United States

Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc.

Summary: <p> The plaintiff&nbsp;brought this action against Defendants Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. and Wyeth Corporation, seeking economic damages suffered from the purchase and injection of her dog with ProHeart&reg; 6 to prevent heartworm. The complaint alleged&nbsp;products liability/failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of state deceptive business practices, among others. In 2004, defendants recalled ProHeart&reg; 6 in response to a request by FDA&nbsp;due to reported adverse reactions. This Court found that Massachusetts law follows the traditional &ldquo;economic loss rule,&rdquo; where such losses are not recoverable in&nbsp;in tort and strict liability actions where there has been no&nbsp;personal injury or property damage. Here, the plaintiff was&nbsp;barred from recovering&nbsp;because she has not&nbsp;alleged any personal injury or property damage under her products liability claim.&nbsp;Further, plaintiff failed to show that defendants' deceptive act caused some injury and compsensable loss. Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. </p>

The plaintiff brought this action against Defendants Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. and Wyeth Corporation, seeking economic damages suffered from the purchase and injection of her dog with ProHeart® 6 to prevent heartworm. The complaint alleged products liability/failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of state deceptive business practices, among others. In 2004, defendants recalled ProHeart® 6 in response to a request by FDA due to reported adverse reactions. This Court found that Massachusetts law follows the traditional “economic loss rule,” where such losses are not recoverable in in tort and strict liability actions where there has been no personal injury or property damage. Here, the plaintiff was barred from recovering because she has not alleged any personal injury or property damage under her products liability claim. Further, plaintiff failed to show that defendants' deceptive act caused some injury and compsensable loss. Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted.

Reams v. Irvin

Summary: <p> <span> On Plaintiff&rsquo;s civil rights &sect; 1983 action against Defendant, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Agriculture, based on the impoundment of forty-six horses and three donkeys from Plaintiff&rsquo;s property following an investigation into potential violations of the Georgia Humane Care for Equines Act (the &ldquo;Act&rdquo;), Plaintiff appealed the District Court&rsquo;s decision to grant Defendant&rsquo;s motion for summary judgment, arguing that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of her equines, adequate notice of Plaintiff&rsquo;s right to and procedure for requesting a hearing, and adequate post-deprivation process. The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court&rsquo;s decision, finding that the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case was minimal in light of the State&rsquo;s compliance with the standards and procedures for inspection and impoundment prescribed by the Act, that the statutory notice of the right to contest the impoundment was reasonably calculated to provide Plaintiff with notice of her right to a hearing, and that the Act provided adequate power to review and to remedy violations of due process. </span> </p>

On Plaintiff’s civil rights § 1983 action against Defendant, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Agriculture, based on the impoundment of forty-six horses and three donkeys from Plaintiff’s property following an investigation into potential violations of the Georgia Humane Care for Equines Act (the “Act”), Plaintiff appealed the District Court’s decision to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of her equines, adequate notice of Plaintiff’s right to and procedure for requesting a hearing, and adequate post-deprivation process. The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case was minimal in light of the State’s compliance with the standards and procedures for inspection and impoundment prescribed by the Act, that the statutory notice of the right to contest the impoundment was reasonably calculated to provide Plaintiff with notice of her right to a hearing, and that the Act provided adequate power to review and to remedy violations of due process.

American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, Inc.

Summary: <p> This opinion represents&nbsp;the nine-year culmination of litigation brought by plaintiff Tom Rider and Animal Protection Institute (API)&nbsp;against Defendant Feld Entertainment, Inc. (&ldquo;FEI&rdquo;) - the operator of Ringling Bros. and Barnum &amp; Bailey&nbsp;traveling circus. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant's use of bullhooks and prolonged periods of chaining with respect to its circus elephants violates the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. &sect; 1531, et seq. This Court held that plaintiffs failed to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Since the Court concluded that plaintiffs lack standing, it did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' allegations that FEI &ldquo;takes&rdquo; its elephants in violation of Section 9 of the ESA.&nbsp; </p>

This opinion represents the nine-year culmination of litigation brought by plaintiff Tom Rider and Animal Protection Institute (API) against Defendant Feld Entertainment, Inc. (“FEI”) - the operator of Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey traveling circus. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant's use of bullhooks and prolonged periods of chaining with respect to its circus elephants violates the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. This Court held that plaintiffs failed to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Since the Court concluded that plaintiffs lack standing, it did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' allegations that FEI “takes” its elephants in violation of Section 9 of the ESA. 

