California

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CA - Restaurant - § 114259.5. Live animals

Summary: In 2014, California added amendments to its law on "Live Animals" in the Retail Food Code related to pet dogs in outdoor dining areas. If a food establishment owner allows it, patrons may bring their pet dogs to an outdoor dining area if requirements are met. Like other states, there must be an outdoor entrance, employees must wash hands if they touch the dogs, dogs must be leashed and under control, pet waste must be properly dealt with, and "food and water provided to pet dogs shall only be in single-use disposable containers." This last provision is interesting because it considers the needs of the canine customers.

In 2014, California added amendments to its law on "Live Animals" in the Retail Food Code related to pet dogs in outdoor dining areas. If a food establishment owner allows it, patrons may bring their pet dogs to an outdoor dining area if requirements are met. Like other states, there must be an outdoor entrance, employees must wash hands if they touch the dogs, dogs must be leashed and under control, pet waste must be properly dealt with, and "food and water provided to pet dogs shall only be in single-use disposable containers." This last provision is interesting because it considers the needs of the canine customers.

CA - Research animals - § 66017.7. Animals used for diagnostic purposes or medical research

Summary: This California law effective in 2016 allows for adoption of cats or dogs used in medical research. If the public postsecondary educational institution (or independent institution) assesses the health of an animal and determines: (1) that the animal is suitable for adoption; (2) the animal's destruction is not required; and (3) the animal is no longer needed, it shall offer the dogs or cats to an animal adoption organization or animal rescue organization for adoption prior to euthanizing those animals.

This California law effective in 2016 allows for adoption of cats or dogs used in medical research. If the public postsecondary educational institution (or independent institution) assesses the health of an animal and determines: (1) that the animal is suitable for adoption; (2) the animal's destruction is not required; and (3) the animal is no longer needed, it shall offer the dogs or cats to an animal adoption organization or animal rescue organization for adoption prior to euthanizing those animals.

CA - Pet Boarding Facilities - Chapter 11. Pet Boarding Facilities

Summary: This chapter of statutes deals with the responsibilities that pet boarding facility operators must adhere to in the state of California. “Pet boarding facility” means any lot, building, structure, enclosure, or premises, or a portion thereof, whereupon four or more dogs, cats, or other pets in any combination are boarded at the request of, and in exchange for compensation provided by, their owner. Operators must ensure that the facility is in good repair, there is adequate pest control, an owner is contacted if a pet escapes and reasonable efforts are made to capture the escaped pet, as well as other upkeep requirements. The chapter also provides enclosure standards and animal care requirements including fire alarm and sprinkler systems. Animal control or qualified humane officers enforce violations of the chapter.

This chapter of statutes deals with the responsibilities that pet boarding facility operators must adhere to in the state of California. “Pet boarding facility” means any lot, building, structure, enclosure, or premises, or a portion thereof, whereupon four or more dogs, cats, or other pets in any combination are boarded at the request of, and in exchange for compensation provided by, their owner. Operators must ensure that the facility is in good repair, there is adequate pest control, an owner is contacted if a pet escapes and reasonable efforts are made to capture the escaped pet, as well as other upkeep requirements. The chapter also provides enclosure standards and animal care requirements including fire alarm and sprinkler systems. Animal control or qualified humane officers enforce violations of the chapter.

CA - Elephant Training - § 2128. Elephants; prohibited practices; penalties

Summary: This statute (operative on January 1, 2018) prohibits a person who houses, possesses, manages, or is in direct contact with an elephant from using a billhook, ankus, baseball bat, axe handle, pitchfork, and other devices that inflict pain for the purpose of training or controlling the elephant. Any person caught in violation of this statute will be subject to civil penalty and a suspension or revocation of his or her license to lawfully possess the animal.

This statute (operative on January 1, 2018) prohibits a person who houses, possesses, manages, or is in direct contact with an elephant from using a billhook, ankus, baseball bat, axe handle, pitchfork, and other devices that inflict pain for the purpose of training or controlling the elephant. Any person caught in violation of this statute will be subject to civil penalty and a suspension or revocation of his or her license to lawfully possess the animal.

CA - Cruelty - § 13012.8. Contents of annual report; violations of § 597

Summary: This new law effective on January 1, 2017 requires the annual report published by the Department of Justice to include information concerning arrests for violations of Section 597 (the cruelty to animals provision).

This new law effective on January 1, 2017 requires the annual report published by the Department of Justice to include information concerning arrests for violations of Section 597 (the cruelty to animals provision).

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Agriculture

Summary: Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Protect Our Communities Foundation v. Jewell

Summary: In this case, various environmental groups filed suit against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Department of the Interior, arguing that the BLM should not have granted right-of-way on federal lands to a proposed energy project because the project would violate the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The plaintiffs also argued that the BLM’s environmental impact statement (EIS) for the project was not sufficient according to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Ultimately, the court held in favor of the defendants and found that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA and that by granting the right-of-way, BLM was not violation the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The court found that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA because it included all the necessary information and was broad enough as to not force the BLM into automatically accepting the proposal. Additionally, the court held that the BLM was not in violation of the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act because the BLM was acting in a “purely regulatory capacity” and the BLM’s action could directly or proximately cause a violation under the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.

In this case, various environmental groups filed suit against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Department of the Interior, arguing that the BLM should not have granted right-of-way on federal lands to a proposed energy project because the project would violate the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The plaintiffs also argued that the BLM’s environmental impact statement (EIS) for the project was not sufficient according to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Ultimately, the court held in favor of the defendants and found that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA and that by granting the right-of-way, BLM was not violation the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The court found that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA because it included all the necessary information and was broad enough as to not force the BLM into automatically accepting the proposal. Additionally, the court held that the BLM was not in violation of the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act because the BLM was acting in a “purely regulatory capacity” and the BLM’s action could directly or proximately cause a violation under the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.

