Results

This article discusses the fact that the International Whaling Commission has not expressly recognized the Makah tribe's aboriginal subsistence need, and instead has intentionally left the issue ambiguous. The only viable reason for the IWC to deny the Norwegians a quota under the same exemption is the "aboriginal" requirement. The IWC should clarify the legal ambiguities regarding the right to harvest whales, and it should grant subsistence right to Norwegian coastal fishermen.

This article examines the main arguments used for denying moral rights to nonhuman animals, the rights to life and bodily integrity in particular. Because these arguments are deficient, animals should not be denied legal rights on the basis of their presumed moral inferiority to humans.

Article explains how the laws which deal with protection of animals from inappropriate human acts developed during the 1800's. The key focus is on Henry Bergh's efforts in the adoption of the 1867 New York Act.

Mr. Duckler delves into valuation issues that arise in the context of recovery of non-economic damages for death and injury to companion animals. He argues that the special nature of companion animals in society necessitates an assigned monetary worth to such animals that is distinct from and exceeds mere market value. As support for this contention, Mr. Duckler provides relevant legal, sociological, and anthropological analyses.

Historically, in prosecutions under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), to prove the element “knowingly” the government only had to prove that a defendant intentionally killed an animal that turned out to be endangered or threatened, not that the defendant knew the identity of the species or the endangered or threatened status of the animal when it was killed. Jury instructions to this effect were repeatedly upheld. Then, in a brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court for McKittrick v. U.S., the federal government, unprompted, unnecessarily, and without explanation, said that it would not use this jury instruction in the future because the instruction did not properly explain “knowingly.” The U.S. Department of Justice subsequently issued a directive to its attorneys to that same effect. Now, there is a self-imposed rule in ESA prosecutions requiring prosecutors to prove that a defendant knew the animal was endangered or threatened at the time it was “taken” or killed. This Article discusses ways in which this change conflicts with the established law and its impact on ESA prosecutions.

In recent years, several member states in the European Union enacted legislation to regulate or prohibit fur farming. This article calls for further action to ban the practice throughout the European Union. The Author notes animals’ inabilities to protect their own interests and the role of law to protect these vulnerable interests. The Author concludes by responding to the objections of fur farming proponents, ultimately finding no legitimate justification for the documented suffering of animals raised on fur farms.

On September 30, 2002, Harvard Law School hosted a legal symposium sponsored by the Chimpanzee Collaboratory’s Legal Committee. The symposium featured speakers with expertise on chimpanzees, as well as legal scholars and lawyers who discussed the possibility of obtaining legal rights for chimpanzees and other great apes. This symposium sought to advance the argument that chimpanzees are entitled to some degree of legal status, and the speakers presented a range of views about how far such legal rights should extend. These remarks reflect the connection between the growing scientific understanding of chimpanzees and the advances in related legal doctrines.

This article discusses the implications of the court decision in U.S. v. Hugs, which denied Native American claims asserting infringement of First Amendment rights as well as treaty rights where eagle parts were sold. This author expresses that the holding in United States v. Hugs is limited to its facts, and does not absolve the government from its obligation under The Federal Indian Trust Doctrine, and that a valid trust doctrine argument remains to be made against the BGEPA.

Twenty volumes is no small feat for an independently funded, entirely student-run journal. With a total staff of twenty students, including a small Board comprised of Editor in Chief, James Goldstein, Jr.; Managing Editor, William Fig; Articles Editor, Kelly Jeffries; and Form and Style Editor, Benjamin Allen, Animal Law published the inaugural volume of the world’s first animal law journal in 1995. This landmark event was the result of the hard work of Lewis & Clark students, with some key support. In this first volume, Animal Law gave “special thanks to Benjamin Allen for his hard work and dedication in founding [the] journal, to Matthew Howard and Nancy Perry for their inspiration, and to Richard Katz for his invaluable support throughout the process.” Animal Law also gave “thanks to Michael Blumm for his advice and encouragement, and to the Board of [Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF)] for their support.”