United States

Sammons v. C.I.R.

Summary: <p> In a tax proceeding, the Commissioner argues that defendant should be disallowed a charitable deduction for donating several artifacts containing eagle parts to a museum because it will frustrate the purpose behind the BGEPA.&nbsp; The court disagrees, finding it unlikely that such an allowance will encourage others to procure eagle artifacts for the sole purpose of obtaining a tax deduction.&nbsp; Further, the court disagrees with the Commissioner that Sammons acquired illegal title to the artifacts, finding Sammons had sufficient&nbsp;ownership interest in the&nbsp;eagle artifacts&nbsp;for donation.&nbsp; For further discussion on commerce in eagle parts under the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#taking"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. </a> </p>

In a tax proceeding, the Commissioner argues that defendant should be disallowed a charitable deduction for donating several artifacts containing eagle parts to a museum because it will frustrate the purpose behind the BGEPA.  The court disagrees, finding it unlikely that such an allowance will encourage others to procure eagle artifacts for the sole purpose of obtaining a tax deduction.  Further, the court disagrees with the Commissioner that Sammons acquired illegal title to the artifacts, finding Sammons had sufficient ownership interest in the eagle artifacts for donation.  For further discussion on commerce in eagle parts under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. The New England Aquarium

Summary: <p> The&nbsp;primary issue addressed by the court was whether a dolphin, named Kama, had standing under the MMPA. The court found the MMPA does not authorize suits brought by animals; it only authorizes suits brought by persons. The court would not impute to Congress or the President the intention to provide standing to a marine mammal without a clear statement in the statute. </p>

The primary issue addressed by the court was whether a dolphin, named Kama, had standing under the MMPA. The court found the MMPA does not authorize suits brought by animals; it only authorizes suits brought by persons. The court would not impute to Congress or the President the intention to provide standing to a marine mammal without a clear statement in the statute.

In re Pajarito American Indian Art, Inc.

Summary: <p> A trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding sought turnover of Sioux Indian Ghost Dance Shield containing eagle feathers.&nbsp; The court observed that normally the laws of the UCC would prevail and the merchants to whom the item was entrusted would have legitimate title to transfer, but since the BGEPA prohibits the sale of eagle artifacts, only the original owner had title to the shield, not the bankrupt who allegedly tried to sell the shield nor the potential purchasers.&nbsp; The court held that the underlying public policy outlined in <u> Allard </u> weighed heavily in the decision to invalidate what it termed an illegal contract.&nbsp; For further discussion on commerce in eagle parts under the BGPEA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#taking"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act </a> . </p>

A trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding sought turnover of Sioux Indian Ghost Dance Shield containing eagle feathers.  The court observed that normally the laws of the UCC would prevail and the merchants to whom the item was entrusted would have legitimate title to transfer, but since the BGEPA prohibits the sale of eagle artifacts, only the original owner had title to the shield, not the bankrupt who allegedly tried to sell the shield nor the potential purchasers.  The court held that the underlying public policy outlined in Allard weighed heavily in the decision to invalidate what it termed an illegal contract.  For further discussion on commerce in eagle parts under the BGPEA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

Animal Protection Institute of America v. Mosbacher

Summary: <p> Wildlife protection organizations, including the API, brought action against Secretary of Commerce to challenge permits for importing false killer whales and belugas for public display. Zoo association and aquarium seeking the whales intervened.&nbsp; The District Court the whale watchers had standing and the permits were not abuse of discretion. </p>

Wildlife protection organizations, including the API, brought action against Secretary of Commerce to challenge permits for importing false killer whales and belugas for public display. Zoo association and aquarium seeking the whales intervened.  The District Court the whale watchers had standing and the permits were not abuse of discretion.

IPPL v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc.

Summary: <p> Private individuals and organizations brought action seeking to be named guardians of medical research animals seized from organization whose chief was convicted of state animal cruelty statute violations. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, John R. Hargrove, J., dismissed action, and individuals and organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) individuals and organizations lacked standing to bring action, and (2) Animal Welfare Act did not confer private cause of action. Case discussed in topic: <a href="/articles/ovusawa.htm#Science_"> US Animal Welfare Act. </a> </p>

Private individuals and organizations brought action seeking to be named guardians of medical research animals seized from organization whose chief was convicted of state animal cruelty statute violations. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, John R. Hargrove, J., dismissed action, and individuals and organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) individuals and organizations lacked standing to bring action, and (2) Animal Welfare Act did not confer private cause of action. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act.

Jones v. Gordon

Summary: <p> A permit was authorized to Sea World to capture killer whales. No environmental impact statement was prepared. Plaintiffs allege that the issuance of the permit without preparation of an environmental impact statement violated the&nbsp;National Environmental Policy&nbsp;Act of 1969.&nbsp;The Court holds that the permit must be reconsidered after an environmental impact statement is prepared. </p>

A permit was authorized to Sea World to capture killer whales. No environmental impact statement was prepared. Plaintiffs allege that the issuance of the permit without preparation of an environmental impact statement violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Court holds that the permit must be reconsidered after an environmental impact statement is prepared.

Ladnier v. Norwood

Summary: <p> Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which found in favor of defendants, veterinarian and insurer, in an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse. The court affirmed the judgment that found defendants, veterinarian and insurer, not negligent in the death of a horse belonging to plaintiff horse owner because they met the statutorily required standard of care. Defendants did not breach a duty to warn because the risk of a fatal reaction to the drug they gave to the horse was common and was considered by equine specialists to be insubstantial. </p>

Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which found in favor of defendants, veterinarian and insurer, in an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse. The court affirmed the judgment that found defendants, veterinarian and insurer, not negligent in the death of a horse belonging to plaintiff horse owner because they met the statutorily required standard of care. Defendants did not breach a duty to warn because the risk of a fatal reaction to the drug they gave to the horse was common and was considered by equine specialists to be insubstantial.

Black v. Coughlin

Summary: <p> Prisoner brought action under &sect; 1983 against commissioner of state department of correctional services to recover damages for punishment imposed as a result of improperly conducted disciplinary hearing. </p>

Prisoner brought action under § 1983 against commissioner of state department of correctional services to recover damages for punishment imposed as a result of improperly conducted disciplinary hearing.

Pfeil v. Rogers

Summary: <p> Where sheriffs deputies acted in accordance with applicable state laws, there was no violation of Fourth Amendment rights in the shooting of plaintiff's dogs. </p>

Where sheriffs deputies acted in accordance with applicable state laws, there was no violation of Fourth Amendment rights in the shooting of plaintiff's dogs.

Callahan v. Woods

Summary: <p> Plaintiff alleged the requirement that his infant daughter receive a social security number as a prerequisite to obtain public benefits infringed on his free exercise of religion.&nbsp; Since the court held that the the social security number requirement substantially interfered with plaintiff's free exercise of religious beliefs, the compelling interest test was applied to determine constitutionality of the regulation.&nbsp; This&nbsp;substantial burden/compelling interest test became the model&nbsp;for infringement of religious exercise claims, including those under the BGEPA.&nbsp; For application of this test to religious challenges to the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#religious"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act </a> . </p>

Plaintiff alleged the requirement that his infant daughter receive a social security number as a prerequisite to obtain public benefits infringed on his free exercise of religion.  Since the court held that the the social security number requirement substantially interfered with plaintiff's free exercise of religious beliefs, the compelling interest test was applied to determine constitutionality of the regulation.  This substantial burden/compelling interest test became the model for infringement of religious exercise claims, including those under the BGEPA.  For application of this test to religious challenges to the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .