United States

Summary: Defendant Tommie Queen was convicted of three counts of dog fighting contrary to Mississippi law. The resulting conviction began with in 2017 after a sheriff's officer received a call about dogs barking and possibly fighting. After being dispatched to defendant's property, the officer encountered multiple dogs on chains and dogs that were actively fighting each other. The officer obtained a search warrant and seized numerous items including heavy logging chains, bite sticks, intravenous (IV) bags containing saline, medicine bottles, vials of vitamins, muscle milk and other muscle-building items, several scales, and a treadmill. Approximately five or six badly injured dogs were taken to a veterinarian and humanely euthanized. The veterinarian visited the property the next day and euthanized three more dogs that were seriously injured. Defendant was convicted on three of the nine indicted counts of animal fighting and sentenced to three years on each count to run consecutively. On appeal here, defendant raised three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by tendering Kyle Held as an expert in the field of animal cruelty and dog fighting; (2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Queen of dog fighting; and (3) whether the trial court erred by denying Queen's motion to recuse. As to the first issue on qualification of the expert witness, the proffered expert, Kyle Held, had been employed by the ASPCA for approximately ten years as the director of investigations. Not only was Held certified by the National Animal Control Association, but he had investigated dog fighting operations "probably a few hundred" times according to his testimony. This included the largest organized dog fighting seizure in history. Moreover, Held indicated he testified in approximately 100 animal cruelty or animal fighting cases and has been qualified as an expert six times in previous dog fighting cases. While defendant argued that Held should not be qualified as an expert because he did not hold any college degrees, this court found that argument without merit. Defendant's second argument challenged the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to support conviction. In particular, defendant notes that the evidence was only circumstantial and no direct evidence showed that defendant was present when the dogs were fighting and injured. However, the court noted that defendant did not dispute that he was the owner of the property where the dogs were recovered (and over 40 other dogs found) and evidence of dog fighting (heavy logging chains, bite sticks, intravenous bags, scales, weight gain powders, treadmills, etc.) were found there. Based on Held's observations, training, and experience, Queen's property was used as a dog-fighting training yard. Further, the veterinarian who performed euthanasia on the dogs testified that there were bite wounds consistent with dog fighting This Court observed that it previously recognized that things like treadmills, dietary supplements, and break sticks of indicative of dog fighting enterprises. Finally, the way the dogs were tied out in the yard with the chains and minimal space between the dogs is “typical on almost every yard that [he] had been on” and was indicative of dog fighting training. Defendant's last contention is that the trial court erred by denying his motion for recusal because Judge Debra Blackwell was previously employed as an assistant attorney general in the district where defendant's indictment was returned. The court found no evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the presumption that Judge Blackwell was both qualified and unbiased. Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Summary: Douglas Niemi appealed the trial court's order granting Mariah Niemi visits with their two dogs, which were awarded to Douglas as his separate property in a dissolution proceeding. Douglas and Mariah were married for 27 years and had two large dogs who were each about two years old. During the petition for legal separation, Mariah asked for 10 hours a week of visitation with the dogs because they were "family members." Following the trial, Mariah continued to emphasize her desire to have access to the dogs and the court ultimately awarded the dogs to Douglas as separate property, but allowed Mariah visits with the dogs three times a week. Douglas appealed that award, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding visitation of his separate property. Mariah countered with the fact a court has discretion to grant her access to this "special classification" of property. Here, the Court of Appeals agreed with Douglas, finding that the lower court had no authority under Washington law to compel a party to produce separate property after a marital dissolution. The court also held that is not the province of the court to recognize a special category of personal property when the statute has not done so. Finally, the court observed that such agreements about visitation with animals would lead to continuing supervision and enforcement problems in the court system. Because the trial court exceeded its authority in awarding visitation rights, this court reversed and remanded the issue for the trial court to strike the provision related to visitation and maintenance costs for the dogs.

