United States

Summary: The court stated that the Secretary’s decision to remove 3,500 to 7,000 wild horses in order to maintain the horse population at a permanent level might qualify as “major” federal action and thus require an EIS before removal could occur.    While the secretary has wide discretion under the WFRHBA, he has no discretion regarding compliance with NEPA.  The court also held that  the exercise of jurisdiction by two courts over public lands created no threat of conflicting decisions on range utilization, because the courts only determined whether the land use decision was an informed one.

Summary: A diabetic woman in Arizona attempted to keep a chimpanzee as an assistance animal in spite of the state’s ape ban. Despite the state’s ban, the diabetic woman imported a chimpanzee with the intention of keeping him as a service animal, claiming that she was entitled to do so under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). In September of 2007, the chimpanzee’s owner sued the State of Arizona, the Game and Fish Commission, and the Director of the Game and Fish Department in federal court claiming that they had violated her rights under the federal disability laws. According to the plaintiff, the ADA requires the state to make “reasonable accommodations” for disabled individuals; and in her case this meant the state must waive its ban on possessing “restricted” apes so that she can keep a chimpanzee in her home as a service animal. The District Court found that the plaintiff’s chimpanzee is “unnecessary” and “inadequate” to meet her disability-related needs and the animal is not a “reasonable” accommodation under the ADA because he threatens the health and safety of the community.

Summary: The plaintiffs, In Defense of Animals and Patricia Haight brought suit against the defendants under the False Claims Act.  In 1997, defendant Michael Berens, Ph.D., submitted a grant application to the NIH in which he sought federal funding for a project to develop a canine model to study glioma, a form of human brain cancer, and attempted to create a process for implanting gliomas in the brains of beagles. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the challenged grant application statements were objectively false. 

Summary: Defendants were indicted for conspiracy to smuggle snakes and other reptiles into the United States in violation of the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 43. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss counts based on alleged violations of the laws of Fiji and of Papua New Guinea, finding that foreign laws and regulations referred to in the statute were designed and intended for the protection of wildlife in those countries. On appeal, the trial court's order dismissing an indictment against defendants for smuggling wildlife was affirmed as to Fiji, where the regulation relied on was a revenue ordinance. The court reversed as to Papua New Guinea where the law was intended to protect wildlife in the country of origin.

Summary: Judicial officer is not required to accept ALJ's findings of fact, even when those findings are based on credibility determinations, and judicial officer is authorized to substitute his or her judgment for that of ALJ.

Summary: Ongoing pattern of violations establishes "history of previous violations" for purposes of 7 USCS § 2149(b).

Summary: The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine section 7613 (related to the importation of fish bait species) places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  While the court noted there is nothing in either the statute or its legislative history which expresses the clear intent of Congress that the Lacey Act Amendments are meant to insulate state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, it found that the somewhat unique characteristics associated with Maine's wild fish population, the substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects these organisms have on fish and the unpredictable consequences attending the introduction of exotic species into Maine's wild fish population (including the introduction of fish parasites into the native population), the state clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation of live bait fish. 

Summary: Proof of willfulness is not prerequisite to concluding that respondent violated Animal Welfare Act or assessing civil penalty or issuing cease and desist order.

Summary: Agency's choice of sanction is not to be overturned unless it is unwarranted by law, unjustified by facts, or represents abuse of discretion; sanction is not rendered invalid in particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases.

Summary: Respondent who, after being duly notified, fails to appear at hearing for good cause, is deemed to have admitted any facts presented at hearing and all material allegations of fact contained in Animal Welfare Act complaint.