United States

Summary: The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) has proven invaluable in minimizing the destruction of the 240 avian species listed by its enforcement agency, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), as “endangered or threatened” or “birds of conservation concern.” Recently, however, the Act is faced with a new challenge: How can it continue to achieve its objective when a highly desirable domestic source of sustainable energy—wind power—is experiencing unprecedented growth? Ever-larger wind projects propelled by giant turbines have become a serious danger to the existence of migratory birds and their natural habitats. Yet most policy makers strongly welcome and support continued expansion of wind power, and are reluctant to permit impediments to halt or restrict its growth. The growing conflict between the goals of protecting migratory birds and producing more wind power should be reconciled. This Article proposes three basic policy revisions: (1) authorization for the FWS to issue incidental take permits to wind power developers; (2) creation of a uniform standard for assessing avian impacts; and (3) amendment of the MBTA to allow for civil sanctions and citizen suits. Although “big wheels in the sky” must keep on turning and expanding to help reduce America’s dependence on fossil fuels and foreign energy sources, this worthy objective must be pursued without weakening federal protection of migratory birds.

Summary: The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulates meat labeling under the statutory authority of the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA). The FMIA’s labeling preemption clause prohibits labeling requirements beyond federal requirements, and would thus preclude state causes of action on the basis of deceptive labels that were properly approved under federal law. Through the eyes of Kat, a hypothetical consumer concerned with the origins of the meat she purchases for her family, this Article argues that consumers should be able to pursue state law claims based on fraudulent animal welfare labels on packages of meat. This is true for two reasons: first, the FMIA’s labeling preemption only covers the USDA’s statutory scope of authority, which does not include on-farm treatment of animals; and second, both FMIA and a state cause of action would require the same thing—a non-fraudulent label. However, even if a court did find that a state cause of action based on a fraudulent label was preempted, consumer plaintiffs would have other avenues through which to pursue their claims.

Summary: This Introduction provides an overview of the evolution of animal law over the past twenty years, demonstrating how changes in the law, social awareness, and legal education have directly affected this field. This Introduction describes both the positive and negative changes that have taken place, from the banning of dogfighting and cockfighting by federal law and some state laws; a spread in voter-adopted legislation providing for the protection of agricultural animals; and movements to reduce the use of chimpanzees in animal research; to the limitations of the Animal Welfare Act; changes in the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) policy lifting the ban on USDA inspection of horsemeat; discrimination of certain breeds of dogs through breed-specific legislation; and the weakening of a number of federal laws providing protection to wildlife. This Introduction also provides an overview of case law, discussing attempts to achieve standing for animals and differing approaches in calculating damages for harm to pets. With respect to legal institutions, there has been an increasing presence of animal law sections within the American Bar Association and state bar associations. Animal law has also expanded within legal education. This is evidenced by the emergence of animal law conferences, publications in animal focused law reviews and textbooks, animal law courses at prestigious law schools, and full-time professors specializing in the area of animal law.

Summary: A car accident occurred and Plaintiffs, Jo Ellen Hendrickson and her husband were injured when her vehicle hit two horses that were on the roadway. Defendant Randall D. Grider owned the horses and Defendant Gartner owned the lot where Grider kept the horses. Defendant Cope is Gartner's son-in-law and acted as an intermediary between Gartner and Grider. The Hendrickson’s filed a complaint against Grider, Cope, and Gartner and alleged that they were owners and/or keepers of horses under statute R.C. Chapter 951 and that they negligently allowed the horses to escape. Hendrickson sought damages for her injuries and a loss of consortium claim on her husbands’ behalf. The Common Pleas Court, granted summary judgment for the Defendants. The Hendrickson’s appealed. The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District affirmed the Common Pleas Court. The Court of Appeals reasoned that: (1) neither defendant was “keeper” of horses within the meaning of the statute which governed liability for horses running at large on public roads; (2) even if the lot owner breached their duty by allowing the owner of the horses to keep the horses on her property before fencing was installed, such breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries; and (3) the lot owner could not have reasonably foreseen that the horses would escape from a fenced-in lot and injure the motorist and, thus, she could not be held liable in negligence for the motorist's resulting injuries.

