United States

Summary: This Colorado statute relates to mandatory reporting for child abuse or neglect. With respect to animal-related issues, the statute requires veterinarians, officers and agents of the state bureau of animal protection, and animal control officers to report suspected abuse or neglect as described in the law.

Summary: This Maine statute relates to mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect and permissive reporting of suspected animal abuse or neglect. With regard to animal-related issues, subsection (1)(A)(29) requires a humane agent employed by the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry to report suspected child abuse or neglect as outlined in the statute. Subsection (1-A) makes an animal control officer (as defined in Title 7, section 3907, subsection 4) a "permitted reporter" who may report to the department when that person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or is likely to be abused or neglected. Finally, subsection (6) allows all the described reporters in subsection (1) to be permissive reporters of suspected animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect. These individuals may report a reasonable suspicion of animal cruelty, abuse or neglect to the local animal control officer or to the animal welfare program of the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry.

Summary: This California law states that any employee of a county child or adult protective services agency, while acting in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, who has knowledge of or observes an animal whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of cruelty, abuse, or neglect, may report the known or reasonably suspected animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect to the entity or entities that investigate reports of animal cruelty, abuse, and neglect in that county. The statute details requirements for the reports.

Summary: This Virginia statute relates to mandated reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect. With respect to animal-related issues, subsection (A)(8) requires any law-enforcement officer or animal control officer to report suspected child abuse or neglect as outlined in the statute.

Summary: This Louisiana law states that any state or local law enforcement officer, or any employee of government or of a government contractor who in his professional capacity routinely investigates alleged abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child, or abuse or neglect of an adult, who becomes aware of evidence of neglect or abuse of an animal shall report such incident to the law enforcement authority of the governing authority in which the incident has occurred or the local animal welfare authority.

Summary: This Illinois law states that Investigation Specialists, Intact Family Specialists, and Placement Specialists employed by the Department of Children and Family Services who reasonably believe that an animal observed by them when in their professional or official capacity is being abused or neglected in violation of the Humane Care for Animals Act must immediately make a written or oral report to the Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Animal Health and Welfare.

Summary: In paragraph (R) of this Missouri regulation, the state prohibits computer-assisted, remote hunting. "Except as otherwise permitted in this Code, wildlife may be taken only in the immediate physical presence of the taker and may not be taken by use of computer-assisted remote hunting devices. . ."

Summary: It is unlawful in Oregon to engage in computer-assisted hunting (Internet hunting) or provide or operate facilities for computer-assisted hunting in Oregon. As used in this act, “computer-assisted hunting” (Internet hunting) means the use of a computer or any other device, equipment, or software to remotely control the aiming and discharge of a firearm, bow, or any other weapon to hunt any game bird, wildlife, game mammal, or other mammal, and “facilities for computer-assisted remote hunting” means real property and improvements on the property associated with hunting, including hunting blinds, offices and rooms equipped to facilitate computer-assisted remote hunting. Nothing in subsection (8) of this section prohibits the use of computer-assisted hunting by employees or agents of county, state or federal agencies while acting in their official capacities.

Summary: Appellants, Teresa's Legacy Continues, Inc., a non-profit organization of concerned citizens and taxpayers in Kentucky sued the Governor and Commissioner of Agriculture alleging failure to monitor or enforce compliance with animal shelter statutes (KRS3 Chapter 258, Animal Control and Protection). The appellants contend that in 120 of Kentucky's counties, only 12% are in compliance with the statutes and over 50% are in violation of at least three statutes. In lieu of filing an answer, the appellants filed a motion to dismiss based largely on appellants' lack of standing. In response, the appellants claimed standing based on actual damage and argued that they have "a real and substantial interest in the outcome" because post-tax funds that are supposed to be for shelters will "unjustly enrich[]" the Commonwealth. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing in 2018 and this appeal followed. On appeal, this court held that the failure to enforce Kentucky laws is not the particularized injury contemplated under the Lujan test. In fact, the court declined to expand the doctrine of standing to include an injury based on the appellants voluntary expenditure of personal time and resources to care for abandoned animals when they were under no legal obligation to do so. As to the asserted taxpayer standing, the court found that appellants failed to allege in circuit court that funds were being illegally expended and thus, could not consider this argument for the first time on appeal. Further, the animal shelter statutes at issue require only that the Governor and Commission of Agriculture disburse the funds and had no control over the oversight of funding (that goes to the governing board of each county). Thus, the cause of appellants' injuries could not be traced to the appellees. Lastly, the court acknowledged that while appellants have attempted to show standing via citizen and taxpayer status, Kentucky law has not previously considered that avenue. Said the court, "[p]erhaps, given the right facts and circumstances, one could obtain such standing. However, for the reasons set forth above, we cannot say the Appellants have properly pled it here." Affirmed.

Summary: The Estis' sued the Mills for the wrongful killing and disposal of the Appellants’ German Shepherd. On appeal, the Appellants argue that the district court erred in permitting the Appellees to amend their original answer to now include an affirmative defense of immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 3:2654, which would relieve the Appellees of liability. Further, the Appellants contend that the district court erred in granting the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, asserting that there remain genuine issues of material fact, and notwithstanding liability for the death of the dog, the court erred in dismissing the Appellees’ claim for conversion. The parties were neighbors whose property was separated by an enclosed pasture where the Mills used to keep horses. Despite requests from Mills, the Estis' dogs would enter the pasture and harass the horses. In 2017, Mills discovered the dog yet again in the pasture with the horses, so Mr. Mills shot, killed, and disposed of the dog. Subsequently, the Estis family filed suit seeking damages for the intentional killing of the dog and disposing of the dog in a bayou approximately ten miles away. The lower court granted a motion in favor of the Mills agreeing that they had immunity from suit under La. R.S. 3:2654.1. On appeal to this court, the Estises argue that the Mills waived the immunity under the statute because they failed to affirmatively plead the defense in their answer to the pleadings. This court found that immunity had not been affirmative pled as required by statute. Consequently, the Mills received permission to amend their answer and plead the immunity provision. Following granting of the Mills' second motion for summary judgment based on the immunity statute, the Estises appeal that decision. As to Estis' argument that leave to amend the answer was erroneously granted, this court first noted that determination whether to allow pleadings to be amended is discretionary and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. The court found no evidence that there was bad faith in the decision to the amend the pleadings like delay. Further, there was no demonstration of prejudice from the granting of an amended answer. As to Estis' claim that summary judgment was erroneously granted, the court discussed a photograph that was submitted in evidence support showing a horse grazing with its back presented "indifferently" to the dog. The Mills countered with the evidence of an independent eyewitness to the incident who asserted that the dog harassed the horses. The court noted that issues of the credibility of evidence have no place in a summary judgment appeal. As a result, this court found that the lower court judge's statements that, in effect, weighed the credibility of the photograph versus the testimony of the witness were inappropriate. Thus, the lower court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. Finally, the court evaluated Estis' conversion claims for the disposal of the dog's dead body. This court said that, [i]f the court finds that the killing of the dog falls under La. R.S. 3:2654, then the claim for conversion of the dog's body does not survive. However, if there were personal items on the dog at the time of the killing, such as a tracking collar or items of other value, then a conversion claim can be made for those items. If the court determines that the immunity statute does not apply, then the claim for conversion and any other applicable damages may apply." Thus, the trial court's judgment to allow the motion to amend the pleadings was affirmed, the granting of the summary judgment was reversed, and the dismissal of Estis' claims for conversion was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.