United States

Summary: Much debate has surfaced surrounding so-called “eco-terrorism.” Some commentators argue that such activity is not and should not be called terrorism. This Comment analyzes these extremist activities through the lens of federal terrorism laws and argues that, while these activists’ goals are laudable, their methods are often terroristic. Consequently, those activities that go too far are-and should be-classified as terrorism.

Summary: It is often argued that one of the most humane methods of killing an animal is through the performance of kosher slaughter. Indeed, the Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act (HMLSA) of 1978 goes so far as to define kosher slaughter, and handling in connection with such slaughter, as humane, and consequently fails to provide any regulation over this method of killing. It is thus concerning that a number of kosher slaughterhouses have, in recent years, been discovered to be using blatantly inhumane practices, which the relevant religious authorities have insisted are completely kosher. This Article examines the Jewish law concerning kosher slaughter and asks how it is possible for a slaughter that has been performed in an inhumane fashion to remain kosher. The answer, it concludes, is that the religious rules provide little guidance on the handling of animals in connection with slaughter. There thus exists a need for either the religious authorities or the law to supplement the existing religious rules with further requirements aimed at ensuring humane-slaughter practices. After analyzing both comparative law on this issue and the relevant First Amendment considerations, this Article argues that there is a need for Congress to remove the HMLSA’s current exemption of handling in connection with kosher slaughter and for regulations to be passed governing this issue. It makes suggestions as to how such regulations could provide for more humane-slaughter practices in a manner that fails to offend either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Summary: This introduction to Volume 16, part 2 is an author-based account of her experience incorporating animal law into her private law practice.

Summary: This reader-based FAQ provides information on how to begin animal advocacy.

Summary: This article provides a short reader-based FAQ on veterinary malpractice.

Summary: Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Summary: This District of Columbia statute requires that any law enforcement or child protective services employee who knows or has reason to suspect than an animal is experiencing cruelty, abandonment, or neglect shall provide a report of the abuse within the specified time. The statute also states that any employee who observes an animal at the home of a person reasonably suspected of child, adult, or animal abuse should report it. The statute also specifies what information the report must include for completion.

Summary: These Connecticut statutes require state employees who work with children and families to also report suspected animal harm, neglect, or cruelty. The statutes explain how the reporting should be completed and describes the implementation of training programs for employees to recognize animal abuse. The statutes also discuss the development of an annual report on actual or suspected instances of animal neglect or cruelty within the state.