United States

Robinson v. U.S.

Summary: <p> Richard "Dick" Robinson was charged by the Department of Agriculture with violating the Animal Welfare Act for transporting a wolf from Utah to California for exhibition on television without a license. Robinson exhibited the wolf on several television programs to promote his most recent book about his exploits as an animal trainer and producer of animal films. Respondent once held a valid exhibitor's license under the AWA, but the license was revoked in 1979 when Robinson failed to comply with the terms of a consent decision requiring him to install more adequate plywood cover for his bear cages. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Department of Agriculture issued a cease and desist order to prevent Robinson from further illegally transporting and exhibiting his animals and assessed a $500 civil penalty against him. The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture affirmed the order of the ALJ on appeal. The 10th Circuit affirmed the&nbsp;ALJ's conclusion that a cease&nbsp;and desist order by itself was insufficient and that a $500 penalty was necessary to impress Robinson with the need to comply with the Act's requirements in the future. </p>

Richard "Dick" Robinson was charged by the Department of Agriculture with violating the Animal Welfare Act for transporting a wolf from Utah to California for exhibition on television without a license. Robinson exhibited the wolf on several television programs to promote his most recent book about his exploits as an animal trainer and producer of animal films. Respondent once held a valid exhibitor's license under the AWA, but the license was revoked in 1979 when Robinson failed to comply with the terms of a consent decision requiring him to install more adequate plywood cover for his bear cages. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Department of Agriculture issued a cease and desist order to prevent Robinson from further illegally transporting and exhibiting his animals and assessed a $500 civil penalty against him. The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture affirmed the order of the ALJ on appeal. The 10th Circuit affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that a cease and desist order by itself was insufficient and that a $500 penalty was necessary to impress Robinson with the need to comply with the Act's requirements in the future.

U.S. v. Bryant

Summary: <p> Ricky Bryant appeals convictions on one misdemeanor and two felony counts of purchasing illegally obtained fox pelts, violations of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. &sect; 3371-3378 (1981).&nbsp; The court held that the North Carolina regulation, which unambiguously&nbsp;prohibited&nbsp;the hunting of&nbsp;foxes without&nbsp;authorization&nbsp;and expressly stated that dealing in untagged pelts is illegal, withstood the void for vagueness test as prosecuted under the Lacey Act.&nbsp; The court further dismissed challenges&nbsp;based on an entrapment defense and arguments that the&nbsp;Lacey Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation to the States of legislative power reserved to Congress. </p>

Ricky Bryant appeals convictions on one misdemeanor and two felony counts of purchasing illegally obtained fox pelts, violations of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. § 3371-3378 (1981).  The court held that the North Carolina regulation, which unambiguously prohibited the hunting of foxes without authorization and expressly stated that dealing in untagged pelts is illegal, withstood the void for vagueness test as prosecuted under the Lacey Act.  The court further dismissed challenges based on an entrapment defense and arguments that the Lacey Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation to the States of legislative power reserved to Congress.

U.S. v. Wahchumwah

Summary: <p> The United States Fish and Wildlife Services investigated a tip that the defendant was selling eagle parts in violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the undercover agent&rsquo;s warrantless use of a concealed audio visual device to record the transaction inside the defendant&rsquo;s home, but the appeals court disagreed.&nbsp; However, the appeals court reversed&nbsp; the defendant's conviction on Counts 2 or 3 and Counts 4 or 5 because those counts were multiplicitous. </p>

The United States Fish and Wildlife Services investigated a tip that the defendant was selling eagle parts in violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the undercover agent’s warrantless use of a concealed audio visual device to record the transaction inside the defendant’s home, but the appeals court disagreed.  However, the appeals court reversed  the defendant's conviction on Counts 2 or 3 and Counts 4 or 5 because those counts were multiplicitous.

U.S. v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets

Summary: <p> Plaintiff U.S.&nbsp;sought to forfeit the Defendant parakeets on the ground that they were imported in violation of Peruvian law and consequently, in violation of the Lacey Act.&nbsp; The court held that, if even the "innocent owner" defense was available under the Lacey Act (which the court held it is not under the forfeiture provision of the statute), the claimant importer never attempted to independently confirm or verify that the parakeet species in question (brotogeris versicolorus) could be lawfully imported from Peru.&nbsp; Thus, the court held the forfeiture valid where the U.S. established by probable cause to&nbsp;believe the Lacey Act was violated where the testimony at trial established that Peruvian Supreme Decree No. 934-73-AG prohibits from anywhere in the national territory the exportation of wild live animals coming from the forest or jungle region.&nbsp; </p>

Plaintiff U.S. sought to forfeit the Defendant parakeets on the ground that they were imported in violation of Peruvian law and consequently, in violation of the Lacey Act.  The court held that, if even the "innocent owner" defense was available under the Lacey Act (which the court held it is not under the forfeiture provision of the statute), the claimant importer never attempted to independently confirm or verify that the parakeet species in question (brotogeris versicolorus) could be lawfully imported from Peru.  Thus, the court held the forfeiture valid where the U.S. established by probable cause to believe the Lacey Act was violated where the testimony at trial established that Peruvian Supreme Decree No. 934-73-AG prohibits from anywhere in the national territory the exportation of wild live animals coming from the forest or jungle region. 

