United States

Summary: This case was brought by several environmental organizations against the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission to challenge the approval or regulations that authorize the trapping and snaring of wolves within grizzly bear habitat in Montana. The grizzly bear is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Montana trapping regulations allow wolf hunters to use foothold traps large enough to capture grizzly bears. Grizzly bears rely heavily on their front and back paws to hunt for food, so crippling their limbs with these traps will lead to the incidental killing of grizzly bears from starvation. Plaintiffs contend that allowing the trapping of wolves in grizzly bear territory is in violation of § 9 of the ESA, as it will lead to the incidental unlawful taking of grizzly bears. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the start of the wolf trapping season, and raised questions on the merits and established a reasonable threat of harm to grizzly bears if the trapping and snaring of wolves is allowed in their habitat. On the merits of the claim, slthough defendants could prove that no grizzly bears had been killed with such traps in Montana for several years, the court found that plaintiffs succeeded on the merits as there was evidence of grizzly bears being killed by such traps in adjacent states. Plaintiffs also showed that there was a likelihood of harm to grizzly bears, with evidence that these traps will lead to the death of grizzly bears. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part and denied in part, and enjoined the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission from authorizing wolf trapping and snaring.

Summary: This is an appeal of a personal injury case brought by plaintiff, the mother of the injured child, against the owners of a dog that caused the injury and the owners of the restaurant where the injury occurred. The injury took place at a dog-friendly restaurant both parties were dining at, where the dog owned by defendants bit a three-year-old infant. Plaintiff alleges that the restaurant owners knew of the dog’s vicious propensities but allowed it on the premises, and are liable along with the owners of the dog for the injuries sustained by her child. Defendant restaurant owners contend that they did not know of the dog’s vicious propensities, and that their restaurant requires that dogs be leashed and the dog was leashed at the time of the bite. Plaintiff argues that, under the Hewitt case, a standard negligence analysis should be used rather than an analysis based on knowledge of vicious propensities. Plaintiffs also argue defendant restaurant owners owed a duty of care to their customers, which was breached by allowing a dangerous dog on the premises. The lower court denied defendants motion for summary judgment because there were unresolved issues of fact as to the restaurant defendants’ duty to their patrons and the foreseeability of the injury. This appeal followed. On appeal, the court reversed the order of the lower court because defendants established that they did not have any knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog and that they exercised reasonable care through their signage and policies to protect restaurant patrons from the risk of harm that allowing animals on the premises poses. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted.

Summary: This is an appeal of a verdict to convict defendant of aggravated cruelty to animals. Defendant was walking his two pit bull dogs and allowed the dogs enough leash space to reach a pet cat resting on the steps of its owner’s porch. The cat’s owners, who were witnesses to this event, watched as the pit bulls mauled their pet cat. When the witnesses asked defendant to stop his dogs, defendant attempted to flee with his dogs still carrying the cat’s body in its mouth. The witnesses pursued and eventually, the dog dropped the deceased cat’s body. Defendant was charged with aggravated cruelty to animals and overdriving, torturing and injuring animals, and failure to provide proper sustenance. Defendant was convicted, and appealed the aggravated animal cruelty charge. Defendant argues that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court here found that defendant was well aware that the dogs were aggressive, even keeping them separate from his young son because of their propensity to attack smaller animals. There was also testimony from another neighbor of defendant allowing his dogs to chase feral cats off her porch without stopping them, and testimony regarding defendant’s dog previously mauling a smaller dog without defendant intervening to stop them. Defendant was warned by animal control to muzzle them, but refused to do so. Defendant also bragged to co-workers about how he let his pit bulls go after other dogs and attack wild and old animals. Accordingly, the court found that defendant was aware of the dogs’ aggressive behavior and affirmed the holding of the lower court.

Summary: This subtitle applies to an action for possession of real property filed on or after November 1, 2023. In addition, by October 1, 2023, the Department of Agriculture shall develop and publish on its website a fact sheet that provides information about how a person may care for and protect any pets in the event the person is evicted or loses possession of the person's property. When possession of real property is delivered to a landlord following an eviction or other described action, law enforcement or other official must immediately inspect the premises for any pet and provide that pet to the tenant. If the tenant is not present, that official must contact an animal shelter or animal rescue to take possession of the pet along with contact information of the former tenant.

Summary: This 2023 law states that a landlord may also require, as a condition of tenancy, that the tenant allow the landlord to enter the rental unit in the case of an emergency when the welfare of the animal is at risk to determine whether the animal has been abandoned or is in need of care. If the landlord determines that a tenant with an animal has vacated the premises or is unable to care for the animal due to death or disability, the landlord may contact a person authorized by the tenant, a humane agent, an animal control officer or an animal shelter to pick up and care for the animal.

