Summary: This statute represents the District of Columbia's pet trust law. The law provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal.
Summary: This D.C. law provides that if, after a hearing, the judicial officer finds that there is good cause to believe the respondent has committed or threatened to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner or against petitioner's animal or an animal in petitioner's household, the judicial officer may issue a protection order that directs the care, custody, or control of a domestic animal that belongs to petitioner or respondent or lives in his or her household.
Summary: This DC law provides that the Mayor must establish an emergency preparedness plan for the protection, sheltering, and evacuation of domestic animals during and following a major disaster or emergency within 90 days of December 5, 2008.
Summary: These District of Columbia statutes make up the dog laws for the District. Included among the provisions are definitions, animal control and at large provisions, and vaccinations/licensing regulations. With regard to dangerous dogs, the term "dangerous animal" means an animal that because of specific training or demonstrated behavior threatens the health or safety of the public. The Mayor may impound any animal at large or any dangerous animal. If a dog injures a person while at large, lack of knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity standing alone shall not absolve the owner from a finding of negligence.
Summary: The Plaintiff The Humane Society of the United States filed this complaint alleging unlawful trade practices pursuant to the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904. This action for statutory penalties and appropriate injunctive relief arises from Defendants’ purposeful marketing, sale, and shipment of graphic dog fighting videos and cockfighting magazines in violation of federal criminal prohibitions and District of Columbia animal welfare laws. The videos and magazines depict and/or describe actual animal cruelty, as well as animal fights staged for the purposes of: (1) producing and selling more copies of the videos for commercial gain; and (2) unlawfully promoting the criminal enterprises of dog fighting and cockfighting. In particular, the magazines contain hundreds of criminal solicitations and feature advertisements for fighting birds, fighting dogs, and other contraband that render them unlawful under the following statutory schemes: federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2132 et seq .; the federal Depiction of Animal Cruelty Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 48; the D.C. Cruelty to Animals Statute, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1015(a)(1), (a)(5); the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371; and the D.C. conspiracy law, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1805a(a).
Summary: <p> The purpose of these District of Columbia ordinances are to regulate the practice of veterinary medicine in the district, to protect the public from the practice of veterinary medicine by unqualified persons, and to protect the public from unprofessional conduct by persons licensed to practice veterinary medicine. To accomplish this purpose, these ordinances require a veterinarian to obtain a license to practice veterinary science from the mayor of the district, as well as obtain a license to operate an animal facility; these ordinances also allow the mayor the discretion to require certification for veterinarian technicians. Additionally, these ordinances also provide penalties for those who practice without a license, license denial and revocations provisions, hearing and appeal procedures, the establishment of a board of veterinary examiners, and permitted practices without a license. </p>
The purpose of these District of Columbia ordinances are to regulate the practice of veterinary medicine in the district, to protect the public from the practice of veterinary medicine by unqualified persons, and to protect the public from unprofessional conduct by persons licensed to practice veterinary medicine. To accomplish this purpose, these ordinances require a veterinarian to obtain a license to practice veterinary science from the mayor of the district, as well as obtain a license to operate an animal facility; these ordinances also allow the mayor the discretion to require certification for veterinarian technicians. Additionally, these ordinances also provide penalties for those who practice without a license, license denial and revocations provisions, hearing and appeal procedures, the establishment of a board of veterinary examiners, and permitted practices without a license.
Summary: <span> <span> <span> <span> Defendant McNeely was convicted in a jury trial in the Superior Court of violating the Pit Bull and Rottweiler Dangerous Dog Designation Emergency Amendment Act. On appeal, t </span> </span> <span> <span> he Court of Appeals, held that the </span> <span> Act did not deprive defendant of fair warning of the proscribed conduct, as the defendant here was </span> <span> required to know that he owned pit bulls in order to be convicted under the Act; and the </span> <span> prosecutor's improper comment was rendered harmless by the trial court's curative instructions. </span> </span> </span> </span>
Summary: <p> <span> Appellants were each convicted of cruelty to animals, in violation of <i> D.C. Code Ann. § <span> </span> 22-801 </i> (1996), and of engaging in animal fighting, in violation of § <span> </span> 22-810. On appeal, both appellants contended that the evidence was insufficient to support convictions of animal cruelty, and of animal fighting. The appellate court found that the proof was sufficient. Each appellant also contended that his convictions merged because animal cruelty was a lesser-included offense of animal fighting. The appellate court found that each crime required proof of an element that the other did not. Appellants' convictions did not merge. </span> </p>
Appellants were each convicted of cruelty to animals, in violation of D.C. Code Ann. § 22-801 (1996), and of engaging in animal fighting, in violation of § 22-810. On appeal, both appellants contended that the evidence was insufficient to support convictions of animal cruelty, and of animal fighting. The appellate court found that the proof was sufficient. Each appellant also contended that his convictions merged because animal cruelty was a lesser-included offense of animal fighting. The appellate court found that each crime required proof of an element that the other did not. Appellants' convictions did not merge.
