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CO - Eggs - Article 21. Pt. 2. Confinement of Egg Laying Hens

Summary: This section of Colorado law regulates the confinement of egg-laying hens in the state. Under these laws, egg-laying hens must be confined in conditions that allow them at least one square foot of usable floor space. Certain exceptions apply, such as for slaughter or veterinary purposes. Violators of these laws may be subjected to a civil penalty of no more than one thousand dollars.

This section of Colorado law regulates the confinement of egg-laying hens in the state. Under these laws, egg-laying hens must be confined in conditions that allow them at least one square foot of usable floor space. Certain exceptions apply, such as for slaughter or veterinary purposes. Violators of these laws may be subjected to a civil penalty of no more than one thousand dollars.

OR - Eggs - Laying Conditions (Chapter 632)

Summary: This set of Oregon laws comprise the state's laws to regulate the conditions that egg-laying hens may be kept in. Under these laws, egg-laying hens must be kept in conditions that are designed to promote humane welfare standards and effective in preventing the spread of food-borne pathogens. Violators may be subject to a civil penalty of no more than $2,500 or have their egg handler's license revoked.

This set of Oregon laws comprise the state's laws to regulate the conditions that egg-laying hens may be kept in. Under these laws, egg-laying hens must be kept in conditions that are designed to promote humane welfare standards and effective in preventing the spread of food-borne pathogens. Violators may be subject to a civil penalty of no more than $2,500 or have their egg handler's license revoked.

Overview of the Legal Battle Over the Vaquita

Summary: This overview explores the decline of the vaquita (phocoena sinus) population in the Sea of Cortez near Mexico. Vaquitas are the smallest cetacean species in the world with populations that have dwindled to near-extinction in the past twenty years. Vaquitas become entangled in gillnet fishing intended for totoaba fish, a commercially valuable species harvested for their swim bladders that are used in traditional Chinese medicine. While vaquitas receive protection under CITES, the MMPA, and gillnet bans, the lack of enforcement by the Mexican government has become an issue that resulted in several lawsuits by conservation organizations. With as few as ten vaquitas remaining in the wild, it is likely they will not be able to replace their population to outpace the deaths caused by illegal gillnet fishing.

This overview explores the decline of the vaquita (phocoena sinus) population in the Sea of Cortez near Mexico. Vaquitas are the smallest cetacean species in the world with populations that have dwindled to near-extinction in the past twenty years. Vaquitas become entangled in gillnet fishing intended for totoaba fish, a commercially valuable species harvested for their swim bladders that are used in traditional Chinese medicine. While vaquitas receive protection under CITES, the MMPA, and gillnet bans, the lack of enforcement by the Mexican government has become an issue that resulted in several lawsuits by conservation organizations. With as few as ten vaquitas remaining in the wild, it is likely they will not be able to replace their population to outpace the deaths caused by illegal gillnet fishing.

Overview of Legal Challenges to Farm Animal Welfare Laws

Summary: This overview introduces the legal challenges to farm animal welfare laws. It begins with a discussion of the means by which farm animal welfare laws are enacted. Next, there is a discussion of the forms of farm animal confinement that welfare laws are aimed at phasing out of the agriculture industry. Then, it explores the current legal framework at the state and federal level that affords welfare protections to farm animals. There is then a discussion of the legal challenges that are brought to challenge these laws, and an exploration of some example cases. Lastly, the latest Supreme Court case, National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, is examined.

This overview introduces the legal challenges to farm animal welfare laws. It begins with a discussion of the means by which farm animal welfare laws are enacted. Next, there is a discussion of the forms of farm animal confinement that welfare laws are aimed at phasing out of the agriculture industry. Then, it explores the current legal framework at the state and federal level that affords welfare protections to farm animals. There is then a discussion of the legal challenges that are brought to challenge these laws, and an exploration of some example cases. Lastly, the latest Supreme Court case, National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, is examined.

Brief Summary of Legal Challenges to Farm Animal Welfare Laws

Summary: This summary introduces the legal challenges to farm animal welfare laws. It begins with a discussion of the means by which farm animal welfare laws are enacted. Next, there is a discussion of the forms of farm animal confinement that welfare laws are aimed at phasing out of the agriculture industry. It touches upon the current legal framework at the state and federal level that affords welfare protections to farm animals. There is then a brief discussion of the legal challenges that are brought to these laws. Lastly, the latest Supreme Court case, National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, is examined.

This summary introduces the legal challenges to farm animal welfare laws. It begins with a discussion of the means by which farm animal welfare laws are enacted. Next, there is a discussion of the forms of farm animal confinement that welfare laws are aimed at phasing out of the agriculture industry. It touches upon the current legal framework at the state and federal level that affords welfare protections to farm animals. There is then a brief discussion of the legal challenges that are brought to these laws. Lastly, the latest Supreme Court case, National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, is examined.