Summary: This Note examines the development of VCPR law, the incorporation - or lack thereof - of telehealth into VCPR law across the United States, and considers VCPR effect on access to care. After discussing the state of the veterinary industry and the regulatory scheme of veterinary medicine, Part II assesses VCPR laws across the United States, establishing that there is general uniformity from state to state. In Part II, the Note juxtaposes human medicine's widespread acceptance of telehealth to establish valid doctor-patient relationships with relative absence of such acceptance of telehealth in veterinary medicine to establish valid VCPRs. Part III then discusses and analyzes existing litigation concerning VCPR law and telehealth measures in the Fifth Circuit and in California. The Note concludes by proposing more widespread adoption of telemedicine as a means to establish a VCPR in order to improve access to quality care for veterinarians, clients, and patients more closely aligned with human medicine.

Summary: These are laws specific to Mobile County in Alabama. The first set of laws concern the regulation of dangerous or nuisance dogs in the county. An animal control officer or law enforcement officer of Mobile County shall investigate any incidents involving any dog reported to be dangerous or a nuisance in the unincorporated areas of Mobile County. If there is probable cause to believe that an owned dog is dangerous or a nuisance and has caused serious physical injury or has caused damage to real or personal property, the law enforcement officer or animal control officer shall impound the dog pending disposition of a petition to declare a dog to be dangerous or a nuisance. The next law (§ 45-49-231) concerns theft of dogs in the county. Any person who picks up a dog wearing a collar and name plate bearing the name and address of the owner of the dog shall make contact with the owner and deliver the dog to the owner, or return the dog to the place where the dog was picked up. If the person fails to carry out this section, he or she shall be subject to arrest and prosecution for the crime of theft as provided in Chapter 8 of Title 13A.

Summary: This chapter contains the Safe Transportation of Dogs and Cats Act. A “mobile or traveling housing facility” means a transporting vehicle, including, but not limited to, a car, truck, trailer, bus, or recreational vehicle used to transport animals. The conditions in a mobile or traveling housing facility for dogs and cats shall not endanger the health or well-being of an animal

Summary: This is a case regarding an animal cruelty charge brought against defendant, the owner of an elderly, terminally ill dog. First, defendant’s family brought the fourteen-year-old dog to an animal hospital. The staff at the hospital examined the dog, which had a large mass on his side, and recommended that the dog have surgery to remove the mass. Defendant did not authorize the surgery, and instead took the dog home. Three weeks later, defendant brought the dog back to the animal hospital, where the staff noticed that his condition had worsened significantly. At this point, the veterinarian recommended humane euthanasia to end the dog’s suffering, but defendant declined and requested the surgery. The veterinarian declined, claiming the dog would not survive the surgery, and defendant took the dog home saying they would have another vet euthanize the dog. The veterinarian reported defendant to the Animal Rescue League of Boston, who conducted a welfare check on the dog and found it in very poor health. When the Animal Rescue League asked defendant to euthanize the dog or get him medical attention, defendant declined and insisted the dog would die at home. Defendants were charged with violating the animal cruelty statute, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was granted, and this appeal followed. The question on appeal is whether defendant’s conduct in refusing to euthanize the dog constitutes animal cruelty under the statute. The Commonwealth argues that the animal cruelty statute covers the conduct of one who has charge of an animal but, rather than inflicting the harm directly, “authorizes or permits” the animal “to be subjected to” harm, and that keeping the dog in a state of suffering rather than euthanizing the dog fits this definition. However, after examining case law, the court could not find a case in which a person's failure to euthanize an animal was interpreted as “subjecting” an animal to harm, and did not want to extend the statute that far. The court affirmed the holding of the lower court.

Summary: This case was brought by plaintiff-appellants, several no-kill animal shelters, against defendant-appellee the County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate against defendant seeking to compel the release of impounded dogs scheduled for euthanasia to plaintiffs. The court sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend, and this appeal followed. Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the Hayden Act imposes a duty on defendant to release the dogs scheduled for euthanasia to plaintiffs. First, the court asked whether defendant had discretion to refuse to release, and then to euthanize, a dog deemed to have behavioral problems when release has been requested by a non-profit animal adoption or rescue organization? Second, the court asked if defendant had discretion to determine and impose requirements for organizations that claim to be animal rescue or adoption organizations to qualify as such, beyond simply ensuring that the organizations are non-profits under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code? The court examined the relevant code, which stated that “any stray dog that is impounded pursuant to this division shall, before the euthanasia of that animal, be released to a nonprofit” and agreed with plaintiffs’ argument that the use of the word shall indicates that the legislature intended to impose a duty on defendant to release these dogs upon request to qualified nonprofit animal rescue or adoption agencies. The court also concluded that the demurrer was improperly granted as defendant lacked discretion to withhold and euthanize a dog based upon its determination that the animal has a behavioral problem or is not adoptable or treatable. The court agreed, however, that defendant had discretion to determine whether and how a non-profit organization qualifies as an animal adoption or rescue organization. The court reversed the judgment of the trial court, vacated the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and remanded to the trial court.