Results

Animals are property, not persons. And yet, at the same time, they are treated differently than other forms of property such as cars, toasters, and crops. Professor Francione discusses the legal status of animals and argues that, given the law as it now stands, before any real gains can be made in animal rights, either theory or in practice, the legal classification of animals must change from that of good to something more closely resembling personhood.

This Article presents a new paradigm, premised on the equal protection principle, for the legal regulation of human interactions with domestic animals: Equal Protection of Animals (EPA). EPA combines the insights of vulnerability theorists with the equal protection principle and capability theory to create a mechanism for recognizing the equal claims of human and nonhuman animals to protections against suffering. Under such an approach, domestic animals—like humans—have claims to food, hydration, shelter, bodily integrity (including avoiding pain), companionship, and the ability to exercise and to engage in natural behaviors of movement. Existing animal welfare and anti-cruelty laws, despite their stated purposes, fail to protect animals adequately. This Article identifies the ontology of the problem as interest-convergence, famously described by Derrick Bell in the desegregation context.

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the federal, state, and international laws that affect circus animals. It also focuses specific attention on three species (primates, elephants, and big cats) that are a special concern for circuses. The threats facing circus animals themselves and the audience members who attend circuses are outlined. Finally, several other countries' laws regarding circuses are presented as a comparison to U.S. law.

This article examines the recent policy trend that pits animal against animal. In particular, the article focuses on the argument that feral cats are a major contributing factor to the demise of many wild bird species. The authors contend that human population growth and encroachment into wildlife habitat is the root cause of species loss, and our attempt to blame an adaptive species like the cat avoids responsibility. Further, the authors suggest that animal lawyers in particular must be aware of this "diversionary tactic" and attempt to refocus the policy debate on the real causes of animal death. (Reprinted with permission.)

Part I of this Note will discuss the domestic horse slaughter industry. It will examine what types of horses are sent to slaughterhouses and by whom, as well as how slaughterhouses operate. Part II will discuss the current state of horse slaughter legislation and the legislative histories that led to the current situation. Part III will discuss the forecast for equine welfare and will explain why the closure of the U.S. equine slaughter industry is detrimental to equine welfare, and Part IV will discuss the negative economic effects that will be felt by the abolition of the domestic slaughter industry. This Note concludes by calling for the repeal of state laws criminalizing the slaughter of horses for human consumption, the reopening of equine slaughterhouses in the United States, and the rejection of the proposed Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2008.

Joan Dunayer's Speciesism appropriates and misrepresents the animal rights theory of Gary L. Francione. Dunayer's objections to Francione's highly qualified suggestion that a prohibition against confining hens to battery cages could be consistent with animal rights theory are specious. If the exploitation of non-human animals is to be completely abolished, those who bring about this result will have necessary been informed by a consistent, well-supported theoretical framework.

This law review examines the nature of the arguments between animal rights advocates and those in favor of the continued use of laboratory animals for research; the parties and their positions will be identified. Consideration will be given to (1) a brief overview of the historical and philosophical basis of the animal rights movement, (2) an examination of whether animals and their particular advocates have standing to bring suit in the courts, (3) an examination of current federal and state regulations concerning laboratory animals and the effect of these laws upon recent court decisions, and (4) a discussion of proposed changes in the law and proposed alternatives to the use of laboratory animals.