Results
| Title | Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal System | David Favre | 93 Marq. L. Rev. 1021 (2010) | This Article develops the proposition that non-human animals can possess and exercise legal rights. This proposal is supported by the fact that our legal system already accommodates a number of animal interests within the criminal anti-cruelty laws and civil trust laws. To make a more coherent package of all animal-related public policy issues, it is useful to acknowledge the existence of a fourth category of property, living property. Once separated out from other property, a new area of jurisprudence will evolve, providing legal rights for at least some animals. This Article establishes why animals should receive consideration within the legal system, which animals should be focused upon, what some of the legal rights might be, and how the traditional rules of property law will be modified to accommodate the presence of this new category of property. |
||
| Long-Term Outcomes in Animal Hoarding Cases | Colin Berry, M.S., Gary Patronek, V.M.D., Ph.D., and Randall Lockwood, Ph.D. | 11 Animal L. 167 (2005) | Animal hoarding is a form of abuse that affects thousands of animals each year, yet little is known about how cases are best resolved, the effectiveness of prosecution, and how sentences relate to the severity of the offense. This lack of information has hampered effective resolution and the prevention of recidivism. This study obtained information about the hoarder, animals, charges, prosecution, sentencing, and recidivism for fifty-six cases identified through media reports. The results showed a disparity between the ways different jurisdictions handled hoarding cases, as well as a lack of communication between agencies. Cases generally lacked follow-up, and it was difficult to determine compliance with court-ordered psychological evaluations and counseling. Additionally, none of the shelters that were ordered to receive restitution has yet received it. Shortcomings in state anti-cruelty statutes contributed to poor outcomes, and current prosecutorial approaches often left officials struggling between the conflicting goals of aggressively prosecuting hoarders and avoiding further institutionalization of the animals. Unfortunately, lenient treatment of hoarders in exchange for immediate custody of the animals appeared to contribute to recidivism. More rapid identification of offenders as hoarders and more creative sentencing involving long-term monitoring could simultaneously speed resolution of cases and avoid extending the suffering of animal victims. | ||
| Looking for a Good Home: Balancing Interests in the Disposition of Impounded Animals to Owners and Rescues | Francesca Ortiz | 67 Syracuse L. Rev. 115 (2017) | This Article explores the scope of governmental authority to interfere with or terminate the property rights of pet owners in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness. Part I sets out the regulatory framework for local animal control programs, describing the process for handling and disposing of stray animals and the provisions designed to help reunite owners with their pets. Part II then turns to the issue of post-redemption ownership, discussing the recognized reach of the law and its limitations as well as the cases that have contemplated termination of an owner’s rights to a pet. Part III explores the policy reasons that support a clear demarcation of when ownership of an unclaimed, impounded animal should be established in the government, making possible a clear transfer of title from a public shelter to an adopter or transferee, and Part IV suggests means by which a local government might increase the possibility of reuniting an owner with a pet within the appropriate timeframe to avoid the conflicts created by late-redeeming owners. | ||
| Looking for a Nexus Between Trust Compassion, and Regulation: Colorados Search for Standards of Care for Private, Non-Profit Wildlife Sanctuaries | Katherine A. Burke | 12 Animal L. 39 (2005) | In 2004, the Colorado legislature amended its wildlife statutes, formally recognizing the existence of private, non-profit wildlife sanctuaries under the jurisdiction of the Colorado Division of Wildlife (CDOW). Opponents to the 2004 amendments and CDOW staff have repeatedly expressed concerns that private sanctuaries should not be authorized in the absence of regulations and enforcement mechanisms sufficient to protect the animals and the people who come into contact with them. In implementing the sanctuary statute, CDOW has followed a familiar pattern, relying on the accreditation program of the American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums (AZA) to provide the basis of its regulations. In doing so, CDOW has failed to understand that the AZA standards are wholly inappropriate for sanctuaries; they are inadequate to protect the safety of animals and humans; and they are overly burdensome and even diametrically opposed to the status and goals of private, non-profit wildlife sanctuaries. Instead, CDOW could have acknowledged the stringent, comprehensive, extensive standards promulgated by The Association of Sanctuaries (TAOS), which are carefully tailored to the operations of sanctuaries. This article considers the plight of Colorado wildlife sanctuaries, which is by no means peculiar to the state of Colorado, and carefully examines the standards promulgated by the AZA and by TAOS. The article concludes that the TAOS accreditation program would have provided a significantly better basis for sanctuary regulation, and that by failing to take advantage of this, CDOW has missed an important opportunity to create a nexus between trust, compassion, and regulation. | ||