Summary: San Antonio Animal Care Services (ACS) responded to a call about 36 pit bull terriers that were chained, significantly underweight, and dehydrated. The dogs also had scarring consistent with fighting. Police obtained a search warrant and coordinated with ACS to seize the dogs. While the dogs were being secured, Appellant Terrence Mouton arrived at the residence. He told the officers that he had been living at the residence for a couple of weeks, but that he did not own all of the dogs and was holding them for someone else. Mouton was convicted in the County Court of cruelty to non livestock animals. On appeal, Mouton argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the Appellee, the State of Texas, failed to prove that the animals were in his custody. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Mouton was responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of the dogs on his property and that the dogs were subject to his care and control, regardless of whether he was the actual owner of each animal. A reasonable jury could have also found that Mouton was “aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that he failed to provide proper nutrition, water, or shelter for the dogs.

Summary: Twenty volumes is no small feat for an independently funded, entirely student-run journal. With a total staff of twenty students, including a small Board comprised of Editor in Chief, James Goldstein, Jr.; Managing Editor, William Fig; Articles Editor, Kelly Jeffries; and Form and Style Editor, Benjamin Allen, Animal Law published the inaugural volume of the world’s first animal law journal in 1995. This landmark event was the result of the hard work of Lewis & Clark students, with some key support. In this first volume, Animal Law gave “special thanks to Benjamin Allen for his hard work and dedication in founding [the] journal, to Matthew Howard and Nancy Perry for their inspiration, and to Richard Katz for his invaluable support throughout the process.” Animal Law also gave “thanks to Michael Blumm for his advice and encouragement, and to the Board of [Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF)] for their support.”

Summary: Between 2006 and 2011, Congress prevented commercial equine slaughter by prohibiting the use of funds for inspection of equine slaughterhouses.  In 2012, Congress lifted the ban on funding and the Food Safety Inspection Service  (FSIS) , which is a branch of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), issued grants of inspection to two commercial equine slaughter facilities: Valley Meat Company, LLC and Responsible Transportation, LLC. Plaintiffs, Front Range Equine Rescue, the Humane Society of the United States, and several other individuals and organizations (collectively, “Front Range”) sued officials of the USDA (“Federal Defendants”). Plaintiffs were seeking a declaration that the grants of inspection violated the National Environmental Policy Act and requested that the court set aside the grants of inspection.  The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico,  granted Front Range's motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), which prohibited the Federal Defendants from sending inspectors to the equine slaughterhouses  or providing equine inspection services to them. The district court also ordered Front Range to post injunction bonds for Valley Meat and for Responsible Transportation and denied Front Range's request for a permanent injunction. Front Range appealed but the appeal was dismissed as moot. However, Valley Meat and Responsible Transportation then filed a motion in the district court to recover the injunction bonds. The motion was denied. Valley Meat then appealed the denial of damages on the injunction bond.  The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth affirmed the district court and held that Valley Meat was not entitled to recover. The Appeals Court reasoned that even if Valley Meat suffered damages, it cannot recover against the bond unless it first showed wrongful enjoinment. Valley Meat failed to do so and therefore could not collect damages.

Summary: To address the Zoo's growing size and complexity, Defendant Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS) entered into an “Operations and Management Agreement” (Agreement) with the City of Seattle. The Agreement gave WPZS exclusive rights and responsibilities regarding many areas such as the care, sale, and purchase of the Zoo's animals. The Agreement also contained several provisions addressing public oversight of the Zoo.  Plaintiff Alyne Fortgang requested several categories of records, all pertaining to the Zoo's elephants. She filed the request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which requires every government agency to make records available for public inspection and copying.  The Zoo's director of Communications and Public Affairs responded to Fortgang's request by asserting that the PRA did not apply because WPZS was a private company. Fortgang filed a lawsuit and alleged that WPZS violated the PRA by refusing to disclose certain records. The trial court granted WPZS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the ground that WPZS was not an agency subject to PRA disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the Telford test was the proper analytical framework for evaluating the private entity’s disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court reasoned that under the Telford analysis, WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency. The court stated that although the second Telford factor was inconclusive, all the other factors weighed against PRA coverage: (1) WPZS did not perform an inherently governmental function by operating the Zoo; (2) the City did not exercise sufficient control over the Zoo's daily operations to implicate PRA concerns; (3) WPZS was created solely by private individuals and not  government action and (4) because operating a zoo is not a nondelegable, “core” government function, the case did not involve the privatization of fundamentally public services. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed.

Summary: A person in Michigan is not allowed to: (1) engage in computer-assisted shooting; provide or operate, with or without remuneration, facilities for computer-assisted shooting; or (3) provide or offer to provide, with or without remuneration, equipment specially adapted for computer-assisted shooting. Violation is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both.

Summary: This new law effective on January 1, 2017 requires the annual report published by the Department of Justice to include information concerning arrests for violations of Section 597 (the cruelty to animals provision).