U.S. v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, More or Less

Summary: <p> Defendants were charged with exporting salmon from Taiwan in violation of Taiwanese regulations.&nbsp; The regulations and public announcement of the Taiwan Board of Foreign Trade restricting the export of salmon from Taiwan constituted "foreign law" as that term is used in the Lacey Act, despite the fact this was embodied in regulation, not statute.&nbsp; Moreover, this provision of the Lacey Act was not void for vagueness for&nbsp;failing to&nbsp;expressly state that the term "foreign law" encompassed both foreign statutes and regulations.&nbsp; </p>

Defendants were charged with exporting salmon from Taiwan in violation of Taiwanese regulations.  The regulations and public announcement of the Taiwan Board of Foreign Trade restricting the export of salmon from Taiwan constituted "foreign law" as that term is used in the Lacey Act, despite the fact this was embodied in regulation, not statute.  Moreover, this provision of the Lacey Act was not void for vagueness for failing to expressly state that the term "foreign law" encompassed both foreign statutes and regulations. 

U.S. v. Big Eagle

Summary: <p> On November 23, 1987, defendant, John Terrence Big Eagle, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in this action on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The indictment charges the defendant with violating the Lacey Act prohibitions against transporting, selling, or acquiring fish taken or possessed in violation of state law or Indian tribal law.&nbsp; The court held that the fishing regulations of the Lower Bule Sioux Tribe were applicable to defendant, a Native American of another tribe, and that this subjected him to prosecution under the Lacey Act. </p>

On November 23, 1987, defendant, John Terrence Big Eagle, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in this action on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The indictment charges the defendant with violating the Lacey Act prohibitions against transporting, selling, or acquiring fish taken or possessed in violation of state law or Indian tribal law.  The court held that the fishing regulations of the Lower Bule Sioux Tribe were applicable to defendant, a Native American of another tribe, and that this subjected him to prosecution under the Lacey Act.

American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Lyng

Summary: <p> This case&nbsp;resulted from a remand by the Court of Appeals after the USDA denied the plaintiff's application&nbsp;for additional rulemaking for the Horse Protection Act to expressly prohibit the use of ten ounce chains and padded shoes in the training of show horses. The use of these materials, argues plaintiff, constitutes soring (the act of deliberately injuring a horse's hooves to obtain a particular type of gait prized at certain horse shows. The object of soring is to cause a horse to suffer pain as its feet touch the ground). This Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, it directed the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture to institute rulemaking procedures concerning the use of action devices on show horses. The Court further held&nbsp;that the existing regulations are contrary to law and that the Secretary ignored his mandate from Congress under the Horse Protection Act. </p>

This case resulted from a remand by the Court of Appeals after the USDA denied the plaintiff's application for additional rulemaking for the Horse Protection Act to expressly prohibit the use of ten ounce chains and padded shoes in the training of show horses. The use of these materials, argues plaintiff, constitutes soring (the act of deliberately injuring a horse's hooves to obtain a particular type of gait prized at certain horse shows. The object of soring is to cause a horse to suffer pain as its feet touch the ground). This Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, it directed the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture to institute rulemaking procedures concerning the use of action devices on show horses. The Court further held that the existing regulations are contrary to law and that the Secretary ignored his mandate from Congress under the Horse Protection Act.

Dorman v. Satti

Summary: The federal district court here considered the constitutionality of Connecticut&rsquo;s Hunter Harassment Act (Conn.Gen.Stat. Section 53a-183a) of 1985. The plaintiff was arrested under the Act after she approached hunters who were hunting waterfowl in public lands adjacent to her property and attempted to verbally dissuade them from hunting. The charge was ultimately dismissed, but plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Act. In finding the Act unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the Court found that it criminalized constitutionally protected speech. Specifically, the Court found that the Act failed to define &ldquo;interference&rdquo; and did not adequately limit the reach of &ldquo;acts in preparation&rdquo; to hunt. </p>

The federal district court here considered the constitutionality of Connecticut’s Hunter Harassment Act (Conn.Gen.Stat. Section 53a-183a) of 1985. The plaintiff was arrested under the Act after she approached hunters who were hunting waterfowl in public lands adjacent to her property and attempted to verbally dissuade them from hunting. The charge was ultimately dismissed, but plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Act. In finding the Act unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the Court found that it criminalized constitutionally protected speech. Specifically, the Court found that the Act failed to define “interference” and did not adequately limit the reach of “acts in preparation” to hunt.

Animal Protection Institute of America, Inc. v. Hodel

Summary: <p> In this case, animal protection groups sued the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin or restrain&nbsp;him from allowing the adoptions of wild horses and burros under circumstances where the defendants know the horses are being adopted for commercial slaughter or exploitation.&nbsp;Defendants opposed the motion and and argued that&nbsp;the Secretary has duly promulgated regulations permitting adoptions of such animals and provided that the animals are humanely cared for during the one year period provided for in 16 U.S.C. &sect; 1333(c). This Court granted&nbsp;plaintiffs' motion, enjoining the Secretary from transferring the titles of wild free-roaming horses and burros to individuals who have, prior to the expiration of the one year &ldquo;probationary period&rdquo; expressed to the Secretary an intent to use said animals for commercial purposes. </p>

In this case, animal protection groups sued the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin or restrain him from allowing the adoptions of wild horses and burros under circumstances where the defendants know the horses are being adopted for commercial slaughter or exploitation. Defendants opposed the motion and and argued that the Secretary has duly promulgated regulations permitting adoptions of such animals and provided that the animals are humanely cared for during the one year period provided for in 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c). This Court granted plaintiffs' motion, enjoining the Secretary from transferring the titles of wild free-roaming horses and burros to individuals who have, prior to the expiration of the one year “probationary period” expressed to the Secretary an intent to use said animals for commercial purposes.