United States

Summary: Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for violation of the Animal Control Act and alleged negligence due to the broken leg that the Plaintiff suffered after she was kicked by Defendant’s horse while trying to pass the horse on a group ride.   At the time of the accident, the defendant was neither an “equine activity sponsor” nor an “equine professional” according to the Act.   The issue was whether the Act applied only to those two groups of people, and the court held that the Act does not preclude negligence liability for persons other than equine activity sponsors and equine professionals.

Summary: Defendant alleged that his treaty-based hunting rights incorporate a right to sell eagles.  The court disagreed, finding such an interpretation of those treaty rights contrary to Indian custom and religion.  Court also holds that defendant lacks standing to raise a religious challenge to the BGEPA based on the religious rights of others.  Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendant's overbreadth claim.  For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

Summary: Defendant was a member of a recognized Indian tribe who killed an eagle upon his reservation.  The Court holds that it will not find an intent by Congress to abrogate Indian hunting rights under the BGEPA where the statute did not explicitly state that those rights were abrogated.  For further discussion on abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

Summary: The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment.  For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

Summary: The Defendant was charged with unlawfully and cruelly torturing, tormenting, and needlessly mutilating a goose under Ind. Rev. Stat. § 2101 (1881).  At issue was the ownership status of the goose.  The affidavit alleged that the goose was the property of an unknown person, and thus was the equivalent of an averment that the goose was a domestic fowl, as required by Ind. Rev. Stat. § 2101 (1881).  The court noted that whenever the ownership of the animal is charged, such ownership becomes a matter of description and must be proved as alleged.  Interestingly, the court in this case also observed that there is "a well defined difference between the offence of malicious or mischievous injury to property and that of cruelty to animals," with the latter only becoming an indictable offense within recent years.  The Supreme Court held that the motion to quash should have been overruled and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Summary: Plaintiff, a passenger of a horse-drawn sled sued the owner of the property on which the accident occurred, as well as the owner of the horses and the sled for the injuries she suffered when thrown from the sled.   The Court of Appeals found that the equine immunity statute provided protection for the owner of the horse against tort liability.   The plain language of the statute provides that immunity from civil liability is available to all persons , “ including an equine activity sponsor or equine professional…”; thus, protection is not limited only to those who are sponsors or professionals, rather they are examples of types of people to whom the statute applies.

Summary: Petitioner dog owner sought an injunction against a Seattle ordinance that allowed the city to destroy a vicious dog once the owner has been found guilty of owning a vicious dog (two lhasa apsos) .  The majority held that the state statute regulating dogs did not preempt field of regulating dangerous dogs and the city ordinance did not irreconcilably conflict with state statute.  Notably, Justice Sanders filed a strong dissent, pointing out that these dogs are the primary companions for the elderly petitioner.  While the state law regulating dangerous dogs allows cities to regulate "potentially dangerous dogs," the Seattle ordinance in question fails to make a distinction between the two types of dogs.  Justice Sanders wrote: "As Mr. Rabon notes, if the City were correct, dog owners and defense attorneys would find themselves arguing the bite was so vicious that the dog qualifies as "dangerous" in order to spare the dog's life."  Thus, the ordinance "eviscerates" the dual definition and violates the overriding state law on dangerous dogs.

Summary: In this case, exotic animal owners appeal a summary judgment order dismissing their various constitutional challenges to a City of Battle Ground ordinance that prohibits ownership of such animals within city limits.  Specifically, the owners contended that the ordinance violated their right to equal protection under the constitution because it treats those who keep exotic pets within the City differently from those who keep dangerous dogs.  The court held that it was within the city's police power authority to enact these laws if they were supported by a rational relationship.  In fact, the court found that the local legislative body may draw a different conclusion from the Washington Supreme Court in areas of public safety and the exercise of the local government's police powers provided it does not conflict with the general laws of the state.  ( Note :  publication of case ordered Feb. 7, 2003 in 115 Wash.App. 752, 63 P.3d 142 ).