United States

Hopson v. Kreps

Summary: <p> Action brought on behalf of Alaskan Eskimos which challenged the validity of the Department of Commerce regulations adopted pursuant to IWC Act. Plaintiffs claim is the the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under the Convention when it eliminated the native subsistence exemption for Alaskan Eskimos. The Court reverses and remands the districts courts dismissal of the action. </p>

Action brought on behalf of Alaskan Eskimos which challenged the validity of the Department of Commerce regulations adopted pursuant to IWC Act. Plaintiffs claim is the the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under the Convention when it eliminated the native subsistence exemption for Alaskan Eskimos. The Court reverses and remands the districts courts dismissal of the action.

U.S. v. Fryberg

Summary: <p> The court finds that the legislative history and surrounding circumstances of the BGEPA evinces a congressional intent to restrict treaty-based rights to hunt eagles.&nbsp; The court aligns itself with Judge Lay's dissent in <u> U.S. v. White </u> to hold that the BGEPA abrogated Indian hunting rights related to eagles.&nbsp; For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#abrogation"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. </a> </p>

The court finds that the legislative history and surrounding circumstances of the BGEPA evinces a congressional intent to restrict treaty-based rights to hunt eagles.  The court aligns itself with Judge Lay's dissent in U.S. v. White to hold that the BGEPA abrogated Indian hunting rights related to eagles.  For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

State v. LeVasseur

Summary: <p> The trial court convicted defendant of first degree theft after he freed dolphins from a university laboratory. The court affirmed the conviction on appeal. It reasoned that the choice of evils defense was unavailable to defendant because the definition of "another" under Hawaii statute clearly did not include dolphins. </p>

The trial court convicted defendant of first degree theft after he freed dolphins from a university laboratory. The court affirmed the conviction on appeal. It reasoned that the choice of evils defense was unavailable to defendant because the definition of "another" under Hawaii statute clearly did not include dolphins.

Holcomb v. City and County of Denver

Summary: <p> In this Colorado case, the defendant was convicted in the county court of keeping dogs in a residential zone in violation of zoning ordinance.&nbsp; The question before&nbsp;the court was&nbsp;whether section 2-3(3)(a) provides ascertainable standards which can be constitutionally enforced by the zoning administrator.&nbsp; The court held that the ordinance is sufficiently specific to pass constitutional muster.&nbsp; The&nbsp;Court also held that&nbsp;the zoning ordinance relating to accessory uses allowed in residential zones provided sufficient guidelines for it to be constitutionally enforced by the zoning administrator and that the municipality had not delegated to the zoning administrator the authority to determine by regulation the number of dogs which may be kept in a residential zone as an accessory use.&nbsp; </p>

In this Colorado case, the defendant was convicted in the county court of keeping dogs in a residential zone in violation of zoning ordinance.  The question before the court was whether section 2-3(3)(a) provides ascertainable standards which can be constitutionally enforced by the zoning administrator.  The court held that the ordinance is sufficiently specific to pass constitutional muster.  The Court also held that the zoning ordinance relating to accessory uses allowed in residential zones provided sufficient guidelines for it to be constitutionally enforced by the zoning administrator and that the municipality had not delegated to the zoning administrator the authority to determine by regulation the number of dogs which may be kept in a residential zone as an accessory use. 

Strong v. United States

Summary: <p> The appeal in this case does not contest the denial of a permit to conduct dolphin feedings cruises. The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that the Secretary of Commerce has no authority to consider feeding to be a form of harassment or to regulate it. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs-appellees and found it clearly reasonable to restrict or prohibit the feeding of dolphins as a potential hazard to them. </p>

The appeal in this case does not contest the denial of a permit to conduct dolphin feedings cruises. The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that the Secretary of Commerce has no authority to consider feeding to be a form of harassment or to regulate it. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs-appellees and found it clearly reasonable to restrict or prohibit the feeding of dolphins as a potential hazard to them.

U.S. v. St. Pierre

Summary: <p> Defendant challenged his&nbsp;felony indictment under the MBTA after selling an "invitation stick" that contained golden eagle feathers.&nbsp; The court held that the act encompasses migratory birds parts, not just whole birds so the indictment would stand.&nbsp; However, in a unique decision it held that the imposition of a felony conviction would violate due process where the statute does not specify any degree of intent.&nbsp; As a result, the court said it would sentence defendant under the misdemeanor provision of the statute if convicted.&nbsp; For further discussion on the intersection of the intent component of the MBTA with the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#mbta"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act </a> . </p>

Defendant challenged his felony indictment under the MBTA after selling an "invitation stick" that contained golden eagle feathers.  The court held that the act encompasses migratory birds parts, not just whole birds so the indictment would stand.  However, in a unique decision it held that the imposition of a felony conviction would violate due process where the statute does not specify any degree of intent.  As a result, the court said it would sentence defendant under the misdemeanor provision of the statute if convicted.  For further discussion on the intersection of the intent component of the MBTA with the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

Adams v. Vance

Summary: <p> An American Eskimo group had hunted bowhead whales as a form of subsistence for generations and gained an exemption from the commission to hunt the potentially endangered species.&nbsp; An injunction was initially granted, but the Court of Appeals vacated the injunction because the interests of the United States would likely have been compromised by requiring the filing of the objection and such an objection would have interfered with the goal of furthering international regulation and protection in whaling matters. </p>

An American Eskimo group had hunted bowhead whales as a form of subsistence for generations and gained an exemption from the commission to hunt the potentially endangered species.  An injunction was initially granted, but the Court of Appeals vacated the injunction because the interests of the United States would likely have been compromised by requiring the filing of the objection and such an objection would have interfered with the goal of furthering international regulation and protection in whaling matters.

United States v. Mitchell

Summary: <p> This appeal turns on whether the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), and related regulations, apply to an American citizen taking dolphins within the territorial waters of a foreign sovereign state. The defendant-appellant, Jerry Mitchell, is an American citizen convicted of violating the Act by capturing 21 dolphins within the three-mile limit of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The court held that the criminal prohibitions of the MMPA do not reach conduct in the territorial waters of a foreign sovereignty and reversed the conviction. </p>

This appeal turns on whether the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), and related regulations, apply to an American citizen taking dolphins within the territorial waters of a foreign sovereign state. The defendant-appellant, Jerry Mitchell, is an American citizen convicted of violating the Act by capturing 21 dolphins within the three-mile limit of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The court held that the criminal prohibitions of the MMPA do not reach conduct in the territorial waters of a foreign sovereignty and reversed the conviction.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah

Summary: <p> Local ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifices under the guise of an anti-cruelty concern was an unconstitutional infringement on church's First Amendment rights because (1) ordinances were not neutral; (2) ordinances were not of general applicability; and (3) governmental interest assertedly advanced by the ordinances did not justify the targeting of religious activity. </p>

Local ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifices under the guise of an anti-cruelty concern was an unconstitutional infringement on church's First Amendment rights because (1) ordinances were not neutral; (2) ordinances were not of general applicability; and (3) governmental interest assertedly advanced by the ordinances did not justify the targeting of religious activity.