages and other relief for copyright infringement. PETA also seeks to enjoin and restrain Defendants from copying, licensing, or distributing the Monkey Selfies and claims damages on behalf of Naruto for the unauthorized use of the pictures.

People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Summary:

Plaintiff People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (“PETPO”) filed the instant lawsuit against United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Daniel M. Ashe, in his official capacity as Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Noreen Walsh, in her official capacity as Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Mountain Prairie Region, the United States Department of the Interior, and Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior (collectively “Defendants”), challenging the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate take of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal land under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Friends of Animals (“FoA”) intervened as a Defendant. The case before the District Court rests on the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that although the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to do many things, it did not authorize Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress similarly lacked authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause because the regulation of takes of Utah prairie dogs was not essential or necessary to the ESA's economic scheme. Therefore PETPO's Motion for Summary Judgment was GRANTED, with prejudice; Defendants' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment was DENIED, with prejudice. Held 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) Unconstitutional

The Least of the Sentient Beings' and the Question of Reduction, Refinement, and Replacement

Summary:

The subjects of this article are biomedical research and animals. In raw percentage terms, the animals involved in experimentation are now overwhelmingly rats and mice, and, perhaps because they are rats and mice, they are used in large numbers, numbers in thousands and tens of thousands at some institutions. Legal, ethical, and practical accommodation to this fact on the ground presents a host of questions. There are questions of the cost of care. There are questions of the training of veterinarians, principal investigators, and laboratory personnel. With mice particularly, there are questions about the creation of conditions in an animal that do not yet exist, a future animal, by knocking out a gene and, as we say, "seeing what happens": new questions, really, that move us away from the traditional focus on the details of how an investigator treats a living animal. Then there are the central questions of weighing costs and benefits, of justification and the application of the three R's of reduction, refinement, and replacement, where it is not dogs or primates or marine mammals that are concerned, but rats and mice - for many, the least on the scale of concern for animals. Rats, mice, and birds have of course been recently exempted from the Animal Welfare Act. But that may be viewed as making the questions only that much more difficult, thrown back into the laps of researchers themselves and review boards, veterinarians, laboratory assistants, and university and corporate administrators, who for the moment can expect to have that much less outside guidance or mandate in deciding what to do. The overarching problem, which is how to think about rats and mice, not a new problem at all, but newly pressing.

Schor v. North Braddock Borough

Summary:

The plaintiff’s dog jumped her fence and after encountering a couple of friendly people in the neighborhood, was confronted by two police officers. At the same time the officers arrived, the plaintiff and her sister arrived at the scene. The plaintiff’s sister yelled to the officer, “that’s our dog,” and while displaying no signs of aggression, with her owner 10-15 feet away, an officer shot the dog four times, killing her. The officer had previous similar encounters with dogs, having shot another dog approximately six months prior to this event. In evaluating the immunity of the police officer, the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish an exception to immunity under the Pennsylvania Subdivision Tort Claims Act. However, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims.

Powell v. Johnson

Summary:

While searching for a person involved in a shooting, a police officer happened upon the plaintiff’s home and noticed the garage door and opening to the backyard were open. Upon finding nothing suspicious, he began to leave the area. The plaintiff’s dog caught sight of the officer and began walking toward him, eventually running towards him, the officer claimed. The officer then pulled out his service revolver and fired one shot, killing the dog instantly. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring and supervision on the part of the officer and municipality. The court held that the plaintiff did not meet his burden in defeating the officer’s qualified immunity, as the officer’s account of the incident constituted a reasonable seizure.

Carroll v. County of Monroe

Summary:

Upon executing a no-knock warrant by using a battering ram to break through the front door of the plaintiff’s home, police encountered the plaintiff’s dog. An officer claimed the dog was growling, barking, and quickly and aggressively approaching him. He then fired one shot from his shotgun, striking the dog and killing him. Prior to the execution of the warrant, the officers were aware that a dog would be present and did not discuss a plan for controlling the dog or neutralizing the dog by any non-lethal means. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the police officers and municipality, alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgement and held that the issue of whether the officer acted reasonably was a question for the jury.
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