In Defense of Animals v. Salazar

Summary: <span> In this case, the Plaintiffs, In Defense of Animals, Craig C. Downer, and Terri Farley, attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction that would stop the defendants, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar and representatives of the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management (&ldquo;the Bureau&rdquo;), from implementing a plan to capture or gather approximately 2,700 wild horses located in western Nevada (&ldquo;gather plan&rdquo;). <span> &nbsp; </span> The plaintiffs contended that the gather plan had to be set aside pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 551 et seq., because the Bureau did not have the statutory authority to carry out the gather plan, and because the plan did not comply with the terms of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (&ldquo;Wild Horse Act&rdquo;), 16 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 1331 et seq. <span> &nbsp; </span> The Court denied the Plaintiffs request for an injunction. <span> &nbsp; </span> </span>

In this case, the Plaintiffs, In Defense of Animals, Craig C. Downer, and Terri Farley, attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction that would stop the defendants, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar and representatives of the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management (“the Bureau”), from implementing a plan to capture or gather approximately 2,700 wild horses located in western Nevada (“gather plan”).   The plaintiffs contended that the gather plan had to be set aside pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., because the Bureau did not have the statutory authority to carry out the gather plan, and because the plan did not comply with the terms of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horse Act”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq.   The Court denied the Plaintiffs request for an injunction.  

Western Watersheds Project v. Dyer

Summary: <p> The plaintiff, Western Watersheds Project (WWP), is an environmental group that brought this lawsuit to ban livestock grazing in certain areas of the Jarbidge Field Office (1.4 million acres of public land managed by the Bureau of Land Management in Idaho and northern Nevada).&nbsp;WWP alleges that continued grazing destroys what little habitat remains for imperiled species like the sage grouse, pygmy rabbit, and slickspot peppergrass (deemed &ldquo;sensitive species&rdquo; by the BLM).&nbsp; After ten days of evidentiary hearings, the court found that three sensitive species in the JFO&nbsp;are in serious decline and that livestock grazing is an important factor in that decline. However, the court found that a ban on grazing was not required by law at this point since the Court was "confident" in the BLM's ability to modify the 2009 season in accordance with the Court's interpretation of the existing RMP. </p>

The plaintiff, Western Watersheds Project (WWP), is an environmental group that brought this lawsuit to ban livestock grazing in certain areas of the Jarbidge Field Office (1.4 million acres of public land managed by the Bureau of Land Management in Idaho and northern Nevada). WWP alleges that continued grazing destroys what little habitat remains for imperiled species like the sage grouse, pygmy rabbit, and slickspot peppergrass (deemed “sensitive species” by the BLM).  After ten days of evidentiary hearings, the court found that three sensitive species in the JFO are in serious decline and that livestock grazing is an important factor in that decline. However, the court found that a ban on grazing was not required by law at this point since the Court was "confident" in the BLM's ability to modify the 2009 season in accordance with the Court's interpretation of the existing RMP.

Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe County, Tex

Summary: <p> In this Texas case, Hoog-Watson asserted that a search and seizure of her home&nbsp;violated 42 U.S.C. &sect; 1983 and Texas tort law, and sought both monetary and injunctive relief against county officials. On appeal, this Court found that Hoog-Watson presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the the requisite prior criminal proceeding took place, thereby precluding summary judgment. As to County Attorney Murray-Kolb's claim of prosecutorial immunity, this court found that because Murray-Kolb partipated in the search and seizure, an investigative function normally performed by the police, she is&nbsp;protected only by qualified immunity. </p>

In this Texas case, Hoog-Watson asserted that a search and seizure of her home violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas tort law, and sought both monetary and injunctive relief against county officials. On appeal, this Court found that Hoog-Watson presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the the requisite prior criminal proceeding took place, thereby precluding summary judgment. As to County Attorney Murray-Kolb's claim of prosecutorial immunity, this court found that because Murray-Kolb partipated in the search and seizure, an investigative function normally performed by the police, she is protected only by qualified immunity.

