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Many invasive procedures, including surgery, are performed on horses’ tails purely for cosmetic reasons. These procedures fall into a variety of categories from the arguably unethical to the undoubtedly criminal. Although criminal laws prohibiting certain cosmetic surgeries have been in existence for approximately one hundred years, they rarely have been enforced. This article reviews the current status of both American and international “anti-cosmetic” statutes, focusing on the constitutional problems that the current American statutes raise. The article proposes a model federal statute that is constitutionally sound, addresses all forms of cosmetic tail procedures, and provides a vehicle for enforcement.

Reviewing preliminary injunction motions under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), most district courts evaluate “irreparable harm” through one of two lines of analysis. One line, promoted by property rights interest groups, reasons that individual mortalities might not constitute irreparable harm if they do not impact survival of the species. In contrast to this “species-level harm” analysis, another approach argues that “individual-level harm” suffices because it is irreparable to the animal. The recent First Circuit opinion in Animal Welfare Institute v. Martin attempts, but ultimately fails, to bridge the divide over which level of analysis to apply for irreparable harm under the ESA. Rather than pick a side about the appropriate level of animal harm analysis, this Article approaches the question of irreparable harm from a fresh angle. Drawing on procedural and remedial principles from across the ideological spectrum, this Article argues that analyzing the scope of animal harm is a false choice. Instead, courts should look to the human plaintiff to define irreparable harm: Will the defendant’s actions harm the plaintiff’s interest? Focusing on irreparable harm to the plaintiff cleans up a messy jurisprudence: it fits the plain text of the traditional injunction standard, fulfills the purpose of the ESA, and synchronizes with the standing analysis. This Article investigates the consequences of moving from an animal harm to a human harm analysis for ESA preliminary injunctions, and identifies the likely challenges for both institutional defendants and wildlife advocates.

This article will argue that the recent regulation of universities' use of Native American mascots has paved the way for criticism of universities' use of live animals as mascots. Part II will examine the federal law governing the treatment of nonhuman animals, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), and examples of cases based on the AWA. Part III will examine the state laws and provide examples of state animal anti-cruelty statutes and cases. Part IV will explain why both the AWA and the state anti-cruelty laws apply to universities. Then, Part V will argue why universities should be proactive and create guidelines and restrictions on the use of live, nonhuman animals as mascots in light of animal rights activists protesting the use of nonhuman animals for entertainment, including in circuses, shows, and movies.

This document briefly explains how one may search for electronic versions of his or her municipality's animal control ordinances over the Interent.