CA - Hunting, Internet - § 3003. Internet hunting and associated activities.

Summary: This statute prohibits Internet hunting in the State of California. Under the law, it is unlawful to own or operate a shooting range or site for the purpose of online shooting or spearing of an animal. It is also unlawful to create, maintain, or utilize an Internet Web site, or other service or business in this state, for the purpose of online shooting or spearing of a bird or mammal.

This statute prohibits Internet hunting in the State of California. Under the law, it is unlawful to own or operate a shooting range or site for the purpose of online shooting or spearing of an animal. It is also unlawful to create, maintain, or utilize an Internet Web site, or other service or business in this state, for the purpose of online shooting or spearing of a bird or mammal.

Leider v. Lewis

Summary: Plaintiffs, taxpayers Aaron Leider and the late Robert Culp, filed suit against the Los Angeles Zoo and Director Lewis to enjoin the continued operation of the elephant exhibit and to prevent construction of a new, expanded exhibit. Plaintiffs contend that the Zoo's conduct violates California animal cruelty laws and constitutes illegal expenditure of public funds and property. The case went to trial and the trial court issued limited injunctions relating to forms of discipline for the elephants, exercise time, and rototilling of the soil in the exhibit. On appeal by both sides, this court first took up whether a taxpayer action could be brought for Penal Code violations or to enforce injunctions. The Court held that the earlier Court of Appeals' decision was the law of the case as to the argument that the plaintiff-taxpayer was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated the Penal Code. The Court found the issue was previously decided and "is not defeated by raising a new argument that is essentially a twist on an earlier unsuccessful argument." Further, refusing to apply this Civil Code section barring injunctions for Penal Code violations will not create a substantial injustice. The Court also found the order to rototill the soil was proper because it accords with the "spirit and letter" of Penal Code section 597t (a law concerning exercise time for confined animals). As to whether the exhibit constituted animal cruelty under state law, the Court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court declined to make such a finding. Finally, the Court upheld the lower court's ruling that declined further injunctive relief under section 526a (a law that concerns actions against state officers for injuries to public property) because the injury prong could not be satisfied. As stated by the Court, "We agree with the trial court that there is no standard by which to measure this type of harm in order to justify closing a multi-million dollar public exhibit."

Plaintiffs, taxpayers Aaron Leider and the late Robert Culp, filed suit against the Los Angeles Zoo and Director Lewis to enjoin the continued operation of the elephant exhibit and to prevent construction of a new, expanded exhibit. Plaintiffs contend that the Zoo's conduct violates California animal cruelty laws and constitutes illegal expenditure of public funds and property. The case went to trial and the trial court issued limited injunctions relating to forms of discipline for the elephants, exercise time, and rototilling of the soil in the exhibit. On appeal by both sides, this court first took up whether a taxpayer action could be brought for Penal Code violations or to enforce injunctions. The Court held that the earlier Court of Appeals' decision was the law of the case as to the argument that the plaintiff-taxpayer was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated the Penal Code. The Court found the issue was previously decided and "is not defeated by raising a new argument that is essentially a twist on an earlier unsuccessful argument." Further, refusing to apply this Civil Code section barring injunctions for Penal Code violations will not create a substantial injustice. The Court also found the order to rototill the soil was proper because it accords with the "spirit and letter" of Penal Code section 597t (a law concerning exercise time for confined animals). As to whether the exhibit constituted animal cruelty under state law, the Court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court declined to make such a finding. Finally, the Court upheld the lower court's ruling that declined further injunctive relief under section 526a (a law that concerns actions against state officers for injuries to public property) because the injury prong could not be satisfied. As stated by the Court, "We agree with the trial court that there is no standard by which to measure this type of harm in order to justify closing a multi-million dollar public exhibit."

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. California Exposition and State Fairs

Summary: Plaintiffs brought a taxpayer action against defendants based on allegations that defendants committed animal cruelty every summer by transporting pregnant pigs and housing them in farrowing crates at the state fair. One defendant, joined by the other, demurred, contending plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a cause of action for three distinct reasons, including that California's animal cruelty laws were not enforceable through a taxpayer action. The trial court agreed on all accounts, and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeals addressed only one of plaintiffs' claims, that contrary to the trial court's conclusion, plaintiffs could assert a taxpayer action to enjoin waste arising out of defendants' alleged violation of the animal cruelty laws. Like the trial court, the appeals court rejected plaintiffs' contention, concluding that they could not circumvent the prohibition recognized in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 136, which concluded that recognition of a private right of action under West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 597t would be inconsistent with the Legislature's entrustment of enforcement of anti-cruelty laws to local authorities and humane societies, by couching their claim as a taxpayer action. The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed.

Plaintiffs brought a taxpayer action against defendants based on allegations that defendants committed animal cruelty every summer by transporting pregnant pigs and housing them in farrowing crates at the state fair. One defendant, joined by the other, demurred, contending plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a cause of action for three distinct reasons, including that California's animal cruelty laws were not enforceable through a taxpayer action. The trial court agreed on all accounts, and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeals addressed only one of plaintiffs' claims, that contrary to the trial court's conclusion, plaintiffs could assert a taxpayer action to enjoin waste arising out of defendants' alleged violation of the animal cruelty laws. Like the trial court, the appeals court rejected plaintiffs' contention, concluding that they could not circumvent the prohibition recognized in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 136, which concluded that recognition of a private right of action under West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 597t would be inconsistent with the Legislature's entrustment of enforcement of anti-cruelty laws to local authorities and humane societies, by couching their claim as a taxpayer action. The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed.
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