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OK - Hunting, remote - § 5-201. Means of taking wildlife--Exceptions--Fines and punishments

Summary: Oklahoma's Internet hunting ban is located in Subsection B and states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided for in this section, no person shall hunt wildlife or exotic wildlife by computer-assisted remote control hunting." Violation incurs a fine of not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or by both the fine and imprisonment. In addition, the court may order that the hunting or fishing license and privileges of any person convicted of violating the provisions of subsection B or C of this section be revoked for a period of not less than one (1) year but not exceeding five (5) years.

Oklahoma's Internet hunting ban is located in Subsection B and states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided for in this section, no person shall hunt wildlife or exotic wildlife by computer-assisted remote control hunting." Violation incurs a fine of not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or by both the fine and imprisonment. In addition, the court may order that the hunting or fishing license and privileges of any person convicted of violating the provisions of subsection B or C of this section be revoked for a period of not less than one (1) year but not exceeding five (5) years.

MO - Domestic violence - 455.045. Temporary relief available--ex parte orders

Summary: Missouri amended its laws on domestic violence protection orders in 2021 to include the protection of pets. Any ex parte order of protection shall be to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault and may include "[a] temporary order of possession of pets where appropriate." “Pet” is defined as a living creature maintained by a household member for companionship and not for commercial purposes.

Missouri amended its laws on domestic violence protection orders in 2021 to include the protection of pets. Any ex parte order of protection shall be to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault and may include "[a] temporary order of possession of pets where appropriate." “Pet” is defined as a living creature maintained by a household member for companionship and not for commercial purposes.

TX - Facility dog - § 21.012. Presence of Qualified Facility Dog or Qualified Therapy Dog in Court Proceeding

Summary: Texas enacted a facility dog/courthouse dog law in 2021. Under the law, any party to an action filed in a court in this state in which a proceeding related to the action will be held may petition the court for an order authorizing a qualified facility dog or qualified therapy dog to be present with a witness who is testifying before the court. The court may enter an order authorizing a qualified facility dog or qualified therapy dog to accompany a witness testifying at the court proceeding if: (1) the presence of the dog will assist the witness in providing testimony; and (2) the party petitioning for the order provides proof of liability insurance coverage in effect for the dog. A handler must accompany the qualified facility dog (as defined in the law).

Texas enacted a facility dog/courthouse dog law in 2021. Under the law, any party to an action filed in a court in this state in which a proceeding related to the action will be held may petition the court for an order authorizing a qualified facility dog or qualified therapy dog to be present with a witness who is testifying before the court. The court may enter an order authorizing a qualified facility dog or qualified therapy dog to accompany a witness testifying at the court proceeding if: (1) the presence of the dog will assist the witness in providing testimony; and (2) the party petitioning for the order provides proof of liability insurance coverage in effect for the dog. A handler must accompany the qualified facility dog (as defined in the law).

VA - Exotic - Article 14. Dangerous Captive Animal Exhibits

Summary: This section of Virginia laws, enacted in 2021, makes it unlawful for any keeper to provide or offer to provide to any member of the public, for free or for a cost, direct contact with a dangerous captive animal. A “dangerous captive animal” means any bear, cougar, jaguar, leopard, lion, nonhuman primate, or tiger, or any hybrid of any such animal. “Dangerous captive animal” does not include a clouded leopard. Violation incurs a Class 3 misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of not more than $500.

This section of Virginia laws, enacted in 2021, makes it unlawful for any keeper to provide or offer to provide to any member of the public, for free or for a cost, direct contact with a dangerous captive animal. A “dangerous captive animal” means any bear, cougar, jaguar, leopard, lion, nonhuman primate, or tiger, or any hybrid of any such animal. “Dangerous captive animal” does not include a clouded leopard. Violation incurs a Class 3 misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of not more than $500.

State v. Hackett

Summary: Defendant was convicted of second-degree animal abuse, among other crimes. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) and imposed fines (in addition to incarceration) without first determining his ability to pay. The conviction was supported by testimony at trial from two witnesses, a mother and her daughter. The daughter was visiting her mother and heard a dog "yike" in pain outside while she was at her mother's house. She thought a dog may have been hit by a car, so she went outside where she observed defendant and his dog Bosco. The dog was whimpering and laying in submission as the defendant hit the dog. Then, after going inside briefly to call police, the witness returned outside to see defendant was "just going to town and beating the dog" and throwing rocks at the dog to the point where the witness was concerned for the dog's life. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred on the second-degree animal abuse charge because the evidence did not permit a rational inference that Bosco experienced "substantial pain" as required by the statute. The court, in a matter of first impression, examined whether Bosco experienced substantial pain. Both the state and defendant acknowledged that appellate courts have not yet interpreted the meaning of "substantial pain" for animal victims, so both parties rely on cases involving human victims. Defendant suggests that Bosco did not experience a significant duration of pain to permit a finding of substantial pain. The court disagreed, analogizing with cases where a human victim could not testify concerning the pain. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Bosco's pain was not "fleeting" or "momentary." Not only did the witnesses see the defendant kick and pelt the dog with rocks, but one witness left to phone police and returned to find the defendant still abusing the dog. As to the fines, the court found that the trial court did err in ordering payment of fines within 30-days without making an assessment of defendant's ability to pay. Thus, the the trial court did not err in denying defendant's MJOA, but the matter was remanded for entry of judgment that omitted the "due in 30 days" for the fines.

