United States

Gibson v. Babbitt

Summary: <p> Defendant, a Native American, challenged the constitutionality of the limitation of eagle parts through the permit system to members of federally recognized tribes.&nbsp; The limitation under the federal eagle permit system to federally recognized Indian tribes does not violate RFRA because the government has a compelling interest in protecting a species in demise and fulfilling pre-existing trust obligations to federally-recognized tribes in light of the limited supply of eagle parts.&nbsp; For further discussion on free exercise challenges under the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#free"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. </a> </p>

Defendant, a Native American, challenged the constitutionality of the limitation of eagle parts through the permit system to members of federally recognized tribes.  The limitation under the federal eagle permit system to federally recognized Indian tribes does not violate RFRA because the government has a compelling interest in protecting a species in demise and fulfilling pre-existing trust obligations to federally-recognized tribes in light of the limited supply of eagle parts.  For further discussion on free exercise challenges under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

State v. Dan

Summary: <p> This is an appeal of a circuit court decision in an aggravated animal abuse case.&nbsp; A defendant was convicted in circuit court of aggravated animal abuse and other charges. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant's testimony that he loved his children more than the dog he shot was not evidence of his character, thus the evidence offered by the state in rebuttal (that the defendant assaulted his spouse) was not admissible and not harmless error by the trial court. </p>

This is an appeal of a circuit court decision in an aggravated animal abuse case.  A defendant was convicted in circuit court of aggravated animal abuse and other charges. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant's testimony that he loved his children more than the dog he shot was not evidence of his character, thus the evidence offered by the state in rebuttal (that the defendant assaulted his spouse) was not admissible and not harmless error by the trial court.

ALDF v. Glickman

Summary: <p> Animal welfare organization and individual plaintiffs brought action against United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), challenging regulations promulgated under Animal Welfare Act (AWA) to promote psychological well-being of nonhuman primates kept by exhibitors and researchers.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals held that: (1) regulations were valid, and (2) animal welfare organization did not have standing to raise procedural injury. Case discussed in topic: <a href="/articles/ovusawa.htm#BM6_Regulatory_Process"> US Animal Welfare Act </a> </p>

Animal welfare organization and individual plaintiffs brought action against United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), challenging regulations promulgated under Animal Welfare Act (AWA) to promote psychological well-being of nonhuman primates kept by exhibitors and researchers.  The Court of Appeals held that: (1) regulations were valid, and (2) animal welfare organization did not have standing to raise procedural injury. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act

U.S. v. Hardman (On Rehearing En Banc)

Summary: <p> The Hardman and Wilgus cases are remanded for factfinding where the record was limited as to whether the government employed the least restrictive means&nbsp;to support its compelling interests of protecting eagles and Native American culture.&nbsp; On the Saenz motion for return of eagle feathers to a non-federally recognized Indian religious practitioner, the court holds that the government failed to support its assertions that opening the permit system to all adherents of Indian religions would compromise the eagle population or destroy federal trust obligations to Native American tribes/culture.&nbsp; For discussion of the BGEPA and religious challenges, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#religious"> Detailed Discussion </a> . </p>

The Hardman and Wilgus cases are remanded for factfinding where the record was limited as to whether the government employed the least restrictive means to support its compelling interests of protecting eagles and Native American culture.  On the Saenz motion for return of eagle feathers to a non-federally recognized Indian religious practitioner, the court holds that the government failed to support its assertions that opening the permit system to all adherents of Indian religions would compromise the eagle population or destroy federal trust obligations to Native American tribes/culture.  For discussion of the BGEPA and religious challenges, see Detailed Discussion .

City of Sausalito v. Brian O'Neill

Summary: <p> In considering standing under the MMPA, the court found that the plaintiff city had only pure economic injury and had not shown that any harm would result to marine mammals protected under the MMPA.&nbsp; </p>

In considering standing under the MMPA, the court found that the plaintiff city had only pure economic injury and had not shown that any harm would result to marine mammals protected under the MMPA. 

Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001))

Summary: <p> (This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized.&nbsp; The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that&nbsp;the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts.&nbsp; For discussion of&nbsp;Eagle Act, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#formerly"> Detailed Discussion </a> . </p>

(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized.  The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts.  For discussion of Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion .

U.S. v. Wilgus

Summary: <p> This opinion was vacated by the <u> Hardman </u> order.&nbsp; Defendant&nbsp;was not a member of a federally-recognized tribe nor a person of Native American ancestry,&nbsp;but sincerely practiced Native American religions.&nbsp; In response to Wilgus's free exercise challenge,&nbsp;the court held that the Act is a neutral, generally applicable law, falling within the safe-harbor created by <u> Employment Division v. Smith </u> .&nbsp; For further discussion on the status of formerly recognized tribes under the BGEPA, please see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#formerly"> Detailed Discussion. </a> </p>

This opinion was vacated by the Hardman order.  Defendant was not a member of a federally-recognized tribe nor a person of Native American ancestry, but sincerely practiced Native American religions.  In response to Wilgus's free exercise challenge, the court held that the Act is a neutral, generally applicable law, falling within the safe-harbor created by Employment Division v. Smith .  For further discussion on the status of formerly recognized tribes under the BGEPA, please see Detailed Discussion.

Kanoa Inc., v. Clinton

Summary: <p> Plaintiff cruise company filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt scientific research of the defendant government, alleging standing under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). </p>

Plaintiff cruise company filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt scientific research of the defendant government, alleging standing under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").

In the Matter of: Thomas E. Rainelli

Summary: <p> This case involves violations of the MMPA by taking, in the form of harassment by feeding or attempting to feed wild dolphins.&nbsp; The respondents, a captain of a vessel used in&nbsp;a dolphin-feeding encounter, and the sole shareholder of a boat renal company, were both found guilty and assessed civil penalties in the amount of $4500.&nbsp; Though the shareholder was not on the vessel when it committed the feeding violations, he was found guilty of violating the MMPA, by providing a platform from which feeding is conducted or supported.&nbsp; </p>

This case involves violations of the MMPA by taking, in the form of harassment by feeding or attempting to feed wild dolphins.  The respondents, a captain of a vessel used in a dolphin-feeding encounter, and the sole shareholder of a boat renal company, were both found guilty and assessed civil penalties in the amount of $4500.  Though the shareholder was not on the vessel when it committed the feeding violations, he was found guilty of violating the MMPA, by providing a platform from which feeding is conducted or supported. 

In the Matter of: Richard O'Barry

Summary: <p> In 1999, civil penalties in the amount of $59,500 were assessed for the release of two dolphins from captivity.&nbsp; The dolphins were not prepared to survive in the wild and sustained life-threatening injuries as a result of their release.&nbsp; An administrative law judge found that the release of two dolphins without providing them with the necessary skills for survival resulted in harassment and injury to them, and therefore, constituted a violation of the MMPA. </p>

In 1999, civil penalties in the amount of $59,500 were assessed for the release of two dolphins from captivity.  The dolphins were not prepared to survive in the wild and sustained life-threatening injuries as a result of their release.  An administrative law judge found that the release of two dolphins without providing them with the necessary skills for survival resulted in harassment and injury to them, and therefore, constituted a violation of the MMPA.