| Lost and Found: Humane Societies' Rights and Obligations Regarding Companion Animal Ownership | Patricia A. Bolen | Animal Legal & Historical Center | This article discusses when ownership of a dog that is lost or relinquished by its owner transfers to an animal shelter. The shelter's property rights in a found animal vary depending on whether the animal is licensed or unlicensed, stray or abandoned. Each state has its own rules regarding how long a shelter must keep an animal before transferring ownership to a third party. |
||
| Lost Pet FAQ | Christopher A. Berry | Animal Legal and Historical Center | This lost pet FAQ gives general guidance for people who are in a conflict over a lost pet or want to avoid losing their pet in the first place. |
||
| LUKUMI AT TWENTY: A LEGACY OF UNCERTAINTY FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND ANIMAL WELFARE LAWS | James M. Oleske, Jr. | 19 Animal L. 295 (2013) | Twenty years after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, uncertainty reigns in the lower courts and among commentators over the issue of constitutionally compelled religious exemptions. Despite the Court’s general disavowal of such exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith, Lukumi appeared to breathe life into a potentially significant exception to Smith. Under that exception—which this Article calls the “selective-exemption rule”—the Free Exercise Clause may still require religious exemptions from a law when the government selectively makes available other exemptions from that law. This Article addresses the key unresolved questions about the scope of the selective-exemption rule and challenges the broad interpretation of the rule that leading religious-liberty advocates have been pressing in courts around the country. That broad interpretation, which played a prominent role in the recent animal-sacrifice case of Merced v. Kasson and has been further developed in the ongoing Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky litigation over emergency contraception, would go a long way to achieving a de facto reversal of Smith. But while there are credible arguments for reconsidering Smith and its “equal protection” interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, those arguments should not be advanced through the backdoor of the selective-exemption rule. That rule was adopted as part of the Smith paradigm, and it only makes sense to interpret it within that paradigm. Accordingly, this Article makes the case for a more appropriately tailored reading of the selective-exemption rule—a reading grounded in the rule’s origins as a tool to prevent intentional discrimination, and a reading that would enable the government to enforce animal welfare laws that have only an incidental effect of limiting religious animal sacrifice. | ||
| Making Decisions About Our Animals' Health Care: Does it Matter Whether We Are Owners or Guardians? | Susan J. Hankin | 2 Stan. J. Animal L. & Pol'y 1 (2009) | This Article explores whether legislating a language change from “owner” to “guardian” has any real impact on the way we make health care decisions for our animal companions. Part I of this Article addresses the arguments that have been mounted against the campaign to change pet “owners” into pet “guardians,” particularly those arguments that center around making choices regarding an animal's medical care. Part II of this Article looks at medical care decision-making in human medicine as a background for exploring these questions in veterinary medicine. Part III looks more generally at the extent to which the legal framework for clinical decision-making in human medicine can be imported into veterinary medicine and through what mechanisms. |
||
| Making the Change, One Conservative at a Time: A Review of Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy by Matthew Scully | Shennie Patel | 9 Animal L. 299 (2003) | This article provides a review of the book, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy, by Matthew Scully. | ||
| Man['s Best Friend] Does Not Live By Bread Alone: Imposing a Duty to Provide Veterinary Care | Phyllis Coleman | 12 Animal L. 13 (2005) | Although all states outlaw cruelty to companion animals, most jurisdictions only prohibit causing unnecessary suffering as well as failure to provide food, water, and shelter. They do not address whether owners must obtain veterinary care. Even the few statutes that mention such treatment do not define exactly what kind and how much is required. This article highlights the deficiencies in these laws. It argues that keeping pets creates an obligation to get them medical treatment when they are sick or injured and also explains why such a duty is necessary. In addition, it proposes uniform legislation that creates an explicit obligation to provide health care to companion animals, imposes a duty on veterinarians to report cruelty, and establishes strict penalties for violations. |