Summary: In this Pennsylvania case, James Burkholder, d/b/a Whispering Spring Kennel (Burkholder), petitioned for review of an adjudication of the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) that imposed a $19,500 civil penalty on Burkholder for transferring two dogs in excess of the annual limit under his Class IV kennel license in December of 2017. Burkholder raises two arguments: first, the Dog Law does not specify that transfers of more than 60 dogs by a private kennel constitute violations; and two, the penalty imposed is excessive and unreasonable. This court first noted that a Kennel Class IV license clearly does not allow him to transfer more than 60 dogs and thus any transfers in excess violate the Dog Law. As to the excessive penalty argument, the court first examined the distinction between separate and ongoing violations of the Dog Law because it raised a question of first impression under the Dog Law. Relying on the distinction in other contexts, particularly regarding penalties imposed by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC), the court found that a kennel owner holding too many dogs could remedy the violation simply by transferring the excess dogs. The problem here is that, where an owner has transferred more dogs than his license allows, there is no way to correct the violation. Thus, said the court, a per-day fine is improper. "Each unauthorized transfer of a single dog is a single violation of the Dog Law, not a continuing violation, because it is not ongoing in nature and such transfers can be feasibly segregated into discrete violations so as to impose separate penalties." The court concluded that the Department erred as a matter of law by imposing ongoing penalties for two discrete unauthorized transfers. The order of the Department as to the excess transfers of dogs was affirmed, but the portion as to the amount of the penalty was vacated. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Summary: This Florida law enacted in 2021 states that a licensed professional may transport a police canine injured in the line of duty to a veterinary or similar clinic if there is no individual awaiting medical transport. In addition, a paramedic or EMT may may provide emergency medical care to a police canine injured in the line of duty while at the scene of the emergency or while the police canine is being transported to a veterinary clinic or similar facility. A paramedic or an emergency medical technician who acts in good faith to provide emergency medical care to an injured police canine is immune from criminal or civil liability.

Summary: This New Jersey case considers whether owning a dog creates an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy such that the owner's personal information in the dog licensing record might be exempt from disclosure under the New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA). Plaintiff Ernest Bozzi, a licensed home improvement contractor, submitted a request to the City of Jersey City (Jersey City) for dog license records to solicit customers for his invisible fencing business. He sought only the names and addresses of dog owners. Jersey City denied his request, objecting on the ground that such a disclosure would violate the dog owners’ reasonable expectation of privacy and that such a disclosure would place dog owners and non-dog owners a risk for theft (e.g., non-dog owners might be singled out for robbery or burglary). The lower court found no privacy interest in disclosing the names to comply with plaintiff's request and the Appellate Division affirmed that order. Upon Jersey City's petition for certification, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, finding that owning a dog is "substantially a public endeavor in which people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy." In arguments on appeal, Jersey City contended that disclosure for the purpose of commercial solicitation was protected by the privacy exception of OPRA. The Supreme Court noted that OPRA was designed to promote transparency in the operation of government. In looking at the state legislature's continuing process of amending OPRA, the Court found legislative history that declined against recommendations to withhold addresses or phone numbers in exceptions to the Act. Thus, the Court found that Jersey City has failed to present a colorable claim that disclosure of dog license records would encroach on dog owners' reasonable expectations of privacy. In looking at the OPRA privacy clauses, the Court concluded that owning a dog is "inherently, a public endeavor." In fact, dog owners continually expose themselves through social media, vet visits, public dog parks, bumper stickers, and the like, which militates against the activity being a private activity. While there are other aspects of dog licensing that may expose dog owners to a risk, like disclosure that a dog is a service animal or identifying the particular breed of the dog and exposing an owner to possible theft, the release of names and addresses does not rise to that concern. The Appellate Division's judgment was affirmed.