Friends of Animals v. Salazar

Summary: <p> Friends of Animals (&ldquo;FOA&rdquo;) filed a Complaint against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the ESA and APA&nbsp;seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. At issue is the petition FOA filed with the FWS in January 2008 to list thirteen species of foreign macaws, parrots and cockatoos as threatened or endangered due to the&nbsp;caged pet bird trade. In July 2009,&nbsp;FWS placed on public inspection at the Federal Register its 90-Day Finding for the Thirteen Species and also moved to&nbsp;dismiss&nbsp;FOA's lawsuit as moot. While the Court&nbsp;held that FOA's substantive claims must be dismissed, it considered FOA's argument that an award of fees and costs is appropriate here because its suit served as the &ldquo;catalyst&rdquo; for&nbsp;FWS's subsequent remedial actions. The Court allowed FOA to file a motion for fees and costs and defendants to respond to such motion. </p>

Friends of Animals (“FOA”) filed a Complaint against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the ESA and APA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. At issue is the petition FOA filed with the FWS in January 2008 to list thirteen species of foreign macaws, parrots and cockatoos as threatened or endangered due to the caged pet bird trade. In July 2009, FWS placed on public inspection at the Federal Register its 90-Day Finding for the Thirteen Species and also moved to dismiss FOA's lawsuit as moot. While the Court held that FOA's substantive claims must be dismissed, it considered FOA's argument that an award of fees and costs is appropriate here because its suit served as the “catalyst” for FWS's subsequent remedial actions. The Court allowed FOA to file a motion for fees and costs and defendants to respond to such motion.

Levine v. Vilsack

Summary: <p> Animal advocates filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) challenging the USDA's interpretive rule excluding chickens, turkeys, and other domestic fowl from the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA).&nbsp; The United States District Court for the Ninth District of California had entered summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the USDA and the Plaintiffs appealed.&nbsp; The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Plaintiffs-Appellants lacked standing to challenge the USDA's interpretive rule and vacated and remanded the case to the district court.&nbsp; </p>

Animal advocates filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) challenging the USDA's interpretive rule excluding chickens, turkeys, and other domestic fowl from the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA).  The United States District Court for the Ninth District of California had entered summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the USDA and the Plaintiffs appealed.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Plaintiffs-Appellants lacked standing to challenge the USDA's interpretive rule and vacated and remanded the case to the district court. 

Animal Welfare Institute v. Martin

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs in this case filed motions for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order to halt the commencement of the early coyote and fox trapping season in the state of Maine. Plaintiffs claim that the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (DIFW)Commissioner had violated the ESA by allowing trapping activities that &ldquo;take&rdquo; Canada lynx, a threatened species. The DIFW stated&nbsp;that the Court has already addressed a motion for preliminary injunction and an emergency motion for temporary restraining order, with no change to circumstances. In denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and TRO, the Court found that Plaintiffs had not sustained their burden to justify the extraordinary remedy of an injunction. Further, the Court found that the circumstances that led the Court to deny the Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order have not changed. </p>

Plaintiffs in this case filed motions for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order to halt the commencement of the early coyote and fox trapping season in the state of Maine. Plaintiffs claim that the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (DIFW)Commissioner had violated the ESA by allowing trapping activities that “take” Canada lynx, a threatened species. The DIFW stated that the Court has already addressed a motion for preliminary injunction and an emergency motion for temporary restraining order, with no change to circumstances. In denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and TRO, the Court found that Plaintiffs had not sustained their burden to justify the extraordinary remedy of an injunction. Further, the Court found that the circumstances that led the Court to deny the Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order have not changed.

Reed v. Vickery

Summary: <p> A veterinarian performed a pre-purchase examination on a horse and indicated to the prospective buyers that the horse was in good health. The vet facility failed to disclose that a different vet at the same facility had injected the horse to mask lameness. The purchasers had a cause of action for negligence where the statements made by the facility constituted misrepresentations or concealment. The measure of damages was the difference between the horse&rsquo;s fair market value before and after the loss. </p>

A veterinarian performed a pre-purchase examination on a horse and indicated to the prospective buyers that the horse was in good health. The vet facility failed to disclose that a different vet at the same facility had injected the horse to mask lameness. The purchasers had a cause of action for negligence where the statements made by the facility constituted misrepresentations or concealment. The measure of damages was the difference between the horse’s fair market value before and after the loss.