United States

Summary: This brief summary examines various federal regulations on animal biomedical testing within the United States as well as the industry’s standards and trends. The application of the federal Animal Welfare Act and regulations issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are discussed. The importance of self-regulation mainly through the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC) is also outlined.

Summary: This overview examines various federal regulations on animal biomedical testing within the United States as well as the industry’s standards and trends. The application of the federal Animal Welfare Act and regulations issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are discussed. The importance of self-regulation mainly through the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC) is also outlined.

Summary: This paper will examine the various federal regulations on animal biomedical testing within the United States as well as the industry’s standards and trends. The first four sections examine the FDA requirements for medical products in the United States, federal animal welfare regulations, the general structure of a research facility, and industry regulations for animal use. The second half of this paper examines the species of animals used in research as well as their source of purchase. Accepted methods of euthanasia per species are also examined. By comparing the options available for a research facility to animal use regulations in the United States, it is hoped that the structure of animal welfare in the laboratory can be understood from both economic and legal motivations that influence animal research use today.

Summary: This document provides of summary of the "Responsible Dog Ownership Law" (RDOA) of Georgia, signed into law by Governor Deal in 2012.

Summary: Utilizing a research exception granted under the international moratorium on commercial whaling imposed by the International Whaling Commission, Japanese whalers have been harvesting endangered whales in the Southern Ocean. The anti-whaling activist group, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, also operates in the Southern Ocean by locating Japanese whaling vessels in order to bring an immediate halt to all whaling activities, often employing violent tactics designed to injure whaling vessels and property. Sea Shepherd operates under an apparent mandate of the United Nations World Charter for Nature allowing individuals to “[i]mplement the applicable international legal provisions for the conservation of nature and the protection of the environment.” The multitude of vague international conventions and treaties governing the Southern Ocean have therefore created a tangled and confusing web of authority where both Japanese whalers and Sea Shepherd have arguable claims of operating under legitimate legal mandates. In this note, Alana Preston argues that individual countries should enforce their domestic laws to prevent the Japanese from whaling, so private entities, like Sea Shepherd, will not.

Summary: In United States v. University of Nebraska at Kearney, a federal district court was asked to determine whether a university, as a provider of housing for its students, must comply with the standards set out in the Fair Housing Act? Typically, the Fair Housing Act requires that housing providers make reasonable accommodations to no-pets policies for people with disabilities to live with emotional support animals, regardless of the animal's training as a service animal. The federal court, however, held that the Fair Housing Act also requires universities to waive no-pets policies for students with emotional support animals. This article examines the test used to determine the applicability of the Fair Housing Act to dwellings—arguing for a new factor test—and also discusses the current test’s effect on the legal coverage for emotional support animals.

Summary: This case considers whether student housing at the University of Nebraska–Kearney (UNK) is a “dwelling” within the meaning of the FHA. The plaintiff had a service dog (or therapy dog as the court describes it) trained to respond to her anxiety attacks. When she enrolled and signed a lease for student housing (an apartment-style residence about a mile off-campus), her requests to have her service dog were denied, citing UNK's "no pets" policy for student housing. The United States, on behalf of plaintiff, filed this suit alleging that UNK's actions violated the FHA. UNK brought a motion for summary judgment alleging that UNK's student housing is not a "dwelling" covered by the FHA. Specifically, UNK argues that students are "transient visitors" and the student housing is not residential like other temporary housing (migrant housing, halfway houses, etc.) and more akin to jail. However, this court was not convinced, finding that "UNK's student housing facilities are clearly 'dwellings' within the meaning of the FHA."

Summary: Plaintiffs seized approximately 65 dogs from the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Connecticut pursuant to a search and seizure warrant that had been issued on facts showing that the dogs, which were being kept in an uninsulated barn with an average temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit, were neglected, in violation of General Statutes § 22–329a. The trial court found that the smaller breed dogs were neglected, but found that larger breed dogs were not. On an appeal by plaintiffs and a cross appeal by defendants, the appeals court found: (1) the trial court applied the correct legal standards and properly determined that the smaller breed dogs were neglected and that the larger breed dogs were not neglected, even though all dogs were kept in a barn with an average temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit; (2) § 22–329a was not unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would know that keeping smaller breed dogs in an uninsulated space with an interior temperature of approximately 30 degrees Fahrenheit would constitute neglect; (3) the trial court did not err in declining to admit the rebuttal testimony offered by the defendants; and (4) the trial court did not err in granting the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and properly transferred ownership of the smaller breed dogs to the town. The appellate court, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court only with respect to its dispositional order, which directed the parties to determine among themselves which dogs were smaller breed dogs and which dogs were larger breed dogs, and remanded the case for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion.

Summary: Plaintiff challenged the defendants' approval of the Rennic Stark Project in the Ninemile Ranger District of the Lolo National Forest under the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Project proposed a host of forest management measures. Under the National Environmental Protection Act, the defendant published an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the project in November 2012. The EA discussed the likely effects of the project on a number of wildlife species, including the ESA-listed threatened Canada lynx, the Forest Service-sensitive fisher, the Forest Service-sensitive North American wolverine, goshawk, and westslope cutthroat trout. The defendant signed and issued a Decision Notice adopting Alternative 2 from the EA, as well as a Finding of No Significant Impact. Plaintiff timely appealed the defendant's decision, but the defendant denied the appeal. Plaintiff then filed its complaint in this court and moved for summary judgment. Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied on all claims and defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on all claims.

Summary: An Animal Control Officer responded to a complaint about two dogs at defendant's residence. While investigating the complaint at defendant's residence, the animal control officer was attacked by one of defendant's dogs. The officer sought medical treatment following the incident. The City of Bluefield subsequently brought charges against defendant in its municipal court, charging her with having a dangerous animal in violation of city ordinances. The municipal court ordered the dog killed. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Mercer County affirmed the municipal court's decision. Defendant then appealed the Circuit Court's decision arguing that that Circuit Court erred in concluding that the municipal court had the authority to order the destruction of her dog. After review, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia agreed with defendant and found that under the plain language of W.Va.Code § 19–20–20, the City of Bluefield was required to set forth satisfactory proof that defendant’s dog was “vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons” before a circuit court or a magistrate, not a municipal court. The court therefore found that ordinance was void to the extent that it allowed a municipal court to order the destruction of the dog. The circuit court's order affirming the municipal court's order to kill Ms. Robinson's dog was therefore reversed. Justice Loughry dissents.