Results

This Note introduces a new approach for resolving the issue of inadequate compensation for pet loss by arguing for the adoption of a new classification of personal property called inimitable property. The new categorization takes into consideration the live, conscious, and unique qualities of pets that distinguish them from other sorts of inanimate property. Part II outlines the historical origins and subsequent shifts in the importance of domestic animals and their status in the law. Part III highlights the existing arguments and suggestions for change and addresses why they ultimately fail. Part IV introduces the requirements and characteristics of “inimitable property” and explains why it could work if applied to domestic pets by courts or the legislature. Finally, Section V briefly reviews and concludes the Note.

This Article presents a theory of the economic value of companion animal life. Under the existing United States torts regime, the standard damages award available to an owner for an action arising from a companion animal death is its fair market value. This approach implicitly assumes that pet owners are irrational, given that they generally invest more in their pets than the animal’s fair market value. This Article suggests that, based on an economic model that conceptualizes companion animals as an employee-investment hybrid, the value of a companion animal is higher than its fair market value. This model has implications for economic damages calculations in wrongful death lawsuits and for companion animal welfare.

Italy's State-Regions Agreement on Companion Animal Welfare and Pet Therapy introduced important new measures aimed at reducing the numbers of stray animals, such as the use of microchips for an official dog identification system and the creation of a computerised data bank. The Author, after having analyzed the legal status of animals under the current system and discussed the idea of extending legal personhood to such animals, considers the law for the current valuation of companion animals. Finally, the Author promotes the idea that there is a legal/rational basis for changing the way that companion animals should be valued by the legal system (such as Agreement) and recommends the adoption of principles/guidelines for the care of pet evaluate these aspects of the Agreement.

A discussion of the state of the Swiss law on the issue of damages for companion animals after the changes of the 2003 legislation.

This article explores the various methods courts have used to determine value when assessing damages in pet injury or death cases. In doing so, it focuses on the conflicts that exist between opinions of older courts and more modern courts in determining damages, and how these conflicts have highlighted the transition of a dog's role in society. Finally, the article discusses solutions to these problems, including exploring exemplary statutes in Illinois and Kentucky, along with other solutions that would significantly reduce the stress faced by pet owners and courts when placed in these positions.

I. Introduction

This is an overview of how the law compensates pet owners for injury or death of their companion animals caused by the wrongful conduct of another person.

The law in United States categorizes animals as personal property. As a result, recovery of damages for the loss of a companion animal is oftentimes the fair market value. This inflexible approach to companion animals fails to distinguish between personal property such as a chair and a beloved pet. Some state court decisions have authorized human guardians of companion animals to plead and recover the “unique value” of the companion animal. Such decisions reflect a shift in the court’s view of companion animals, which acknowledges public policy concerns for the guardian of the companion animal. This article discusses the law in United States concerning recovery of damages in cases involving harm to companion animals and the reasoning behind why courts should acknowledge such a recovery.