Defendant was convicted of second-degree animal abuse, among other crimes. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) and imposed fines (in addition to incarceration) without first determining his ability to pay. The conviction was supported by testimony at trial from two witnesses, a mother and her daughter. The daughter was visiting her mother and heard a dog "yike" in pain outside while she was at her mother's house. She thought a dog may have been hit by a car, so she went outside where she observed defendant and his dog Bosco. The dog was whimpering and laying in submission as the defendant hit the dog. Then, after going inside briefly to call police, the witness returned outside to see defendant was "just going to town and beating the dog" and throwing rocks at the dog to the point where the witness was concerned for the dog's life. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred on the second-degree animal abuse charge because the evidence did not permit a rational inference that Bosco experienced "substantial pain" as required by the statute. The court, in a matter of first impression, examined whether Bosco experienced substantial pain. Both the state and defendant acknowledged that appellate courts have not yet interpreted the meaning of "substantial pain" for animal victims, so both parties rely on cases involving human victims. Defendant suggests that Bosco did not experience a significant duration of pain to permit a finding of substantial pain. The court disagreed, analogizing with cases where a human victim could not testify concerning the pain. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Bosco's pain was not "fleeting" or "momentary." Not only did the witnesses see the defendant kick and pelt the dog with rocks, but one witness left to phone police and returned to find the defendant still abusing the dog. As to the fines, the court found that the trial court did err in ordering payment of fines within 30-days without making an assessment of defendant's ability to pay. Thus, the the trial court did not err in denying defendant's MJOA, but the matter was remanded for entry of judgment that omitted the "due in 30 days" for the fines.

Siegel v. State

Summary: Defendant Karen Siegel was convicted of 31 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty based on 31 breeding dogs that were seized from her home. At issue here on appeal by defendant is whether the underlying statutes that allows seizure of the animals, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 5-62-106 and 5-62-111, are constitutional. In addition, defendant argues that by not ordering return of the seized dogs to defendant and compensating defendant for her loss of property was error. The first circuit court criminal case was dismissed on speedy-trial grounds and that ruling was upheld in later appeal. The issues on the instant appeal relate to the status of the seized dogs. Siegel argues that the circuit court erred by not ordering the return of her seized property and also not assigning a value for the property that was destroyed or damaged. The court here looked at the language of the seizure statute and found that Siegel failed to post a bond to care for the dog as is contemplated by the statute. The statute provides no award of damages to a defendant and the county that seized the dog is not a party in the criminal action brought by the state. Thus, the lower court was correct in stating that Siegel's remedy was a separate civil action. As to Siegel's challenges to the constitutionality of those statutes, this court found the argument moot since review of the issue would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing controversy. The case was affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part.

Defendant Karen Siegel was convicted of 31 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty based on 31 breeding dogs that were seized from her home. At issue here on appeal by defendant is whether the underlying statutes that allows seizure of the animals, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 5-62-106 and 5-62-111, are constitutional. In addition, defendant argues that by not ordering return of the seized dogs to defendant and compensating defendant for her loss of property was error. The first circuit court criminal case was dismissed on speedy-trial grounds and that ruling was upheld in later appeal. The issues on the instant appeal relate to the status of the seized dogs. Siegel argues that the circuit court erred by not ordering the return of her seized property and also not assigning a value for the property that was destroyed or damaged. The court here looked at the language of the seizure statute and found that Siegel failed to post a bond to care for the dog as is contemplated by the statute. The statute provides no award of damages to a defendant and the county that seized the dog is not a party in the criminal action brought by the state. Thus, the lower court was correct in stating that Siegel's remedy was a separate civil action. As to Siegel's challenges to the constitutionality of those statutes, this court found the argument moot since review of the issue would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing controversy. The case was affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part.

