Results

This article considers the present attitude of many Chinese toward animals and how it will pose difficulties for the adoption of new Animal Welfare laws.

Trainers should be held criminally liable when racehorses break down under the New York anti-cruelty statute, Agriculture and Markets Law § 353. This section prohibits anyone from unjustifiably overdriving, torturing, injuring, or killing animals. By racing unfit horses, the trainers are not only withholding medical care, but are causing pain and further injury to the horses, which is cruel under the statute. Knowingly racing an unfit horse meets the definition of “cruelty” under § 353, and a guilty trainer should be held to account.

This article explores the constitutionalization of hunting and fishing rights and, considered within that context, the role of state constitutions. It begins by tracing hunting and fishing rights through western legal history with a special emphasis on ancient Rome, England, and the American colonies. Next, it directs attention to the existing status of hunting and fishing rights under the federal and state constitutions, including the dramatic surge in the constitutionalization of hunting and fishing rights since the mid-1990s and the reason for this surge. The article then explores the legal effect of these state constitutional hunting and fishing rights provisions and addresses the likely legal impact of Tennessee's proposed hunting and fishing rights amendment. The article concludes by considering whether this type of right is appropriate for enshrinement in a state constitution. In doing so, it explores the role of a state constitution in the modern federal system.

This Appendix accompanies the thesis from Malta entitled, "The Regulation and Protection of Animals Kept for Companionship: A Critical Analysis and Comparative Perspective."

The article discusses the history of the tuna and dolphin story, beginning with an explanation of the nets and techniques used to catch tuna, the development of laws to protect dolphins, and the dolphin-safe tuna issue.

This Introduction provides an overview of the evolution of animal law over the past twenty years, demonstrating how changes in the law, social awareness, and legal education have directly affected this field. This Introduction describes both the positive and negative changes that have taken place, from the banning of dogfighting and cockfighting by federal law and some state laws; a spread in voter-adopted legislation providing for the protection of agricultural animals; and movements to reduce the use of chimpanzees in animal research; to the limitations of the Animal Welfare Act; changes in the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) policy lifting the ban on USDA inspection of horsemeat; discrimination of certain breeds of dogs through breed-specific legislation; and the weakening of a number of federal laws providing protection to wildlife. This Introduction also provides an overview of case law, discussing attempts to achieve standing for animals and differing approaches in calculating damages for harm to pets. With respect to legal institutions, there has been an increasing presence of animal law sections within the American Bar Association and state bar associations. Animal law has also expanded within legal education. This is evidenced by the emergence of animal law conferences, publications in animal focused law reviews and textbooks, animal law courses at prestigious law schools, and full-time professors specializing in the area of animal law.

This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I will describe the problem presented by international whaling and provide a historical context of the industry, its relatively recent regulation, and specific actions concerning Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean. Parts II and III will draw on this case study to illustrate the competing models of activism--protest and interventionist--and highlight the demonstrated advantages of and drawbacks to each. Part IV will lend insight into the implications of permitting each model.

Separate from its vulnerability to criticism by those politically opposed, a call for legal rights for animals is without justification on the very two pillars on which such a claim presumes to found itself—the precepts of law and of science. The claim’s inherent weaknesses are revealed in the use of terms that are inapplicable given both the way that legal rules work as a practical matter and the current level of our scientific knowledge about animals themselves. This article confronts these two core defects of the animal rights paradigm and seeks to shed the light of law, science, and reason on what seems to be an unreasonable, nonscientific, and yet ill-critiqued phenomenon.