Summary: Several animal advocacy organizations filed a complaint against the Vaughts and Peco Foods, Inc. seeking an order that would prevent defendants from bringing a civil suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-113 (colloquially known as Arkansas' "ag gag" law). The statute at issue provides a civil cause of action for unauthorized access to protected properties described under the law. Plaintiffs claim that the statute violates their right to free speech under the First Amendment by chilling them from engaging in activities protected under the First Amendment. In particular, the plaintiffs have "specific and definite plans" to investigate the defendants' chicken slaughterhouses and pig farms by sending undercover investigators to seek employment with defendants and collect information in an effort to support their mission to "reform[] animal agriculture." The district court found that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing to sue, finding that the injury at hand was too speculative. On appeal here, the court noted found that plaintiffs established the three primary elements of standing from the Lujan case ("(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury."). First, but for the statute, plaintiffs allege that they would engage in the protected constitutional conduct. Second, the plaintiffs adequately outlined their intention to engage in a course of conduct that is proscribed by the statute. Finally, the court found a credible threat of enforcement that was objectively reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact plaintiffs have successfully engaged in the conduct at other facilities in the past. While defendants contend that there is no credible threat that they would enforce the statute because these organizations would not find entry to their facilities worthwhile. However, plaintiffs presented allegations that indeed they would be interested in documenting the plaintiffs' operations because of the conditions of pigs in "nearly immovable quarters" and the use of controversial methods of slaughter. The court was equally unpersuaded by defendants' claims that there is no injury in fact since plaintiffs are not poised to publish any information gathered from their facilities. Additionally, plaintiffs sent letters to defendants asking them to waive their rights to sue and neither defendant responded. Thus, the complaint sufficiently established a case or controversy. The lower court judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Summary: This section of laws applies only to Chilton County. An animal control officer or law enforcement officer of the county shall investigate any incidents involving any dog reported to be dangerous or a nuisance in the unincorporated areas of the county. If an unowned dog has been reported to be dangerous and bites a person, the dog may be quarantined and destroyed pursuant to Section 3-7A-9(b). In addition, if there is probable cause to believe that an owned dog is dangerous or a nuisance and has caused serious physical injury or has caused damage to real or personal property, the law enforcement officer or animal control officer shall impound the dog pending disposition of a petition to declare a dog to be dangerous or a nuisance. A following section details the requirements for an owner of a dog that has been declared dangerous or a nuisance.

Summary: This case concerns a challenge to Proposition 12, a measure passed by California voters in 2018 that bans the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Proposition 12 amended sections 25990–25993 of the California Health and Safety Code to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement." The National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (collectively referred to as “the Council”) filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The court noted that under its precedent, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only in narrow circumstances. Here, the Council argues that Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that Proposition 12 has an impermissible extraterritorial effect. The court disagreed, finding that Proposition 12 does not function as a price-control nor price-affirmation statute, as it neither dictates the price of for pork products nor does it tie the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices. The Council also suggests that the law effectively violates the dormant Commerce Clause because of the interconnected nature of the pork industry. Pork producers would either have to produce all pork according to California standards or segregate California pork production to comply with the enhanced welfare standards. Again, the court found the argument unpersuasive based on precedent because a a state law is not impermissibly extraterritorial unless it directly regulates conduct that is wholly out of state. The "upstream" effects of Proposition 12 apply to both California and out-of-state entities equally, and a state is entitled to regulate commerce within its state. Finally, the court dismissed the argument that the dormant commerce clause is violated because it create inconsistent regulations where there is a need for "national uniformity in regulation." The court was unpersuaded that pork production rises to the level of need like taxation or interstate travel. The court held that the complaint here does not plausibly allege that such narrow circumstances apply to Proposition 12; thus, the court ruled that the district court did not err in dismissing the Council's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Summary: Plaintiffs are Wisconsin residents who monitored hunting activity through visual observation and photographic and video documentation. They brought an action against state employees challenging constitutionality of state statute that prohibits a person from interfering with or attempting to interfere with “activity associated with lawful hunting, fishing or trapping.” Plaintiffs claim that after being amended in 2015 to include two or more acts of maintaining a “visual proximity” to, “approaching,” or creating visual or audio of someone engaged in those activities, this prohibition is now overbroad, vague and chills lawful expression in violation of the First Amendment. The District Court held that the residents lacked Article III standing to assert a pre-enforcement as-applied challenge to constitutionality of statute. Further, the affirmative defense provision of statute did not preclude judicial review of statute for overbreadth or vagueness. However, the statute was not overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague. The state employees' motion was granted and the residents' motion was denied.

Summary: Opponents of an initiative in Colorado petitioned for a review of the Ballot Title Setting Board's decisions regarding the initiative's title, ballot title, and submission clause. The initiative proposed to amend the state's criminal animal cruelty statutes by ending certain exemptions for livestock, creating a safe harbor for their slaughter with certain conditions, and expanding the definition of "sexual act with an animal." The opponents alleged that the initiative violated the single subject requirement by covering multiple subjects. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the central focus of the initiative was to extend animal cruelty statutes to cover livestock. The initiative's safe harbor provision for the slaughter of livestock did not violate the single subject rule. The initiative's expansion of the definition of "sexual act with an animal" violated the single subject rule. The Court reversed the lower court's decision.