Detailed Discussion of Legal Challenges to Farm Animal Welfare Laws

Summary: This article explores the legal challenges to farm animal welfare laws. It begins with a discussion of the means by which farm animal welfare laws are enacted. Next, there is a discussion of the means of farm animal confinement that welfare laws are aimed at phasing out of the agriculture industry. Then, it explores the current legal framework at the state and federal level that affords welfare protections to farm animals. The article then explores the organizations and people that bring lawsuits to challenge farm animal welfare laws. There is then a discussion of the legal challenges that are brought to challenge these laws, and an exploration of some example cases. Lastly, this article explores a Supreme Court case regarding a state farm animal welfare law, National Pork Producers Council v. Ross.

This article explores the legal challenges to farm animal welfare laws. It begins with a discussion of the means by which farm animal welfare laws are enacted. Next, there is a discussion of the means of farm animal confinement that welfare laws are aimed at phasing out of the agriculture industry. Then, it explores the current legal framework at the state and federal level that affords welfare protections to farm animals. The article then explores the organizations and people that bring lawsuits to challenge farm animal welfare laws. There is then a discussion of the legal challenges that are brought to challenge these laws, and an exploration of some example cases. Lastly, this article explores a Supreme Court case regarding a state farm animal welfare law, National Pork Producers Council v. Ross.

Cardenas v. Swanson

Summary: The Cardenas family (Appellants) owned three St. Bernard dogs. Appellants lived on a home adjacent to large tracts of state land, and would allow the dogs to roam the land unleashed, but the dogs would return each night. One afternoon, the dogs were let outside to run, but one dog did not return. Appellants found the dog caught in a snare, where it died from a broken neck. Appellants attempted to free the dog from the snare, and one of the Cardenas children was injured in the process. While appellants were attempting to free their dog from the snare, the other two dogs were also caught in snares, and died from their injuries. Appellants filed suit against the trapper who set the snares (Appellee), asserting claims of negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, violation of statutes, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied in part, finding that appellee’s conduct was not willful and wanton and that appellants could not recover emotional damages for the loss of the dogs. On appeal, the court considered: (1) whether the members of the Cardenas family can recover damages for emotional injuries for the loss of their dogs, and (2) whether this court should allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet. The court held that (1) emotional injuries for the loss of property are not recoverable, under this court’s precedent emotional damages are only recoverable for certain limited situations. Dogs are considered personal property under state law, and damage to personal property is not one of the situations in which emotional damages are recoverable. Next, the court held that (2) it would not create a precedent to allow people to recover emotional distress damages when animate personal property is harmed, as that change would be best suited for the legislature to make. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case.

The Cardenas family (Appellants) owned three St. Bernard dogs. Appellants lived on a home adjacent to large tracts of state land, and would allow the dogs to roam the land unleashed, but the dogs would return each night. One afternoon, the dogs were let outside to run, but one dog did not return. Appellants found the dog caught in a snare, where it died from a broken neck. Appellants attempted to free the dog from the snare, and one of the Cardenas children was injured in the process. While appellants were attempting to free their dog from the snare, the other two dogs were also caught in snares, and died from their injuries. Appellants filed suit against the trapper who set the snares (Appellee), asserting claims of negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, violation of statutes, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied in part, finding that appellee’s conduct was not willful and wanton and that appellants could not recover emotional damages for the loss of the dogs. On appeal, the court considered: (1) whether the members of the Cardenas family can recover damages for emotional injuries for the loss of their dogs, and (2) whether this court should allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet. The court held that (1) emotional injuries for the loss of property are not recoverable, under this court’s precedent emotional damages are only recoverable for certain limited situations. Dogs are considered personal property under state law, and damage to personal property is not one of the situations in which emotional damages are recoverable. Next, the court held that (2) it would not create a precedent to allow people to recover emotional distress damages when animate personal property is harmed, as that change would be best suited for the legislature to make. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case.

Matter of S. A. B.

Summary: In this Ohio juvenile dependency case, a father appeals a juvenile court judgment ordering him to transfer the his dog to his child, claiming that the court lacked the authority to transfer possession of the dog. He also claims the dog is his personal property and not the child's. The child, who does not live with the father, suffers from panic attacks and has difficulty sleeping at night. The child's therapist testified that the child's mental health symptoms are exacerbated by "missing and worrying about the dog." The therapist testified that, because of the bond that child shares with the dog, the child's emotional support dog should be this particular dog. In contrast, the father claims the dog is legally his and provides a household benefit for him by keeping raccoons away from his chickens and deterring thieves from entering the property. The lower court found that the child shares a bond with the dog and having the dog as an emotional support animal would benefit the child. On appeal, the father argues that an emotional support animal does not fall within the statutory definition for "counseling" and, thus, the court's order was tantamount to giving away his property. In looking at the statute, the court noted that "counseling" is undefined and so looking at the plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate. As a result, the court found that the dictionary definition read with the policy goals of the chapter on jurisdiction of the juvenile court allowed the court to conclude that the term "counseling" includes the use of emotional support animals. The evidence in this case also shows that this particular dog is necessary as ". . . this particular dog is not just a pet, but rather is an emotional support animal for child, as evidenced by child's strong emotional bond with this particular dog and various testimony demonstrating that this particular dog will contribute to child's well-being by providing child with emotional stability and security." As to the property issue raised by the father, the court observed that courts routinely order parents to provide support for their children and this transfer of property did not abuse the court's discretion. Affirmed.

