United States

Summary: From the courtroom, to Capitol Hill, to the international arena, the struggle for animal rights continues (as it does too for human rights). In this volume of Animal Law, several authors discuss how the legal rights of humans compete with those of animals. Rick Eichstaedt's article, "Save the Whales" v. 'Save the Makah": The Makah and the Struggle for Native Whaling, discusses the competing interests of the Makah Indian tribe and the gray whale. The Makah will begin hunting gray whales for the first time in over seventy years in the fall of 1998. Some defenders of indigenous peoples' rights argue that the Makah should be allowed to return to their traditional ceremonial practice. Animal rights groups argue that it is not right to kill even one whale. There are no easy answers in conflicts such as these.

Summary: Mr. McGovern discusses the reasoning behind the leap from patentability of non-living things to the living things within the last twenty years. He concludes that neither the Supreme Court or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has offered a convincing rationale for the inclusion of living things within 35 U.S.C. Section 101.

Summary: In recent years, the equine industry has become concerned by court decisions which undermine the traditional view that persons who participate in horseback riding activities assume the risk of any injury they incur. Ms. McEvoy examines significant cases and state statutes designed to meet the challenges posed by these decisions, as well as the legislative history behind a Connecticut statute.

Summary: Mr. Duckler examines the historical perceptions of zoo animals as legal entities and discusses a proposal to classify zoo animals as objects for historical preservation, suggesting that zoo animals and society will be better served by a change in the historical legal status of zoos and zoo animals.

Summary: Approximately thirty-five million dollars are spent each year by the Animal Damage Control division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to destroy predator animals that supposedly kill livestock. The methods by which the ADC kills these “predators” are appalling. Mr. Hoch argues that funding for this program is excessive, irresponsible, and raises serious ethical questions. The authors conclude that ADC activities should be terminated immediately.

Summary: Ms. Hessler examines the constitutionality of the federal hunter harassment statute and concludes that protests of hunting events should be protected under the First Amendment.

Summary: In Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement, Professor Gary L. Francione argues that the modern animal rights movement is propelled similarly like the American abolitionist movement. "New Welfarists," he claims, fruitlessly pursue the goal of ending the exploitation of nonhuman animals through measures that better their welfare but cannot result in what matters most, the abolition of their legal status as property. In this essay, Steven Wise argues that New Welfarism does not contain a "structural defect," but a "structural inconsistency" that is necessary to achieve Gary Francione's goal of abolishing the property status of nonhuman animals in a manner consistent with the moral rights of nonhuman animals.

Summary: This article provides a review of the book "Animals, Property, and the Law" by Gary Francione regarding the differences between animal rights and animal welfare.

Summary: This case has to do with the mistreatment and unsafe captivity of numerous animals kept at a roadside zoo in Sequim, Washington called Olympic Game Farm (OGF). The Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) alleged that OGF’s failure to abide by the Federal Endangered Species Act, as well as alleged violations of Washington State animal cruelty laws created a public nuisance. OGF admitted one of the allegations, specifically, that they are not accredited but possess or display Roosevelt Elk. That was an admitted violation of Washington law which makes it unlawful for a non-accredited facility to possess such a species. That single admission supported ALDF’s public nuisance claim in addition to all of the other alleged state violations. The court stated that ALDF met the "low bar" of standing in a public nuisance context. Accordingly, OGF’s Motion to Dismiss was denied.

Summary: In July of 2017, Alpena County Animal Control Officer Michelle Reid, filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that a black and tan German Shepherd named Bruiser had attacked or bit a person. The victim, Joshua Henderson, testified that as he was jogging past the respondents’ house, Bruiser ran toward him and bit his left bicep and left forearm. The Respondents stated that Bruiser had never attacked or bitten anyone before and was raised around children. The prosecutor clarified that euthanization was not being sought at the time, however, the district court found that Bruiser had caused serious injury to Henderson and noted the possibility of Bruiser injuring children in the future and ordered Bruiser to be destroyed. The Respondents appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Respondents argued that the circuit court erred in determining that Bruiser was a dangerous animal and that the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser caused death or serious injury or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals concluded that Bruiser fit the definition of a dangerous animal under the statute, however, the Court agreed with the Respondents that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Bruiser caused serious injury or was likely to cause death or serious injury in the future. In order for an animal to be destroyed, it must be more than dangerous. Henderson’s injuries consisted of scrapes, puncture wounds, and three stitches. Those injuries did not rise to the level of a “serious injury” as defined under MCL 287.321(e) which defines serious injury as permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of bodily function. The district court did not properly interpret MCL 287.322 and based their decision solely on the fact that Bruiser had bitten someone once and concluded that because of that, the court knew that Bruiser was more likely to do so again. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s order because the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser had caused serious injury or death to a person or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court.