State v. Crew

Summary: Defendant Daniel Crew appealed his convictions for dogfighting, felony cruelty to animals, misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and restraining dogs in a cruel manner. Crew also challenges the trial court's restitution orders totaling $70,000, which the trial court immediately converted to civil judgments. The arrest and conviction of defendant stemmed from an investigation at defendant's residence, where 30 pit bulls were recovered with injuries "similar to injuries a dog would sustain through dogfighting." In addition, publications and notes on preparing for a fight were found, as well as dogfighting training equipment such as a "jenny," staging area for fights, and weight scales for weighing dogs. The State charged Crew with fifteen counts of engaging in dogfighting, one count of allowing property to be used for dogfighting, five counts of felony cruelty to animals, twenty-five counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and sixteen counts of restraining dogs in a cruel manner. Ultimately, Crew was convicted by the jury of eleven counts of dogfighting, three counts of felony cruelty to animals, fourteen counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and two counts of restraining dogs in a cruel manner. The trial court imposed six consecutive active sentences of 10 to 21 months each along with several suspended sentences. The trial court also ordered Crew to pay Orange County Animal Services $10,000 in seven separate restitution orders that were then entered as civil judgments, totaling $70,000 in restitution (testimony at trial indicated that the cost to house the dogs alone was a "a littler over $80,000"). Defendant appealed his criminal judgment and petitioned for a writ of certiorari for the award of restitution entered as civil judgments. On appeal, this court rejected defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence of dogfighting. The police found training equipment, medication commonly used in dogfighting operations, and a dogfighting "pit" or training area as well as the notes preparing dogs to fight. A reasonable juror could have concluded that Crew intended to engage in dogfighting. However, as to the restitution order converted to civil judgments, the court found that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to immediately convert those restitution orders into civil judgments. The court found no error concerning the criminal convictions, but vacated the conversion of the restitution to civil judgments against defendant.

Defendant Daniel Crew appealed his convictions for dogfighting, felony cruelty to animals, misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and restraining dogs in a cruel manner. Crew also challenges the trial court's restitution orders totaling $70,000, which the trial court immediately converted to civil judgments. The arrest and conviction of defendant stemmed from an investigation at defendant's residence, where 30 pit bulls were recovered with injuries "similar to injuries a dog would sustain through dogfighting." In addition, publications and notes on preparing for a fight were found, as well as dogfighting training equipment such as a "jenny," staging area for fights, and weight scales for weighing dogs. The State charged Crew with fifteen counts of engaging in dogfighting, one count of allowing property to be used for dogfighting, five counts of felony cruelty to animals, twenty-five counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and sixteen counts of restraining dogs in a cruel manner. Ultimately, Crew was convicted by the jury of eleven counts of dogfighting, three counts of felony cruelty to animals, fourteen counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and two counts of restraining dogs in a cruel manner. The trial court imposed six consecutive active sentences of 10 to 21 months each along with several suspended sentences. The trial court also ordered Crew to pay Orange County Animal Services $10,000 in seven separate restitution orders that were then entered as civil judgments, totaling $70,000 in restitution (testimony at trial indicated that the cost to house the dogs alone was a "a littler over $80,000"). Defendant appealed his criminal judgment and petitioned for a writ of certiorari for the award of restitution entered as civil judgments. On appeal, this court rejected defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence of dogfighting. The police found training equipment, medication commonly used in dogfighting operations, and a dogfighting "pit" or training area as well as the notes preparing dogs to fight. A reasonable juror could have concluded that Crew intended to engage in dogfighting. However, as to the restitution order converted to civil judgments, the court found that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to immediately convert those restitution orders into civil judgments. The court found no error concerning the criminal convictions, but vacated the conversion of the restitution to civil judgments against defendant.

NV - Housing - 116.318. Right of units’ owners to keep pet

Summary: This Nevada law enacted in 2019 states that the executive board of an association shall not and the governing documents of that association must not prohibit a unit's owner from keeping at least one pet within such physical portion of the common-interest community as that owner has a right to occupy and use exclusively.

This Nevada law enacted in 2019 states that the executive board of an association shall not and the governing documents of that association must not prohibit a unit's owner from keeping at least one pet within such physical portion of the common-interest community as that owner has a right to occupy and use exclusively.

MD - Humane officers - § 1-1314. Humane society or animal control officers; education and training requirements

Summary: This Maryland law, added in 2021, creates education and training requirements for new humane and animal control officers. The training requires satisfactory completion of at least 80 hours of animal care and control coursework as described in the law. There are also continuing education requirements on an annual basis.

This Maryland law, added in 2021, creates education and training requirements for new humane and animal control officers. The training requires satisfactory completion of at least 80 hours of animal care and control coursework as described in the law. There are also continuing education requirements on an annual basis.
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