In this Ohio juvenile dependency case, a father appeals a juvenile court judgment ordering him to transfer the his dog to his child, claiming that the court lacked the authority to transfer possession of the dog. He also claims the dog is his personal property and not the child's. The child, who does not live with the father, suffers from panic attacks and has difficulty sleeping at night. The child's therapist testified that the child's mental health symptoms are exacerbated by "missing and worrying about the dog." The therapist testified that, because of the bond that child shares with the dog, the child's emotional support dog should be this particular dog. In contrast, the father claims the dog is legally his and provides a household benefit for him by keeping raccoons away from his chickens and deterring thieves from entering the property. The lower court found that the child shares a bond with the dog and having the dog as an emotional support animal would benefit the child. On appeal, the father argues that an emotional support animal does not fall within the statutory definition for "counseling" and, thus, the court's order was tantamount to giving away his property. In looking at the statute, the court noted that "counseling" is undefined and so looking at the plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate. As a result, the court found that the dictionary definition read with the policy goals of the chapter on jurisdiction of the juvenile court allowed the court to conclude that the term "counseling" includes the use of emotional support animals. The evidence in this case also shows that this particular dog is necessary as ". . . this particular dog is not just a pet, but rather is an emotional support animal for child, as evidenced by child's strong emotional bond with this particular dog and various testimony demonstrating that this particular dog will contribute to child's well-being by providing child with emotional stability and security." As to the property issue raised by the father, the court observed that courts routinely order parents to provide support for their children and this transfer of property did not abuse the court's discretion. Affirmed.

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Haaland

Summary: A small porpoise called the vaquita is on the verge of extinction, largely due to gillnet fishing of the totoaba fish that commonly traps and kills vaquitas as well. This fishing takes place in waters in Mexico’s territory, where the last few vaquitas live. In 2020, under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the United States banned the importation from Mexico of seafood products caught with gillnets inside the vaquita’s range. The Center for Biological Diversity, the Animal Welfare Institute, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Plaintiffs) brought this lawsuit in 2022 against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior Deb Haaland and the U.S. Department of the Interior (Defendants). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants caused an unlawful delay responding to a 2014 letter requesting that Secretary of the Interior certify the embargo against Mexico in order to curb the fishing of the totoaba, as doing otherwise diminished the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) by furthering the extinction of the vaquita. Plaintiffs also requested an order enjoining defendants from further delay in responding to the petition to certify Mexico, and costs and attorneys’ fees associated with the lawsuit. After settlement negotiations took place, parties reached a conditional settlement, and Secretary Haaland certified to the President that the fishing of totoaba by Mexican nationals and related killing of vaquita diminishes the effectiveness of CITES. It remains unclear whether Mexico has made progress in implementing the plan to save the vaquita, whether CITES is being implemented effectively by Mexico, and whether the President will act on the Secretary’s certification. After confirming that the Secretary of the Interior certified Mexico pursuant to the settlement agreement, parties entered into a voluntary dismissal and the court dismissed the lawsuit.

A small porpoise called the vaquita is on the verge of extinction, largely due to gillnet fishing of the totoaba fish that commonly traps and kills vaquitas as well. This fishing takes place in waters in Mexico’s territory, where the last few vaquitas live. In 2020, under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the United States banned the importation from Mexico of seafood products caught with gillnets inside the vaquita’s range. The Center for Biological Diversity, the Animal Welfare Institute, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Plaintiffs) brought this lawsuit in 2022 against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior Deb Haaland and the U.S. Department of the Interior (Defendants). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants caused an unlawful delay responding to a 2014 letter requesting that Secretary of the Interior certify the embargo against Mexico in order to curb the fishing of the totoaba, as doing otherwise diminished the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) by furthering the extinction of the vaquita. Plaintiffs also requested an order enjoining defendants from further delay in responding to the petition to certify Mexico, and costs and attorneys’ fees associated with the lawsuit. After settlement negotiations took place, parties reached a conditional settlement, and Secretary Haaland certified to the President that the fishing of totoaba by Mexican nationals and related killing of vaquita diminishes the effectiveness of CITES. It remains unclear whether Mexico has made progress in implementing the plan to save the vaquita, whether CITES is being implemented effectively by Mexico, and whether the President will act on the Secretary’s certification. After confirming that the Secretary of the Interior certified Mexico pursuant to the settlement agreement, parties entered into a voluntary dismissal and the court dismissed the lawsuit.
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